Prepared under a grant from the National Institute of Justice to the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ), grant no. 96-WT-NX-0007.  Any opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Justice or ILJ.

A Law Enforcement and Prosecution Perspective

Neal Miller

  June, 2003

The past decade has witnessed increasing legislative attention to the problem of domestic violence, which has led to new laws in every state.  Between 1997 and 2002 there were over 600 enactments, including both amendments of old laws and passage of new laws, such as the creation of a new crime of domestic violence in 38 states.[1]  Although writings on individual laws abound, systematic attention to these laws as a whole has been limited.  As a result, state legislators have had limited information about statutory experimentation in other states, a problem compounded by the near absence of Model Code-like guides for their work.[2]  This review can serve as a reference for state legislators concerned with domestic violence (including stalking), especially in defining the responsibilities of law enforcement and prosecutor agencies.  It can also serve as a source of ideas for advocates interested in promoting legislative reforms directed at reducing domestic violence.  Finally, this review can help researchers and evaluators better understand the legal context (and constraints) in which local justice agencies operate in responding to domestic violence.

Background

Until recently, legal fictions, social prejudices, and criminal justice apathy and ignorance combined to define domestic violence as a nonevent.  Society’s often tacit acceptance of domestic violence has significantly waned in the past decade, however.[3]  New laws in many states now criminalize abusive behavior that was implicitly accepted (although not necessarily approved) 15 years ago.[4]  Among the more significant advances in criminal law relating to domestic violence are (1) the adoption of antistalking laws in 50 states where there were none in 1989;[5] (2) repeal or limitation of states’ spousal exception laws in rape cases;[6] and (3) passage of new domestic violence battery laws that provide unique penalties in family-related assault and battery cases.[7]  

Other laws reform the criminal process to make arrest and prosecution of abusers easier.  For example, every state now permits warrantless arrests in misdemeanor domestic violence cases—subject to a police officer’s determination that probable cause exists to believe domestic violence occurred.[8] 

Civil protective laws to protect abused spouses and other family members have become integrated with the criminal law to augment the protections offered by the former.  In almost all states, violation of a court order of protection is a crime; in some it is a felony, in others a misdemeanor.[9]  Police officers are authorized to arrest order violators without a warrant, based on a determination of probable cause that a court order was violated.  Similarly, advances in information technology used by criminal justice agencies, such as statewide law enforcement computerized criminal record communication systems, now improve police abilities to enforce civil law injunctions.[10] 

Many states have also updated their civil protective laws that provide for court injunctions against domestic violence.  These changes include broadening the category of persons who may seek court protection to include non-married couples[11] and eliminating the need for victims to pay court fees to invoke the protection of the court.[12]

Finally, new training mandates ensure that police, prosecutors, and judges will be better informed about the societal and personal costs of domestic violence and how these criminal justice actors can best act to reduce such incidents.[13]

State Variations

Not every state has adopted every type of law cited above; nor has every state adopted the most protective law possible.[14]  Indeed, the states have adopted widely variant statutory models that in some instances reflect strong legislative intent to protect domestic violence victims; in other instances the laws perhaps reflect more compromise than fervor.  Among the key indicators of the depth of protection offered are

·        Severity of punishment for domestic violence, violation of court orders, and stalking

·        Extent to which the state criminal code provides for domestic violence-related crimes such as marital rape or terrorizing/threatening

·        Breadth and scope (e.g., mandatory versus discretionary, time limitations) of police authority to arrest domestic violence, stalking, or order-violation offenders without a warrant

·        Degree of non-arrest duties assigned to officers for purposes of providing victim assistance, such as informing of rights, transporting to medical facility or shelter, or helping with removal of personal property

·        Degree of emphasis upon training police and prosecutors on issues relating to domestic violence

·        Extent to which state law allows for an evaluation of police and prosecutor efforts through mandatory police reporting and tabulation of domestic violence incidents.

·        Restrictions on release of arrestees before court appearance.

One additional issue that must be included in any assessment of the variation among state domestic violence laws is the integration of domestic violence with states’ victim rights acts.  For example, many states’ laws provide that police officers responding to a domestic violence call must inform the “victim” of his or her rights, such as the right to a court protective order, and of available services such as shelter availability.[15]  In other states without such statutory requirements, there are broad victim rights acts that provide generally for police and prosecutor informing victim of rights.[16]  Finally, there are states where both types of laws coexist.[17] 

Legislative Review

This review grew out of a study of a larger study to examine police and prosecutor responses to domestic violence[18] for which we reviewed state laws affecting how police and prosecutors perform their duties in domestic violence cases.[19]  Special attention was paid to states’ penal and criminal procedure laws that set out agency staff duties and provide for staff training.  No systematic attempt was made, however, to examine state court decisions ruling on the constitutionality of state laws that may be subject to such challenges (e.g., stalking laws, marital exception to sex assault laws).  Thus, this review may count laws that are, in fact, inoperative in whole or part under court interpretation.[20]  The present review has followed the initial model, although support for this effort has come from a variety of federal grants and ILJ funds.

Criminal Code Provisions

The starting point for understanding police and prosecutor responses to domestic violence is determining which laws they are required to enforce.  These laws include both traditional (common law) offenses and more recent provisions that explicitly criminalize domestic violence and related offenses.  Other provisions criminalize violation of a civil order of protection issued by the court, complementing the common law offense of criminal contempt of court.[21]

Traditional Offenses  

Common law crimes that may be invoked in domestic violence incidents include homicide offenses, assault and battery, and criminal trespass.  Needless to say, every state provides criminal penalties for homicide and assault and battery.  All but a few states punish criminal trespass.[22]

State laws against rape, another common law offense, present a different picture, however.  Until recently, many states’ laws provided for a marital exemption defense to charges of rape of an offender’s spouse.[23]  Most states have now abolished the marital defense, at least in part.  However, only 11 states and the District of Columbia have totally abolished the marital defense to charges of sexual assault.[24]

State Variations. Five states have enacted special spousal sexual assault laws that have the effect of abolishing the marital exemption laws to the extent that they parallel the general sexual assault laws.[25]  Two states’ laws provide for a limited exemption where spousal complaint of rape is delayed past 30 days of the incident.[26]  Three states repeal the spousal exemption where the couple is living apart under a separation agreement.[27]  Two other states provide for a marital exemption in lesser offenses, but repeal it for forcible rape cases.[28]  In toto, 14 states provide for a partial lifting of the marital exemption.[29]

Domestic Violence Crimes

Just as some states have adopted spousal sexual assault laws as supplements to traditional rape laws, 38 states have adopted domestic battery laws that complement common law assault and battery.[30]  The primary purpose of these laws is to provide enhanced penalties, especially for repeat offenses, and to ensure equality of treatment for victims of domestic violence.[31] 

State Variations.  In 8 of these states, a single violation of the domestic violence criminal law may be a felony.[32]  In 7 states, a second domestic violence offense is treated as a felony.[33]  And in 16 states, a third domestic violence misdemeanor conviction calls for felony sentencing.[34]  Even where domestic assault is treated as a misdemeanor, the criminal codes of 9 states provide for a mandatory minimum jail sentence.[35]  Of special interest is a Wisconsin law providing for a 2-year enhancement for a repeat domestic assault occurring within 72 hours of release after arrest from a first domestic abuse incident.[36]  Finally, 9 states now provide enhanced penalties when domestic violence is committed in the presence of a minor,[37] and 2 states provide enhanced penalties for assault on a pregnant woman.[38]

State Variations.  An unusual blend of criminal procedure and civil law is the West Virginia statute requiring police investigation when a person who is the beneficiary of an order of protection is reported missing.[39]

Stalking and Related Offenses 

A common corollary of domestic violence after a court order of protection has been issued is the offense of stalking.  The new stalking laws supplement the older harassment and threatening laws that were found ineffective when dealing with less aggressive following, lurking and the like.  First enacted in 1990 by California, every state has now adopted a stalking law to deal with more sophisticated harassments and implicitly threatening behavior.[40] 

State Variations.  In 38 states, a first stalking offense may be treated as a felony;[41] in 24 of these states, stalking can also be a misdemeanor, depending on the specific conduct involved.[42]  In the other 12 states, 9 provide for felony treatment only for a second[43] and 3 states provide for felony conviction only after a third stalking offense.[44]  In the District of Columbia, a second stalking conviction calls for a maximum of 18 months jail time; a third offense, for 3 years.[45]  In no jurisdiction is stalking always a misdemeanor, even for repeat offenses.[46]

 

Exhibit 1.  Criminal Stalking Laws: Felony* or Misdemeanor Penalties

State

Felony-
1st Offense

Felony or
Misdemeanor-1st Offense

Misdemeanor-1st Offense

Felony-
2nd Offense

Felony-
3rd Offense

AL

x

 

 

 

 

AK

 

x

 

 

 

AR

x

 

 

 

 

AZ

x

 

 

 

 

CA

 

x

 

 

 

CO

x

 

 

 

 

CT

 

x

 

 

 

DE

x

 

 

 

 

DC

 

 

x

x

 

FL

 

4

 

 

 

GA

 

4

 

x

 

HI

 

 

x

x

 

ID

 

 

x

x

 

IL

x

 

 

 

 

IN

x

 

 

 

 

IA

 

x

 

 

 

KS

x

 

 

 

 

KY

 

x

 

 

 

LA

 

x

 

x

 

ME

 

 

x

 

x

MD

x

 

 

 

 

MA

x

 

 

 

 

MI

 

x

 

x

 

MN

 

x

 

 

 

MS

 

 

x

x

 

MO

 

x

 

x

 

MT

 

 

x

x

 

NE

 

 

x

x

 

NV

 

x

 

x

 

NH

 

 

x

x

 

State

Felony-
1st Offense

Felony or
Misdemeanor-1st Offense

Misdemeanor-1st Offense

Felony-
2nd Offense

Felony-
3rd Offense

NJ

 

x

 

x

 

NM

 

x

 

x

 

NY

 

x

 

 

 

NC

 

 

x

x

 

ND

 

x

 

x

 

OH

 

x

 

x

 

OK

 

x

 

x

 

OR

 

 

x

x

 

PA

 

x

 

x

 

RI

x

 

 

 

 

SC

 

x

 

x

 

SD

 

x

 

x

 

TN

 

 

x

x

 

TX

x

 

 

 

 

UT

x

 

 

 

 

VT

x

 

 

 

 

VA

 

 

x

 

x

WA

 

x

 

x

 

WV

 

 

x

 

x

WI

 

x

 

x

 

WY

 

x

 

x

 

US

x

 

 

 

 

*  As used in the Model Penal Code and federal law, “felony” here means any offense for which the authorized sentence includes a term of incarceration of at least one year and a day.


Stalking-related laws in the states include provisions barring harassment (26 states),[47] threats and intimidation (36 states and the District of Columbia),[48] telephone threats or harassment (44 states),[49] and letter threats (19 states).[50]  In most instances, these laws only provide for misdemeanor penalties, reflecting the fact that they precede the stalking laws that impose more severe penalties.  Ten states provide enhanced felony penalties for harassment or stalking of a minor.[51] 

Court Order Violation Crimes

Every state provides for a court order of protection against domestic violence.[52]  Typically, these orders enjoin any further violence and, where the parties are not residing together, further mandate that the abuser stay away from the victim. 

State Variations.  Forty-four states and the District of Columbia make violation of the court order of protection against domestic violence a separate criminal offense.[53]  In Kansas, violation of an order may be subject to a special criminal trespass law.[54]  Even in those states where there is no criminal penalty, violation of a court order of protection may be punished by a court finding of criminal contempt, which typically calls for misdemeanor-level penalties.[55]  In only 6 states can a single violation of a court protection order be treated as a felony;[56] in the remainder it is a misdemeanor.  However, in 7 states, repeat violations of a court order may constitute a felony.[57]  In addition, one state makes it a felony to violate a criminal protection order issued as part of a sentence after conviction for a domestic violence-related crime.[58]  Four other states make an assault in violation of a protective order to be a felony; violations not involving assaults are misdemeanors.[59]  A mandatory minimum sentence for repeat order violations is established in 4 states.[60]

Twenty-eight states authorize issuance of a civil protection order against stalking, regardless of whether there is any related domestic violence.[61]  Violation of an antistalking order can be a criminal offense in 25 of these states, often at a higher level than that authorized for violation of a domestic violence protective order.[62]

State Variations.  Ten of the 26 states with explicit criminal penalties for violating a stalking protective order make a first such violation a felony offense.[63]  Of the remaining 16 states, 5 provide for enhanced felony penalties for a repeat violation of a stalking protective order.[64]  Eleven states provide only misdemeanor penalties for order violations, although one of the 11 states does provide for felony penalties where there is an aggravated assault involved in the order violation.[65]

Other Related Crimes

Other related crimes in the state penal codes include tampering or intimidation of a witness (26 states)[66] and interfering with reporting of a crime (9 states).[67]  One state’s laws even include interfering with access to a medical facility or shelter and trespass at a domestic violence shelter to be crimes.[68]  Another state makes trespass on a shelter premise a misdemeanor.[69]  Two other states make it a misdemeanor to maliciously disclose the location of a domestic violence shelter.[70]  Yet another new stalking-related crime in 2 states is privacy violation.[71]

Criminal Procedure

Warrantless Arrest: Domestic Violence

One of the most important innovations in domestic violence cases has been a change in the common law rule authorizing police to make warrantless arrests in misdemeanor cases only where they actually see the crime committed.  As of 2000, [72] all states authorize warrantless arrests of domestic violence offenders based solely on a probable cause determination that an offense occurred and that the person arrested committed the offense (the common law standard used for felony cases).[73]  In 21 states and the District of Columbia, police arrest is required when the officer determines that probable cause exists.[74] 

State Variations.  Nine states place time or “noticeable injury” limits on the exercise of an officer’s discretionary power to arrest.[75]  Mandatory arrest authority is subject to some time or noticeable injury limitations in 10 states[76] and limited to felony assaults in 3 states.[77]  In 8 states, an arrest for domestic violence is the preferred action;[78] officers who fail to arrest in these states must usually explain why they did not do so in a written incident report.[79]  Two of the states whose laws provide a preference for arrest, however, place time limits on such action.[80]

State Variations.  One problem in implementing mandatory arrest policies in domestic violence cases occurs when both parties allege that the other was the aggressor, leading the police to arrest both parties, including an innocent victim who may have been acting in self-defense.  Without a law or policy limiting the officer’s duties under the mandatory arrest law in the dual arrest context, victim complaints to the police may be deterred by fear of personal arrest, contrary to the purpose of the mandatory arrest law.  Hence, many states have adopted an amendment to the mandatory arrest law authorizing the officer to arrest only the primary aggressor.[81]  A corollary amendment often provides an incentive to exercise judgment in dual arrest situations, by requiring the officer to fully explain why a dual arrest was made.[82]  Because the problem of dual arrests can be exacerbated by the court’s issuance of mutual orders of protection to both parties, many state laws contain provisions limiting the authority of the court to issue mutual orders of protection.[83]    A number of other states (and some of those with dual arrest laws) also have statutory provisions that tell police not to discourage reporting of domestic violence by threatening arrest of the person making a complaint.[84] 

State Variations.  Surprisingly, only one state mandates that a police officer seek an arrest warrant where arrest is not authorized due to expiration of a time limit after the domestic violence occurred;[85] one other state mandates seeking a warrant where an arrest could not be made for any reason.[86]  

Warrantless Arrests: Stalking

Because most states either make stalking a felony offense under all circumstances, or provide for aggravated stalking as felony offenses, the need for legislation authorizing warrantless arrests based upon probable cause for stalking is not as great as it is for domestic violence.  Nonetheless a few states have enacted warrantless arrest laws for stalking crimes.[87]  A few other states have laws authorizing probable cause-based warrantless arrests for violation of an anti-stalking protective order.[88]

Warrantless Arrests: Court Order Violations

Violation of a court order of protection is a crime in most states, and state laws in all but one state and the District of Columbia authorize warrantless arrests based on a probable cause determination that the order has been violated.[89] 

State Variations.  In 31 states, arrest for violating the court order is mandated,[90] and in one state it is preferred (mandated arrest authority may be set by local policy).[91]  In 16 states, only discretionary arrest is authorized for violating an order of protection;[92] in contrast, 6 of these 16 states establish a  preferred or mandated arrest policy in domestic violence incidents.[93] 

Centralized Order Registration Systems

A prerequisite for the police to arrest for violating a protective order is the validity of the victim’s assertion of a valid protective order.  To facilitate police determination whether a court order of protection against domestic violence is in effect, 36 states have established centralized registries for protection orders.[94]  Typically these laws require police to enter court orders into the registry within a short period after receipt of the order from the court (e.g., 24 hours).  

Incident Reports

In 35 states and the District of Columbia, police officers are required to file incident reports in domestic violence cases.[95]  These reports typically will describe what occurred and the reasons why no arrest was made or why dual arrests were made. [96] 

State Variations.  In 14 states, reports of all domestic violence incidents must be forwarded to state authorities and will usually be tabulated for inclusion in the state Uniform Crime Reports.[97]  In 2 states, copies of incident reports must be forwarded to the district attorney in cases where no arrest was made.[98] 

Citation/Bail Release

A common reform of state bail laws is to authorize police to issue citations in lieu of arrest.  This saves officer time and reserves jail resources for those cases requiring incarceration.  However, inappropriate use of citation is especially problematic in cases where there is a potential for violence, often the situation with domestic violence police calls.

State Variations.  In 14 states, the criminal procedure laws explicitly bar police officer use of a citation or appearance ticket in lieu of a formal arrest.[99]  In one other state, the officer may not issue a citation where there is a possible danger to the victim.[100]  In 4 of the states barring the use of a citation in lieu of an arrest, the arrest itself is discretionary, neither preferred nor mandated.[101]  But in one state that places no restrictions on police citation, domestic violence arrestees must be fingerprinted.[102]  In one other state, the bail schedule used by the court is increased in domestic violence cases.[103]  Maryland prohibits bail commissioners from releasing defendants charged with violation of a protective order,[104] resulting in a de facto jail-holding period.  Finally, 3 states authorize police or the magistrate to hold persons arrested for family violence for a short period before posting of bail;[105] one other state authorizes either preventive detention or electronic monitoring where danger to the victim is found;[106] and a fifth state prohibits the use of non-monetary bail at first appearance in dangerous crimes, including domestic violence and stalking.[107]

Criminal Protective Order

A number of states also authorize, or even mandate, the arraigning court to issue a criminal protective order as a condition of bail or other form of pretrial release.[108]  Violation of a criminal protective order may result in either the release order being reversed or even additional criminal charges (or both).[109]  Criminal court orders of protection may also be issued as part of the court’s sentence after conviction.[110] 

State Variations.  In 5 states, arrest is mandated for violation of a criminal no-contact order issued as part of pretrial release order.[111]  In 3 of these states, a violator of any prerelease condition is subject to mandatory arrest.[112]  In a 6th state, arrest for violation of bail conditions is discretionary.[113] 

Prosecutor Duties

Although prosecutors have not been a central focus of legislators concerned about domestic violence, state victim rights acts’ provisions relating to the prosecutors are relevant.  In many states, these laws place responsibility on prosecutors to inform crime victims of their procedural and substantive rights (e.g., to compensation);[114] and in half these states, the laws require the prosecutor to meet with the victim about their decisions to charge the defendant, accept a plea to reduced charge, or to make a sentencing recommendation to the judge after conviction.[115] 

State Variations.  Only one state explicitly places responsibility for dealing with victims on prosecutors in domestic violence cases as such.[116]  In 2 states, state law places limitations on the prosecutors’ ability to plea bargain.[117]  One other state requires local prosecutors to have written policies on domestic violence prosecution.[118]

Police and Prosecutor Training and Guidelines

Police Training

The many changes in law that have occurred in the creation of new crimes and in the enforcement of these laws underscore the need for training in domestic violence among police and prosecutors. 

State Variations (entry-level training).  State legislators have enacted laws that require police entry-level training to include domestic violence in 30 states and the District of Columbia.[119]  Related training requirements have been enacted for sex crimes in 5 states.[120]  Other related required training includes violent crime prevention and investigation,[121] violent crimes, including stalking,[122] victim rights,[123] victim needs,[124] and crisis intervention.[125]  The minimum content of the required domestic violence entry training is specified by statute in 21 states.[126]  Alaska law, for example, requires that domestic violence training include materials on state laws, crime incidence and significance, and service providers.[127]  Other topics include techniques to minimize threats to officer and victim safety, the investigation and management of domestic violence cases, report writing, shelters, and written notice of victim rights.[128] 

State Variations.  Only 7 states require in-service domestic violence police training to complement entry training requirements.[129]  Two states and the District of Columbia require in-service training where the officers had no entry training in domestic violence.[130]  One reason for this smaller number of states compared to that for entry training is the absence in many states’ laws of any reference generally to state standards for in-service training.

Police Guidelines

A training-related requirement in 18 states is for local development of written policies and procedures for the handling of domestic violence cases.[131] 

State Variations.  State legislation relating to policies and procedures includes that of 8 states where a central agency (e.g., Attorney General) is responsible for drafting minimum uniform or model standards for local agencies to use in drafting their local policies and procedures.[132]  More limited legislation is found in 3 states that require local written guidelines for verification of protective orders.[133]  One other state, conversely, requires the Attorney General to set standards for police crime victim duties.[134]

Prosecutor Training and Operations

Much less attention has been paid to the training and performance of prosecutors compared to that for law enforcement.  This is, of course, a reflection of a more general disparity, not one limited to domestic violence.

State Variations.  Only 4 states require that prosecutors be trained in the handling of domestic violence cases.[135]  Three other states’ laws authorize the availability of such training to prosecutor offices.[136]  Another 3 states’ laws provide for victim assistance training to be made available.[137] 

Miscellaneous laws relating to prosecutors include:

·        State grants for special domestic violence prosecutor units[138]

·        Written prosecution plan with vertical prosecution requirement in domestic violence cases[139]

·        Special domestic violence prosecution staff or units[140]

·        Required written policies that favor prosecution[141] 

·        Required consultation with victim prior to final plea negotiations or at opening of trial[142]

·        Bar to referral to mediation as alternative to prosecution[143]

·        Authority for prosecutors to file for civil protection order on behalf of victim[144]

·        Bar on accepting pleas to lesser charges.[145]

Multi-Agency Operations

Although encouragement of multi-agency operations is one of the implied goals of the Violence Against Women Act,[146] very little state legislation has addressed this issue.  One of the few such laws, in California, requires the development of protocols for prosecution, law enforcement, child protection, and community-based agencies for how these agencies will work together to respond to domestic violence where a child is present at the residence.[147]  A less comprehensive law is Virginia’s provision creating the position of state facilitator to help local jurisdictions implement domestic violence programs.[148]

Analysis

The major policy question requiring analysis is, How “good” are the states’ laws against domestic violence?  Answering this question requires the identification of model legislative guidelines.[149] 

Application of these guidelines allows us then to identify those states that best encompass the provisions found in the guidelines.  A more detailed look at how these guidelines can be used is then demonstrated by using the state of Pennsylvania’s laws as a case example for needed change.

Legislative Guidelines

Drawing upon existing legislation as a guide, domestic violence legislative guidelines for police and prosecutors include the following.

Substantive Criminal Law Provisions

·        Establishment of both domestic violence assault and battery crime and stalking crime that include minimum mandatory jail sentences for second and subsequent offenses.  Where the initial crime is classified as a misdemeanor, second and subsequent offenses should be classified as felony offenses.

·        Enhanced penalties for domestic violence committed within 72 hours of release after arrest for either domestic violence or violation of an order of protection

·        Felony penalties for aggravated domestic violence or stalking (weapon presence), including a mandatory minimum jail sentence

·        Elimination of any vestiges of the spousal exemption from general rape laws and enactment of special spousal rape laws that emphasize to police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors the criminal nature of such acts

·        Enactment of other laws providing for criminal law punishment of persons interfering with a victim’s filing of a police report or access to a health facility or shelter for domestic violence victims; and providing for felony penalties against any person assaulting a victim for reporting domestic violence or otherwise seeking to intimidate victims against exercising their legal rights

Criminal Procedure Provisions

·        Provision for mandatory warrantless arrest for domestic assault or battery, for violation of a court protective order, or for stalking, and a bar against officer issuance of a citation in lieu of arrest.  Discouragement of dual arrests is also included through appropriate statutory guidelines for police investigation of domestic violence complaints.  Unreasonably short time limitations upon the duration of the power to execute a warrantless arrest should also be repealed.[150]  Further, there is encouragement of police to obtain arrest warrants where an arrest is not immediately possible because suspect has left scene.[151]

·        Mandatory issuance of a criminal order of protection as a condition of bail release, with mandatory arrest and separate criminal penalties for violation of the order

·        Mandatory reporting of all domestic violence incidents by officers responding to calls for assistance; reports should include an explanation of why no arrest was made or why dual arrests were made

·        Expansion of police officer duties in responding to calls for assistance at domestic violence scenes to providing victims with written notices of their rights and available services, and the provision of other assistance such as arranging for transportation to a medical facility or shelter; related authorities include the power to seize weapons used by the abuser or which could be used unless seized

·        Specification of prosecutor duties in domestic violence cases to include typical Victim Rights Act provisions such as notification of legal rights, personal meeting with victims to explain criminal court processes, and consultation with victims at key case decision points; and authority to file for civil protection order on behalf of victim where criminal prosecution not filed

Training/Guidelines

·        Mandatory entry and in-service training for police and prosecutors on domestic violence and other topics related to dealing with victims, including intensive training for special unit officers and prosecutors

·        Requirement for both a state model and local written policies and procedures for police and prosecution to guide agency staff in the exercise of discretionary decisions to arrest or prosecute

·        Judicial training on sentencing in domestic violence cases

The several criminal code and criminal procedure laws detailed above parallel in many ways the “Criminal Penalties and Procedures” provisions of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence developed by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.[152]  The Model Code, however, is a much broader document and includes provisions not discussed here, including civil orders of protection, custody of children, and prevention efforts.  Among the more significant differences between the listing above and the provisions of the Model Code are the specification in the former of separate domestic violence crimes (the Model Code simply provides for enhanced penalties for a second domestic violence-related offense such as assault and battery[153]), explicit repeal of any spousal or marital exemption to the sexual assault laws, and requiring police to seek a warrant where immediate arrest is not possible.  Nonetheless, the Model Code is a good quick resource for those seeking additional discussion of many of the issues raised here and many others not discussed here.  Most importantly, the Model Code provides specific legislative language for implementing the recommendations made here.

Assessing State Legislation I: The National Perspective

From a criminal justice perspective,[154] the states with the best overall legislation for combating domestic violence include California, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  All of these states make domestic violence a crime (California law includes a felony domestic violence provision).[155]  California also has a separate provision for sexual assault of spouse.[156]  None of these states recognizes a spousal exemption for rape.  All three states make violation of a protective order a crime and also authorize criminal contempt proceedings for violation.[157] 

California makes stalking a felony[158] while the other two states provide felony treatment for repeat stalking.[159]  All three states provide for civil orders of protection in stalking cases, with criminal penalties for their violation.[160]  California and Wisconsin also provide separate penalties for telephone threats.[161]  Wisconsin makes harassment a Class A misdemeanor.[162] 

California provides for preferred arrests in domestic violence cases and in order violations; local policy sets standards for mandatory arrest in order violation cases.[163]  Minnesota law mandates arrest in order violation cases and authorizes discretionary arrest in domestic violence cases within 12 hours of their occurrence.[164]  Wisconsin also mandates arrest in both types of cases; however, arrest in domestic violence cases must be made within 28 days of the incident and there must be physical injury or a threat of injury.[165]  Two of the 3 states (except Wisconsin) require written incident reports by the police.[166]  The same 2 states bar the use of citations in lieu of arrest.[167]  All 3 states require written policies and procedures for the handling of domestic violence cases; [168] Minnesota law calls for state-level model policies.[169]

All three states’ laws include mandates for local prosecutors.  California funds special domestic violence units and places limits on plea-bargaining in serious cases.[170]  Minnesota requires local prosecutors to have a written plan for handling domestic violence cases; the plan must include vertical prosecution.[171]  Wisconsin requires prosecutors to have written policies to guide assistant prosecutors; the policies must favor prosecution.[172]  All three states’ laws require that entry-level police training include domestic violence.[173] 

The three states that seem to have the best criminal law provisions for combating domestic violence are not perfect.  Each state has significant weaknesses.  California, for example, lacks a police incident reporting requirement and does not mandate arrest for domestic violence.  On the other hand, its criminal code provisions establishing domestic violence as a separate crime and setting penalties for stalking are among the strongest in the nation.  Minnesota also fails to mandate arrests in domestic violence cases, but requires police incident reports; bars the use of citations instead of arrest; and requires vertical prosecution.  Wisconsin law provides for enhanced penalties for any domestic violence within 72 hours of release after arrest,[174] but state law seemingly makes no mention of any bar to the use of citations. 

In sum, even the best states’ laws have gaps.  But as a group, these states illustrate the best that state legislation currently provides.

Assessing State Legislation II: The Pennsylvania Example

The Legislative Guidelines, supra, can also be used by local policymakers as a standard for assessing the needs of their state for new legislation.  A review of the state domestic violence laws in Pennsylvania illustrates this use. 

The Legislative Guidelines are composed of two major types of laws: substantive criminal law and criminal procedure.  The analysis of Pennsylvania law follows this structure.

Substantive Criminal Law Omissions in Pennsylvania Law

The review of state domestic violence laws identified six substantive criminal law issues of concern for Pennsylvania. 

1.  Pennsylvania law does not include a separate domestic violence criminal statute (found in 38 states’ laws).  The most significant omission is that of enhanced penalties for recurring domestic violence.

2.  There is no spousal sexual assault law in Pennsylvania (found in 5 states).  However, in 1995, Pennsylvania did repeal state laws providing for a spousal exception to rape where the parties were still living together.[175]

3.  There are only limited penalties for violation of a court protective order.  Pennsylvania law provides for only criminal contempt[176] versus 6 states making order violation a separate felony offense and 7 states with felony enhancement for repeat protective order violations.

4.  There are only limited penalties for first-time stalking in Pennsylvania[177] (38 states make first-time stalking a felony or potential felony).  Nor are the penalties for threats[178] or harassment[179] very strong.

5.  There are no Pennsylvania statutory provisions to enforce victim’s right to file complaint with police (e.g., crime of interfering with 911 call) (9 states), or to seek shelter, or to protect their safety at a shelter.  State law does provide for felony punishment of efforts to intimidate or retaliate against witnesses,[180] which can be used in domestic violence cases.

6.  There is no bar in Pennsylvania to firearm possession for conviction of simple domestic violence.  State law provides for such a bar where a person is convicted of stalking or aggravated assault and where the person is subject to a protective order providing for confiscation of firearms.[181]

Criminal Procedure Code Concerns

Criminal procedure code provisions are also lacking when compared with other states, albeit not as badly.  The review of Pennsylvania state law showed the following five areas of concern.

1.  There is no Pennsylvania statutory requirement for mandatory arrest for domestic violence (found in 21 states) or even a preferred arrest policy (8 states), or for direction in dual arrest situations such as how to identify the primary aggressor where cross complaints exist.[182]  Related laws missing in Pennsylvania include a requirement to seek a warrant when an arrest could not be made at the scene and forwarding of an incident report to the district attorney where no arrest is made.  Pennsylvania law mandates arrest when there has been a violation of a court protective order.[183]  State law authorizes arrest at the officer’s discretion in domestic violence cases only where physical injury or other corroborative evidence is seen.[184]  The same law also bars the use of citation in lieu of arrest (found in 10 states).[185]  State law also requires local incident reports to be filed with the state, but conditions this on implementation of the new FBI incident-based reporting system (NIBRS).[186]  When the incident reports are filed, the State Police are to publish department-level statistical summaries of police incident reports.[187]

2.  Pennsylvania law fails to specify the officer’s non-arrest duties when responding to a domestic violence call to include assisting victim to obtain medical help, transport to shelter, remove belongings from property, etc.  Police are required, however, to provide[188] a notice of rights under the state Victims Rights Act,[189] and of rights as a domestic violence victim to a protective order and shelter availability.[190]  Police may seize weapons used in domestic violence,[191] or threatened to be used, where a protective order has been violated;[192] however, no provision is made for seizure of any other weapons seen (but not used to commit domestic violence) at the incident scene. 

3.  There is no provision in Pennsylvania for domestic violence training of prosecutors (found in 7 states).  Police statutory training requirements[193] for domestic violence do not seemingly include in-service training (9 states) and may even be limited to protection order enforcement.  The Pennsylvania Municipal Police Officers Education and Training Commission has authority, however, to issue regulations regarding in-service training that can provide an alternative source for requiring mandatory in-service training in domestic violence.[194]  State law does require local police agencies to establish written policies and procedures[195] (18 states), without, however, providing for any state oversight of these policies’ content.  There are no requirements for prosecutors to develop pro-prosecution policies that would apply to cases where the victim is a non-cooperating witness.

4.  Citation release in domestic violence cases is not permitted.[196]  Pennsylvania law authorizes issuance of a criminal protective order at bail or other form of pretrial release on a finding of threat or danger,[197] without making such an order mandatory upon a probable cause finding of domestic violence. 

5.  In at least one area, Pennsylvania law is among the nation’s leaders.  Thus, state law establishes a state registry for domestic violence orders and provides for registry of out-of-state orders for application of the Full Faith and Credit requirement.[198]  The prothonatary is responsible for notifying the state police of entry of a court order of protection within 24 hours of its entry.[199]  Registration is not required for enforcement of foreign orders.[200]

Pennsylvania Summary

In comparison with other states’ laws, Pennsylvania law lacks many statutory provisions intended to protect victims of domestic abuse.  The most obvious candidate for legislative action is mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence.  At the same time, direction should be provided for dual arrest situations to discourage officers from arresting both parties except in the rare instance when there is no primary aggressor.  In general, enforcement of court protective orders needs to be strengthened, including increased penalties.  Consideration should be given to making mandatory the issuance of criminal protective orders at release hearings, with violation of this order a separate criminal offense.  There is no necessary imperative for a new domestic violence crime, but consideration should be given to a law that provides enhanced mandatory penalties for repeat domestic violence offenses.  Stalking laws should also be upgraded to provide felony penalties for aggravated stalking and threats.  Finally, it should be noted that references in existing state law to the implementation of NIBRS in Pennsylvania are dated.  According to the Department of Justice, Pennsylvania has stopped testing of NIBRS for a variety of factors, including inadequate funding.[201]  The failure of NIBRS should not, however, result in a similar failure of required reporting by police of how they handle domestic violence incidents and calls for service.  Public accountability can only be served by such a requirement and it should be enforced.

Summary

State legislation making domestic violence a crime and providing new remedies for victims of domestic violence is largely a hodge podge of differing provisions.  From a national perspective, however, one can discern what the outlines of a comprehensive statutory approach should be; hence, a listing of model code provisions is provided infra.  A few states come close to this standard, but most do not.  It may be hoped that this simple checklist approach can provide “needs” guidance to state legislators in revamping their domestic violence laws.  The analysis of Pennsylvania law also provided infra provides a sample of how such a review might be conducted.

This review also shows how far we have come in the past few years in both understanding the seriousness of domestic violence and how we have acted on that seriousness.  At the same time it must be recognized that we have for decades had laws on the books that seemed to say that domestic violence is criminal behavior.  But we did little about it.[202]  The enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) was in many ways a signal that we are now going to enforce laws against domestic violence.  VAWA also served to encourage advocates to press for improved laws to combat domestic violence.  The separate enactment of stalking laws, beginning in 1990, provided a parallel track for legislative initiatives against domestic violence that has also proved valuable.  Not surprisingly, a review of federal funding under the STOP block grant program found that these two legislative efforts have indeed merged at the operational level in many jurisdictions, with nearly 50 agencies developing stalking projects directed at violence against women.[203]

Legislative efforts to improve the laws against domestic violence and stalking will continue.  One important unanticipated consequence of VAWA has been to help create a block of advocates for such actions that includes not only traditional advocates, but also judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers and officials who are responsible for enforcing these laws.  To the extent that there are shortcomings to these laws, this larger universe of advocates are joining together to eliminate such shortcomings.  This review of relevant legislation can be used to guide their efforts. 

 

[1]      These statistics are based upon annual reviews of state violence-against-women legislation initially conducted by the author for an evaluation of the federal block grant STOP (Services and Training for Officers and Prosecutors) program that provides funds under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 for state and local agencies to use in combating violence against women.  See note 3 infra.  These reports are available at www.ilj.org/dv/index.htm.  A summary of the first three of these reports was published in 2001 as part of the Final Report of the National Evaluation of the STOP Program, funded by the National Institute of Justice.

[2]      But see, Advisory Committee Family Violence Project, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence (1994); National Criminal Justice Association, Project To Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for the States (1993).

[3]      At the national level, enactment of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, is the most obvious symbol of the new recognition of the seriousness of domestic violence.  See also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3355 (1994) (Report 103-694).  The VAWA was reauthorized in October 2000, Pub. L. 106-386, and the new VAWA, Pub. L. 106-386, is in some ways broader than the 1994 act.  See House Conference Committee Report No. 106-891, Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (July 20, 2023).

Key provisions of VAWA include criminalizing interstate travel to commit domestic violence; establishment of a new grants program of up to $800 million over 5 years for police, prosecution, and service projects to aid victims of domestic violence; new requirements for state observation of the Full Faith and Credit clause in responding to out-of-state protective orders; a ban on firearm licensing of persons convicted of domestic violence.  Consider also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.2901 (2) (“It is the intent of the Legislature that domestic violence be treated as a criminal act rather than a private matter.”); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 5.03 (family or household relationship does not create an exception to official duties).

[4]      Compare the findings presented here with Lisa G. Lerman, Leslie Landis & Sharon Goldzweig, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, In Abuse of Women: Legislation, Reporting, and Prevention, 39-70 (Joseph J. Costa ed. 1983).

[5]      See infra, notes 40-46, and accompanying text. 

[6]      See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.

[7]      See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.

[8]      See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.  See also infra note 183 and accompanying text for an illustration of how one state statutorily operationalizes the probable cause requirement.

[9]      See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.

[10]     See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 

[11]     See, e.g., see, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 813.12 (1)(a).  Similar changes have also been adopted by the Violence Against Women Act reauthorization (supra note 3), § 1109, amending 42 U.S.C. 3996gg-2.  This, in turn, has led to additional state enactments to match the federal changes.

[12]     See e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.66.150 (d); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3104 (a).  Again federal law has led the way;  see 2000 VAWA reauthorization § 1101, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg-5 (a)(1), 3796hh (c)(4). 

[13]     See infra  notes 118-129, 134-136 and accompanying text.

[14]     An earlier and more expansive, albeit now dated, analysis of state domestic violence laws is Catherine Klein & Leslye Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801 (1993).  See also Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Recommendations, 43 J. Juv. & Fam. Crt. J. 1 (Special Issue No 4 1992); Costa, supra note 4.  Another, more recent, albeit less extensive, review is Jennifer Stojak, Domestic Violence 1 Geo. J. Gender & L. 579 (2000).

[15]     E.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.65.520.

[16]     E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4405, 4419; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-4.1-302.5.  See infra note 113 for a complete listing.

[17]     E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 741.29, 960.001.   See generally, David Ford, Ruth Reichard, Stephen Goldsmith & Mary Jane Regoli, Future Directions for Criminal Justice Policy on Domestic Violence, in  Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? , 243, 248-250 (Eva Buzawa & Carl Buzawa eds.1996). 

[18]     See supra, note 1.

[19]     The review includes all legislation enacted up to December, 2002.  Laws enacted after that date are not included herein.  This review did not examine civil laws such as those providing for protective orders (except for those laws directly relating to the operation of the criminal justice system).  See infra, note 52, for books discussing this topic.  For yet another type of civil law enactment, see Jeffrey Even, Washington’s Address Confidentiality Program: Relocation Assistance for Victims of Domestic Violence, 31 Gonzaga L. Rev. 523 (1995).  Even within the justice system context, many laws have been left out as secondary to our focus on arrest and prosecution.  See, e.g., OklA. Stat. tit. 10 § 1211 (requiring judicial training on domestic violence); Idaho Crim. Rules, Rule 33.4 (setting standards for evaluation of batterers who were found guilty); Ala. Code § 30-6-3 (prosecutor duties include certifying domestic violence facilities for state funding); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38b (a) (firearm seizure); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 634.20 (evidence law provision allowing testimony about defendant's prior domestic violence in domestic violence prosecution).

[20]     See, e.g., Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1996) (striking down state stalking law, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.071); State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998) (harassment law, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (2), (7) is constitutionally overbroad).

[21]     This discussion of criminal laws relating to domestic violence is far from complete.  See, e.g., Victor Veith, Broken Promises: A Call for Witness Tampering Sanctions in Cases of Child and Domestic Abuse, 18 Hamline L. Rev. 533 (1996).  Other relevant crime types include reckless endangerment (e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1025; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.050) or other special population offenses such as R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-14.2 (battery against child 10 years old or less) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-10.1 (assault on person 60 years or older).

[22]     National Criminal Justice Association, Project To Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for States 38 (1993) reports that 46 states had criminal trespass laws as of 1993.  A number of states have recently strengthened their criminal trespass laws.  See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 601 (felony trespass to enter onto property with intent to carry out a threat).

[23]     See generally Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption, Law & Soc. Inquiry 941 (1996); Comment, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 Cleveland State L. Rev. 351 (1995).  See also Cassandra DeLaMothe, Liberta Revisited: A Call To Repeal The Marital Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 Ford. Urban L.J. 857 (1996).

[24]     Nine states have abolished the marital exemption by statute.  These are Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-409, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-1 (a); Mich. Comp. L §§ 50.520b, .5201; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A-5; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2, -5(b); N.C. § 14-27.8; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (2); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225 (6); and Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-307.  The District of Columbia has also abolished the exemption, D.C. Code § 22-3019.  In Alabama and New York, the state courts have ruled the exemption to be unconstitutional, Merton v. State, 500 So.2d 1301 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d  152 (1984).  A number of additional states have repealed statutes that formerly provided for a marital exemption to their sexual assault laws.  See e.g., former Del. Code Ann. tit 11 § 775 (1986); N.  Compare N. Mex. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-9-10E, 30-9-11 (1984) with N. Mex. Stat Ann. §§ 30-9-10, 11 (2002).

[25]     The states with spousal sexual assault laws are Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1406.01, 1407, Cal. Penal Code § 262; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-70b, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-507 (applies only to acts where weapon was used or serious injury resulted, or where spouses are living apart and filed for divorce or separate maintenance.), and Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-61, 18.2-67.2:1.  But see Va. Code Ann. 19.2-218.2, establishing a treatment alternative to prosecution when defendant and prosecution agree to it.  In addition, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-615 conditionally establishes a spousal sexual battery crime, while also limiting the spousal exemption to rape charges to exclude cases where the parties are living apart under a formal separation agreement, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-658.  South Carolina law also provides that persons convicted of sexual assault of a spouse must register under the state's sexual offender registration law, S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430 (c) (17), (18).

[26]     See 720 ILCS 5/12-18 (c);  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-615 (spousal sexual battery). 

[27]     The states partially repealing the spousal exemption for couples living apart under a formal separation agreement are La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 14:43 (B); Md. Crim. Law § 3-318; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02(G).  See also N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00 (3), (4).  Miss. Code § 97-3-99 does not specifically specify that there must be a legal separation, merely that the couples are “living apart.”  The Mississippi law also eliminates the spousal exemption in forcible rape cases, while Miss Code § 97-3-65 (2) eliminates the spousal exemption in rape cases involving the use of drugs or liquids.

[28]     These are; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.023; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.010 et seq. (limited exemption in rape 3 cases).

[29]     (Id. Stat. §§ 18-6107, 6101 (3), (4) lift the marital exemption where there is force or threat of force, or use of drugs; threats to third parties or victim unconsciousness is not covered.  Iowa repeals the marital exemption for sexual assault in the third degree (Iowa Code Ann. § 709.4 (1)), but does not refer to marital status in defining first or second degree sexual assault, Iowa Code Ann. §§ 709.3, 709.2, and 709.1 (defining sexual abuse).  Kan. Stat. § 21-3517 maintains the marital exemption for misdemeanor sexual battery, perhaps implying a repeal for felony-level sexual assaults.  Minn. Stat. § 609.349 (marital exemption law), 609.342 (defining first degree sexual assault  ¾   not covered by prior statute) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 (1) limit the marital exemption to cases where there is mental impairment or physical barriers to giving consent, unless the parties are living separately without court filing for divorce or separation.  Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-99 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.373, like Idaho, lift the marital exemption where there is force or the threat of force; unlike Idaho there is no reference to use of drugs or alcohol to gain consent.  Okla. Stat. § 21-1111 (b) also lifts the marital exemption to cases involving force or threat of force against the victim or a third party, or where rape by instrumentation occurred.  Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.060 maintains the marital exemption for third degree rape, again suggesting its nonapplicability in more serious cases.

[30]     State domestic assault or battery laws include Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-130-132; Alaska Stat. § 12-55.135 (g), (h)(i) (minimum sentence provision for repeat offense); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-711, 13-3601 (N), 13-3601.01, 13-3601.02; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-26-303 to 306; Cal. Penal Code §§ 243 (e) (misdemeanor battery), 273.5 (felony assault), Penal Code §§ 1203.097 (sentencing), 13700 (definition); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-6-801, 16-21-103 (2)(b) (identifying domestic violence cases for case management and data collection purposes); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 3906 (sentencing provision for second offense), 10 Del. Code § 1024 (first offender diversion program); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§, 741.28 et seq. (special prosecutorial and sentencing provisions); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1 (f); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906; Idaho Code § 18-918; 720 ILCS 5/12-3, -3.2; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-42-2-1, -1.3; Iowa Code Ann. § 708.2A; Kan. Stat. ann. § 21-3412; Ky. Rev. stat. Ann. § 508.032; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.276, 276(1), (2); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.2242; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.070 (4) (penalty provision); Miss. Code § 97-3-7 (3) (simple domestic assault), (4) (aggravated domestic assault-felony); MO. Rev. Stat. §§ 565.063, .072; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.485; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3-12 to 16; N. D Cent. Code § 12.1-17-01; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.25; Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 644 (C); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.160; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-25-20 to 65; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (b); Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1042-1044; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-57.2; W. Va. Code § 48-2A-10d;; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.621; Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-2-501 (e), 7-13-1105 (c) (intensive probation of abusers authorized).  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601 (H) also requires that all offenses involving domestic violence be so identified in all court documents, including indictments.

For alternative recognition by state legislators of domestic violence as distinct crimes, see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601.01 (treatment required except where court finds prior treatment attendance failed); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-801 (1)(a) (providing required treatment attendance for offenders convicted of assault and other crimes that involved domestic violence).  Other states requiring treatment program attendance include Cal. Penal Code § 1203.097 (a)(6); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-801 (a); Del Code Ann. tit. 11 § 3906 (second conviction); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.281; GA. Code Ann. § 19-13--10; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906 (6); Iowa Code Ann. § 708.2A (a), 2 (B); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 34-A § 1214 (5); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (5) (authorizes court to order); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (4); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.485 (2); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343 (b1)(9a), 143b-394.16 (a)(8), 50B-3 (a)(12);  N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-01; Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 644;Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.540; R.I. Gen. Laws §  12-29-5 (a).  See also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-218.2 (authorizing hearing on treatment alternative to prosecution).

[31]     See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-18 (Legislative Findings for Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991), which states that “even though many of the existing criminal statutes are applicable to acts of domestic violence, previous social attitudes…[have resulted] in these acts receiving different treatment from similar crimes when they occur in a domestic context.”

[32]     Domestic violence may be a separate felony under state penal codes in Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-130, 131; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-306; Cal. Penal Code § 273.5 (a); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (2), (4) (discretionary sentence); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.070; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3-13, 14, 16; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-65 (10-year maximum misdemeanor for aggravated domestic violence); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 §§ 1043.

[33]     Laws providing felony penalties for second domestic violence offenses include Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-303; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1 (f)(2); 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2; Mich. Stat. Ann,. §§ 28.276 (4) (2 priors), 28.276.4(1) (if aggravated assault, 1 prior); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.2243; Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 644 (C); Tex. Penal Code § 22.01 (b)(2).

[34]     Felony penalties are provided for a third domestic violence conviction by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601.02 (A), (F); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906 (7); Idaho Code § 18-918 (7)(a); Iowa Code Ann. § 708.2A(4); Kan Stat. Ann. § 21-3412 (3); Miss. Code § 97-3-7 (3) (simple domestic assault); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.070 (4); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (3)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.485 (1)(c) ; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5 (c)(2);  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-40 (simple domestic violence  as a 3 year maximum misdemeanor); Tex. Penal Code § 22.01; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-57.2 (B); W.Va. Code § 61-2-28 (c); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-501 (f)(ii).  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-801 (7); Ore. Rev. Stat. §163. 160 provide felony penalties for a fourth domestic violence misdemeanor conviction.

[35]     Mandatory minimum jail sentences are provided for by Alaska Stat. § 12.55.135 (g), (h); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601.02 (B) (4 months with 2 priors), (C) (8 months with 3 priors); Fla. Rev. Stat. § 741.283 (five days for intentional harm); Haw. Rev. stat. § 709-906 (5) (increase from 2 to 30 days for second offense); Iowa Code Ann. § 708.2A (6)-(9); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3412 (2)(c) (2nd offense); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.063 (6 months); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (3)(a); R.I. Gen Laws. § 12-29-5 (2nd offense).

[36]     Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.621.

[37]     Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155 (c)(18); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.0024; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-606.4; Idaho Code § 18-918 (7)(b); Miss. Code § 97-3-7; Ohio Rev. Stat. §§ 2929.12, .01, .22; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 644; Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.160.  In addition, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1 and Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 authorize judges to consider at sentencing whether domestic violence was committed in the presence of a minor.

[38]     Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-711, 3601; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-59a, 60b, 61a.

[39]     W.Va. Code § 48-27-601.

[40]     The California stalking statute is codified at Cal. Penal Code § 646.9.  This law is unique in providing prosecutors discretion to charge identical stalking behavior as either a felony or misdemeanor (“wobbler”).  See generally, Tatia Jordan, The Efficacy of the California Stalking Law: surveying its evolution, extracting insights from domestic violence cases, 6 Hastings Women’s L.J. 363 (1995).  Note, California’s Anti-Stalking Statute: Deterrent or False Sense of Security? 24 Southwestern L. Rev. 389 (1995); Note Stalking Stuffers: A Revolutionary Law To Keep Predators Behind Bars, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1027 (1995).  A somewhat different history is found in Doris Marie Hall, Outside Looking In: Stalkers and Their Victims. 22-24 (1997) (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont California).

Most recently, there has been concern about the applicability of stalking statutes to Internet use.  While a number of states have explicitly defined stalking to include electronic stalking (e.g., California), only North Carolina has enacted a separate cyberstalking crime law, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-196.3.  States that explicitly list electronic communication as a means of stalking include Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-90; 720 ILCS 5/12-7.5; Kan Stat. Ann. § 21-3438; La R.S. 14: 40.2; 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 210-A; Miss. Code Ann.§ 97-29-45; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§  2C:33-4, 2C:1-14, 2C:12-10; N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30; OR. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.730, 166,065; S.D. Code Ann. § 22-19A-1; Tn. Code Ann. § 39-17-308 (a)(1) (threat law); Tx. Penal Code § 42.07; Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-1. 

[41]     The 14 states that have first offense stalking felony laws with no lesser penalties include Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-90, 91; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2923; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111 (4), (5); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 1312A; 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3, 7.4; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-10-5; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438; Md. Crim. Law § 3-801 et seq. (5 year misdemeanor); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265 § 43; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-2;Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07; Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1061-63.  One difficulty in comparing crime gradings is the lack of uniformity among the state stalking laws in defining stalking.  While most states require a threat to be made as an element of the crime, not all do so.  In a few states, the term stalking encompasses both types of stalking, with non-threatening stalking a misdemeanor and the same behavior with a threat to be aggravated stalking, a felony.  See, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.048; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.575; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.211.  Also compare Mich. Comp. L. § 750.411h (stalking) with § 750.411I (aggravated stalking).

[42]     The 24 states where first-offense stalking is punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor include Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270; Cal. Penal code § 646.9; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-181c, 181d, 181e; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.048; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-90, 91; Iowa Code Ann. § 708.11 (3)(c); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.130,.140, .150; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 (B)(1), (2), (3); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.643(8), (9); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (2)(a)(2); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225 (3)- (5); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.575; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-10 (c), (e); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-2; N.Y. Penal L. § 120.40-§ 120.60; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.1 (6); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.211; Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1173; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §  2709 (c)(2)(ii); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1720, 1730; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-19A-1, 2; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.110 (5); Wis. Stat. ann. § 940.32 (2); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (d), (e).

[43]     Laws authorizing felony penalties for a second misdemeanor stalking offense include Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106.4 (where stalking accompanied by order violation); Idaho Code § 18-7905 (c); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (3); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-220 (3); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.03, .04; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a (VI)(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3 (b); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (b)(2).  States that provide felony penalties for a second misdemeanor stalking conviction where felony penalties are available for the most serious stalking cases include Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii (if second violation violates court order or release conditions), Iowa, Louisiana (within 7 years), Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (citations supra notes 42, 43).

[44]     Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 17-A § 210-A (1)(C), 1252 (2)(C) (setting sentence for Class C crimes); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-60.3 (B); W.Va. Code § 61-2-9a (d).  See also Iowa Code Ann. § 708.11 (3)(a), providing for felony penalties for a third simple stalking conviction.

[45]     D.C. Code Ann. § 22-504.

[46]     See notes 41-45 supra.

[47]     Harassment laws include Ala. Code § 13A-11-8; Alaska Stat. § 11.61.120 (a)(1); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2921; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-208; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111 (1); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-182b; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 §§ 1311, 12; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106; Iowa Code Ann. § 708.7; Me Rev. stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 506-A; Md. Crim. Law § 3-803; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265 art. 43A; Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.27. 749; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.571; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §  644:4; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-4; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-2; N.Y. Penal Law § 240.25, .30; ND Cent. Code § 12.1-31-01 (1)(e), (g), (h); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709 (A); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-1700, 1710; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07; Wash. Rev. stat. Ann. § 9A.46.020; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.013.  The Missouri law cited here also includes specific reference to harassment by means of electronic communication.

[48]     State laws criminalizing threats include Ala. Code § 13A-6-23; Alaska Stat. §§ 11.56.807, 810, 11-41.530  (a)(1) (coercion); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1202; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-301; Cal. Penal Code § 422; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-3-206 (menacing), 18-9-106 (1)(b) (disorderly conduct); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-62, 181 (d); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 621; D.C. Code Ann. § 22-504 (a); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 836.05 (verbal threats), 836.10 (written threats); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-37; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-716; 720 ILCS 5/12-6; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-2-1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3419; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.050; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A §§ 209, 210; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 275 § 1 et seq.(maintaining peace); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.27;  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 574.010.1 (c); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-203; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28.311.01; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:4; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3; N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 (1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.1; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-04; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.21, .22; Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1362; Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.07; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107;  Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 §§ 1026, 1701; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.020; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 943.30. 

In many states, threats may be alternatively punished as common law assault.  See, e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701 (a)(3); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101 (a)(2). 

[49]     Telephone threat or harassment laws include Ala. Code § 13A-11-8; Alaska Stat. § 11.61.120 (a)(2)-(4); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2916; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-209; Cal. Penal Code § 653m; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111(1) (e)-(g); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-182b, 183; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 365.16; Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-21; Idaho Code § 18-6710; 720 ILCS 5/12-6; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-2-2; Iowa Code Ann. § 708.7; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4113; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.080; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:285; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 506; Md. Crim. Law § 3-805; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269 § 14A; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.808; Minn. Stat. Ann. §§  609.79, .749 (2)(a)(4), (2)(a)(5); Miss. Code § 97-29-45 (b); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.255; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-12; N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-196, 14-277.1; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2917.21, 4931.31, 4931.99 (penalty provision); Olka. Stat. tit  21 § 1172; Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.065 (1)(c),166.090; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5504;  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-430; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 49-31-31; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-308; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07; Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1027; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-427;  Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.61.230; W. Va. Code § 61-8-16; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.012; Wyo. Stat. § 6-6-103. 

[50]     Letter threat laws include Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-209 (a)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-182b, 183 (a)(2); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 836.10; 720 ILCS 5/12-6; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-2-2 (a)(2); Iowa Code Ann. § 708.7 (1)(a)(1); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.080; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.622; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-85; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.180; N.Y. Penal Code § 240.30 (1); NC Gen. Stat. §§ 14-277.1 (a)(2), 394; Okla. Stat.  tit. 21 § 1304; Ore. Rev. Stat. §  166.065 (1)(c); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-308 (a)(1); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-60; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 943.30.  See also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3889 (threat by telefacsimile); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265 § 43 (a) (e-mail or facsimile threats as element of stalking); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.643(8) (411h) (1)(e)(vi) (electronic communication as element of stalking); N.Y. Penal Code § 240.30 (1) (aggravated harassment by electronic or mechanical means); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.0125 (2)(b)(threat by e-mail or other electronic communication); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (b)(i) (electronic harassment as part of stalking).

[51]     Laws providing felony penalties for stalking a minor include Alaska Stat. § 11.41.260 (a)(3) (age 16); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-181c (a)(3) (age 16); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.048 (5) (age 16); Iowa Code Ann. § 708.11 (3)(b)(3) (age 18); La. Rev. Stat. § 14:40.2 (2)(b) (under age 18), (6)(a) (12 years or younger), ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.643(8) (411h)(2)(b) (age 18); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (3)(5) (age 18); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-3.1 (A)(4) (age 16); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.211 (B)(2)(d); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1063 (a)(4) (age 16) (make harassing or stalking a minor a felony offense).  S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-7 makes stalking a minor age 12 or younger a Class 1 misdemeanor.   See also Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145d, making it a crime to use a computer to stalk a minor.

[52]     Stojak, supra note 14 at 695, note 100, lists the statutory citations for these laws.  For information on civil protection orders, see Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement (1990); Susan Keilitz, Paula Hannaford, & Hillery Efkeman, Civil Protection Orders: The Benefits and Limitations for Victims of Domestic Violence (1991).

[53]     Laws making violation of a court order a separate criminal offense include Ala. Code §§ 30-5-9, 5a-3; Alaska Stat. § 11.56.740; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2810 (2); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-207 (b); Cal. Penal Code §§ 273.6, 273.65; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-223, 223b, 40d (persistent offender); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 1046; D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1005; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 741.31 (4), 784.047; Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-6 (b) (if protective order evicts person from household); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-11; Idaho Code § 39-6312; 725 ILCS 5/112A-23; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-46-1-15.1; Iowa Code Ann. § 236.8; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.763; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 4659 (harassment order); Md. Fam. Law Code § 4-509 (a) (subject to voter approval of related constitutional amendment); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 7; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 Subd. 14 (b)-(d); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085 (7), (8); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-626; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924 (felony if 2nd offense involving same victim); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 33.090; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:8 (III); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-30; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-6 (E); N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51 (b), (c); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-226.1, 50B-4(a); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-06; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.27; Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 60.6; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-8.1-3, 15-15-3 (d); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-50; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-13; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102 (c) (if assault, enhanced penalty); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (b); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1030; Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-253.2; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.50.110; W. Va. Code § 48-2A-10d; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 813.12 (8); Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-404.  Hawaii law, in addition to providing criminal penalties for violation of a protective order, also requires order violators to attend batterer intervention programs, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 586-11.

[54]     Ka. Stat. Ann. § 21-3721 (a)(1)(c).  See also  Conn. Gen. Laws § 53a-107 (a)(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.211; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-119.

[55]     See La. Rev. Stat. § 46:2137; Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-21; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6113.1.

[56]     Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 7 (two and one-half maximum sentence is denoted a misdemeanor under state law), ch. 265 § 43 (felony to stalk in violation of domestic violence protective order); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (14)(d)(1); N.Y. Penal Law § 215.52 (with injury); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.17 (B)(1)(b) (where there are two prior domestic violence convictions);Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1044 (with injury).  Connn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-223 provides felony penalties for violation of a restraining order issued by a sentencing court under § 53a-40e.

[57]     A second order violation is a felony under Conn. Gen. Laws § 53a-40d; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085 (7), (8); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 1030.  Three violations are required under Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-626; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5 (c)(2);Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07 (g); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.50.110 (5). 

[58]     Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-40e, -110c.

[59]     Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch 265 §§ 13A, 15A; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-13; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102 (d); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07 (g).

[60]     Mandatory minimum sentences are provided for by Ala. Code § 30-5-9 (30 days for 2nd offense, 120 days for 3rd); Cal. Penal Code § 273.6(e) (30 days minimum for second violation of protective order); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-11 (30 days); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-30 (30 days).  See also Alaska Stat. § 12-55-135 (c) (20 day minimum sentence for non-assault domestic violence in violation of a protective order); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 1271A (c) (15 days for third violation of order).  The Alabama law supra is supplemented by a provision doubling the minimum penalties for domestic violence when it is a violation of a court order, Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-130 (b), 131 (b), 132 (b)..

[61]     State laws authorizing stalking protection orders include Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1809 (harassment); Cal. Fam. Code § 6320, Civ. Proc. Code §§ 527, 527.6; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-1001; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.046; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-94; Idaho Code § 18-7905; Iowa Code Ann. § 708.12 (1) (criminal no-contact); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-31a06; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.155 (criminal order);  La. R.S. § 431.005, C.C.P. § 3603.1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 4655; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2950(1); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.020, .040, .050; Mont. Code Ann. § 40-5-220 (4); Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-311.09; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.591; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a (III-a); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31.2-01 (disorderly conduct order); Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.214; Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 60.2 (A); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 30. 866, 163.735, .738; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1750; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-19A-8; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-152.8  et seq.; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.14.040 et seq. (anti-harassment); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 813.12, .125; Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-507.  Other laws authorizing employers to obtain protection orders on behalf of their employees include Ark. Code Ann. §  11-5-15; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (b); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-26-6; Nev. Rev. Stat § 33.200 to 33.360, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-52-2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-14-1-1 et seq.

It may also be possible that where state law does not explicitly authorize anti-stalking orders of protection that the courts may entertain such a motion based upon common law principles.  This ios especially true in states authorizing civil suits for damages from stalking, see, e.g., R.I. Gen Laws § 9-1-2.1.

[62]     Among those states not explicitly authorizing criminal penalties for violation of a anti-stalking protective order are Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1809 (I) specifically references the crime of “interfering with judicial proceedings”.) and Michigan  (Mich. Comp. Laws § 600,2950a (8)(a)(i) specifically cites criminal contempt).   Related laws include Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-1k; Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 2919.27 (A)(2) (providing criminal penalties for violation of a stalking protective order issued as a condition of pretrial release); W.Va. Code § 61-2-9a (providing enhanced misdemeanor penalties for stalking in violation of a domestic violence protection order).  Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-10-5 provides that violation of a criminal order of protection against stalking constitutes the crime of stalking for which felony penalties attach.  Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.140 (1)(b)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265 § 43 make it a felony to stalk in violation of a domestic violence protection order.  R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4-3 provides criminal penalties for cyberstalking in violation of a protective order.

[63]     Felony penalties for violating a stalking court order are provided by Cal. Fam. Code § 6320, Civ. Proc. Code §§ 527, 527.6; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-91; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438 (b) (enhanced felony penalties for stalking in violation of order of protection); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.591 (5)(b)(permanent order); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.1 (6)(a)(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.17 (B)(2)(b) (with two prior order violations or stalking convictions); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732 (2)(b); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-3; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.110 (5)(b); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (e)(iv). 

[64]     Felony penalties for repeat violations of a stalking order are provided by Idaho Code § 18-7905 (c); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.1 (7), (8); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-626 (third violation is felony); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a (VI)(a) (second offense); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-60.3 (B) (third offense). 

[65]     Misdemeanor penalties for violating a stalking court order are provided by Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5 (2)(a); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.047; Iowa Code Ann. § 708.12 (4) (criminal no-contact); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 4659; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748 (6); Neb Rev. Stat. 28-311.09 (4); Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.214 (K); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 60.6;  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-2023 (B); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-19A-16; Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 813.125 (7), 947.013 (1r).  However, South Dakota law upgrades a stalking protective order violation to a felony if the violation involved an aggravated assault, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-19A-16, or if the violation of the order itself constitutes stalking, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-19A-2.  See also Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-91 (stalking in violation of order is felony); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.20 (1m)(b) (battery against person protected by protective order is felony).

[66]     Witness intimidation or threat laws include Cal. Penal Code § 136.1; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53A-151; Del. Code Ann. tit 11 § 1263, 1244 (a)(4), 3532; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§  914.22, .23; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710.1072, 1072.2 (retaliation); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3832, 3833; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 520.040, .045, .050; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:129.1; Md. Crim. Law § 9-302; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 268 § 13B; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.498; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.270; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 199.230, .240; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641.5; NM Stat. Ann. § 30-24-3; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 215.11 to .17; N.C. Gen. Stat § 14-226; Okla. Stat. tit  21 § 455; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4952; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-5; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-340; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-507; Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.72.110; Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 940.42-.45, 940.201; Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-305.  Texas law makes an actual assault upon a witness a felony-one offense, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b)(3).

[67]     See Alaska Stat. § 11.56.745; 720 ILCS 5/12-6.3; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.305; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642.10; Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.572; Wash Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.150; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.44 prohibit interfering with the report of a crime.  Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-24.3; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.78 (2) make interfering with a 911 call a crime.  S. Dak. Codified Laws Ann. § 49-31-29.2 provides misdemeanor penalties for interfering with reporting of an emergency.  In other states, obstruction of justice laws may apply to offenses involving interference with filing police complaints.  See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1)(f).  See also Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2921.31.

[68]     Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.7495.

[69]     Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-816.5.

[70]     Cal. Penal Code § 273.7; Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-23.

[71]     Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1111 (unconsented observing, filming, or recording of another person in state of undress); Idaho Code § 18-7006 (trespass of privacy).

[72]     The last state to enact a warrantless arrest law for domestic violence misdemeanor cases was Indiana, infra note 73.

[73]     For an illustrative discussion of warrantless arrest law in one state, see Comment, Batterers Beware: West Virginia Responds to Domestic Violence With the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statute, 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 181 (1994). 

The 21 state laws providing only discretionary arrest authority include Ala. Code § 15-10-3 (a)(8); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 1904; Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-20.1; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906; Idaho Code § 19-603; 725 ILSC 5/107-2; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-1-1; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.005 (2); Md. Crim Proc.§ 2-204; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.341; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.1; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-404.02 (3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173-B:9, 594:10; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-7; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401 (b), (b)(2))(d); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 40.3 (B); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711; Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 14.03 (a)(4); Vt. Rules Crim. Proc. Rule 3; W. Va. Code § 48-2A-14; Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-20-102 (a), 35-21-107 (b)(iv).

[74]     State laws establishing a mandatory arrest policy include: Alaska Stat. § 18.65.530; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601 (B); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.6; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38b (a); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1031; Iowa Code Ann. §§ 236.12 (2), Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2307 (b)(1); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-2140 (1) (aggravated or second degree battery), (2) (danger to victim exists where assault or simple battery occurred); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 19-A § 4012 (5); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (3); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.137; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-21; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10 (4)(c); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.032 (A)(1)(a); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.055 (2)(a); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-70; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 23A-3-2.1; Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.3; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.31.100 (2); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075(3).  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.1 requires arrest for a second domestic violence incident within 12 hours.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.6 is somewhat unique in explicitly stating that an officer is not required by this statute to make an arrest where there is no probable cause.

A considerable literature on mandatory arrests exists.  See, e.g., Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 10 Crim. Just. (Fall 1995 at 2); Pamela Blass Bracher, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: The City of Cincinnati’s Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 65 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 155 (1996); Marion Waless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough? 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 533 (1996); Kevin Walsh, The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, 16 Pace L. Rev. 97 (1995).

[75]     Discretionary arrest limits are established by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-113; Del. Code Ann. tit 11 § 1904; Md. Crim. Proc. § 12-204 (a)(1)(i), (ii); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.341; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594:10 (I)(b); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-11 (2) (but see 14-07.1-10(1) (setting forth presumptive arrest policy); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 40.3; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711; Wyo. Stat. § 7-20-102.

[76]     Mandatory arrest limits are established by Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601; Iowa Code Ann. §§ 236.12, 804.7 (5); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-2140 (2); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (3); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.137; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-21; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-70; Wash. Rev. code Ann. § 10.31.100 (2)(b); Wis. Stat. Ann. §  968.075 (3).  See also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.3, which authorizes officer discretion to determine whether “special circumstances” exist that dictate alternatives to arrest be used.

[77]     Mandatory arrest in felony assault cases is required by Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.032 (A)(1)(a); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.31.100 (2)(b).  Statutes such as  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-21 that mandate warrantless arrest only where injury resulted or weapon was used may, in practice, be applied only in felony-level assaults.

[78]     Preferred arrest policy laws include Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-113;Cal. Penal Code § 836; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.29 (4)(b); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 6; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.874 (1), 28.1274(3); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-6-311 (2)(a); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-10; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-619.  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.03 (B)(3)(b) provides for a preferred arrest policy when there is “reasonable grounds” to arrest; however, when there is probable cause to arrest, arrest is mandatory. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:9 is ambiguous in directing that an officer “should” arrest the primary aggressor in the context of a discretionary arrest directive for domestic violence generally.

[79]     See Lonn Lanza Kaduce, Richard G. Greenleaf & Michael Donahue, Trickle-up Report Writing: The Impact of a Proarrest Policy for Domestic Disturbances, 12 Just. Q. 525 (1995), for a discussion of changes in incident report writing accompanying adoption of a proarrest policy.

[80]     Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-113 (4 hours); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-07.1-10, 14-07.1-11 (12 hours).

[81]     State laws setting forth “dual arrest” or “primary aggressor” guidelines for police to follow in making arrests include Ala. Code § [new], Ala Acts 2000, Act 266, § 5; Alaska Stat. § 18.65.530 (b); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601 (B) (self defense is not an act of domestic violence); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.6 (2); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38b (b);  Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 741.29 (4), 901.15 (7) (public policy to discourage dual arrest), 943.171 (1) (training in dual arrests); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-20.1 (b); Iowa Code Ann. § 236.12 (3); Md. Crim. Proc. § 2-204 (b) (self defense consideration); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 6 (7) (special report required); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(3) (3)(b)(ii); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085 (3); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-6-311 (2)(b); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.137 (2); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:9; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-21 (comparison required); N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-1.1; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10 (4)(c); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-10 (2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2935.03 (B)(3)(d), 2935.032 (A)(1)(a)(ii), (b)(ii); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3 (c)(2); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-70 (D); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-3-2.2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-619 (b), (c); Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2 (3); Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-81.3 (B), 19.2-81.4 (2); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.31.100 (2)(c); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075 (3)(a)1.b.

[82]     See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.

[83]      See Mary O’Brien, Mutual Restraining Orders in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 30 Clearinghouse Rev. 231 (1996).

[84]     See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38b (b).

[85]     R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3 (b)(4). The problem of fleeing offenders is common in many jurisdictions, reaching, in our studies, as high as 40-50 percent of all domestic violence calls to the police.  Some jurisdictions we have studied make a significant effort to follow up on these cases, such as return visits to the incident address (or other locations where the suspect may be found) by patrol or special domestic violence officers.  Many others do not, however.  F.W. Dunford, System-Initiated Warrants for Suspects of Misdemeanor  Domestic Assault: A Pilot Study, 7 Justice Q 631 (1990), found that automatic issuance of arrest warrants reduced subsequent violence.

[86]     Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.03 (B)(3)(g).

[87]     See, e.g., Md. Crim. Proc. § 2-205; Va. Code § 19.2-81.3.

[88]     See, e.g., LA Rev. Stat. § 14.133.1 (general provision applicable to any order violation); N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 594.10 (I)(b), 633:3-a (III-a); Vt. Crim. Rules, Rule 3..

[89]     The District of Columbia and the state of  Indiana are the only jurisdictions without explicit statutory authority permitting police to make an arrest on the basis of a protective order violation.

[90]     Arrests without a warrant for violating a court protective order are mandated by Alaska Stat. § 18.65.530; Cal. Penal Code § 836; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5; Iowa Code Ann. § 236.11; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2307 (b)(1); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.760; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 4-509 (b) (subject to voter approval of related constitutional amendment); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 6 (7); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 Subd. 14 (e); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (3); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.1 (2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-928, 28-311.09 (9) (stalking order); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 33.070 (1); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:8 (I) (if within 12 hours); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-31; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-6 (c); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10 (4) (b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1 (b); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.310 (3)(a); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6113; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3 (b)(iv) (if within 24 hours); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-70 (B) (if physical injury); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-3-2.1 (1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-611; Tex Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 14.03 (b) (if in presence of officer, otherwise discretionary); Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.4; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.3; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.50.110 (2); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-10c (if injury); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 813.12 (7), 813.125 (6).  California law provides for preferred arrest, but requires local agencies to establish mandatory arrest policies, Cal. Penal Code §§ 836, 13701. 

[91]     Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.032 (B)(1)(a) (authorizing local agencies to adopt mandatory arrest policies in lieu of the statutory preferred arrest policy).

[92]     Discretionary arrest for violating a court order of protection is authorized by Ala Code §§ 30-5A-4, 15-10-3 (a)(7); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3602 (L); Ark. Code  § 5-53-134 (c); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 1046; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 901.15 (6), (8); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-7-2, 19-13-1 (2), 17-4-20 (a) (together authorize arrest for violating court order that involves criminal trespass); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-5 (any offense); Idaho Code § 39-6312 (2); 725 ILCS 5/112A-26; La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 213 (any offense); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.874; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-6-311 (2)(a); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-11 (1); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 60.9; Vt. Rules Crim. Proc. Rule 3;Wyo. Stat. § 7-20-102 (b).  Connecticut law is somewhat ambiguous.  But see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-1g (arraignment procedures following arrest for order violation).  The Arkansas law, supra at subsection (d), is unique in stating that reconciliation of the parties may be an affirmative defense to a charge of violation of a protective order.

[93]     Arizona and Louisiana law mandate arrest for domestic violence where injury is seen or fear of injury occurring exists.  Ohio mandates arrest where the officer has probable cause and prefers arrest where there is only a “reasonable” basis for arrest.  Michigan, Montana, and North Dakota law provide for a preferred arrest policy,  supra note 78.

[94]     State laws establishing protective order central registries (including use of the law enforcement information network for this purpose) include Alaska Stat. § 18.65.540; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3602 (L) (local registry); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-215 (a); Cal. Family Code § 6380; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.7; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38c (c); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 1046 (b); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 741.30 (7)(b), 943.05 (2)(e); Idaho Code § 39-6311 (2)(b); Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-9-5; 725 ILCS 5/112A-28, 750 ILCS 60/302; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 403.737, 403.770; 19 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 16,  632 (4-B), 25 MRSA 2803-B, ; Md. Code Ann. art. 88B § 7A; Mass, Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 5 (referring to Acts 1992, Ch. 188, establishing registry); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2950(10); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.040 (3); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-4-125, 40-15-303; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179A.350; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:4 (1-a)(VI); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:25-28 (n), 29 (c) (state police notification); N.Y. Exec. Law § 221-a; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3 (d); N.D. Cent. Code § 12-60-23; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31 (F)(2) (local registry); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.720; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6105 (E), 6109 B); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-8.1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-609; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.042 (a), Gov't Code Ann. § 411.042 (b)(5); Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-8, 53-5-209; Vt. Code Ann. tit. 15 § 1107 (b); Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-279.1 (B), 19.2-152.8 (E) (stalking orders), 19.2-387.1 (registry created); Wash Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.50.100, .160; W. Va. Code § 48-2A-12; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 813.12 (6)(c).

[95]     Police officer filing of incident reports is required by Ala. Code § 15-10-3 (c); Alaska Stat. § 18.65.530 (e) (if no arrest or dual arrest); Cal. Penal Code § 13730; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38d; D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1032;  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.29 (2); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-20.1 (a); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906 (3) (if officer believes abuse occurring); Idaho Code § 39-6316 (4) (where probable cause of crime exists, report to prosecutor); 750 ILCS 60/303; Iowa Code Ann. § 236.9 (requirement for criminal justice agency collection of statistics implies need for report); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2307 (b)(8)B, (b)(9); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.785 (to state Cabinet for Human Resources); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2141; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 4012 (1) (requirement for departmental reports to state implies officer reports); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 6 (7); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.874(3) (2), 28.1274(3) (3)(h); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.341 (Subd. 4); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-6-601 (non-arrest reasons); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.1227; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-24; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10 (5); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-12; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.032, 2935.03 (B)(3)(c) (report of why no arrest); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 40.6 (requirement for department reports to state implies officer reports); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (c) (conditioned on adoption of NIBRS); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3 (f); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-70 (F) (for dual arrest reports); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-3-21 (only if arrest made); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-619 (e); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 5.05; Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2 (5) (if no arrest or dual arrest); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.3 (c); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.99.030 (6)(b); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-9 (d); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075 (4) (if no arrest made); Wyo. Stat. § 7-20-107 (a).  See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.6 (4.5), requiring officers to include in their written or oral report of a domestic violence incident whether a child was present.

[96]     See e. g.,  Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.3 (report required for nonarrests with domestic violence and stalking calls).

[97]     State reporting of domestic violence incidents is established by Iowa Code Ann. § 236.9; Ka. Stat. Ann. § 22-2307 (b)(9); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.785 (1); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 25 § 1544; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179A.075 (6)(h); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:25-24; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.32; Okla. Stat. tit  22 § 40.6  (C); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (C); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-619 (f) (state office of courts); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 5.05; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.99.030 (12); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-9 (d); Wyo. Stat. § 7-20-107 (b).  See also Iowa Code Ann. § 692.22 (stalking) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 19 § 770 (1) (stalking and harassment cases); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.829 (stalking) (requirement expired).  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.316 (3), requires the state Department of Law Enforcement to annually publish a report based on statistics on domestic violence gathered by the new domestic violence fatality review teams established by the law.  See also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.7505 (requiring state collection of information on domestic violence incidents and offenders).

[98]     Iowa Code Ann. § 236.11 (order violation cases); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075 (4).  See also Mich. Stat. Ann. 28.874(3) (3), requiring report to district attorney within 48 hours.

[99]     Citation use is barred by Alaska Stat. § 12.25.180 (a)(5); Cal. Penal Code § 853.6 (a) (order violation cases); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-105 (1.5); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-63d (b) (where defendant is charged with domestic violence involving use or threatened use of weapon); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.2901 (3); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 236.14 (2), 708.11 (5),  805.1 (1) (stalking); Mich. Comp. L. § 764.9c (3); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.72; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-302 (1) (bail schedule use prohibited); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:9 (where defendant charged with violating protective order); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-10 (3); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1105(B); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-4 (a).  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.484 (4) prohibits bail release within 12 hours of arrest without, however, explicitly barring citation use.  Ala. Code § 15-13-190 (involving physical attack or order violation); Miss. Code § 99-5-37; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-302,  bar bail release of persons arrested for domestic violence before a judicial hearing.  The Alabama law, supra, does, however authorize bail after 12 hours without a judicial hearing.  The Montana law also applies to stalking charges.

[100]   Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-118 (b)(3)(D), (c)(2).

[101]   These states are Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania (citations supra at note 73)..

[102]   Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.1229 (2).

[103]   Ga. Code Ann. § 17-6-1 (f)(2).  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.484 (5), provides for an escalating bail schedule in domestic violence that looks at prior domestic violence convictions and past injuries.

[104]   Md. Crim. Proc. § 5-202 (e).

[105]   Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.484 (5) (6) (no less than 12 hours); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-150 (h) (hold up to 12 hours); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 17.291 (up to 48 hours).

[106]   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597:2 (III-a). 

[107]   Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.041 (3)(4).  See also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann  tit 15 § 1023 (4),  requiring bail commissioners to obtain background information in domestic violence cases.  Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 770.9a, denying post conviction bail in specified assault cases (domestic violence on pregnant woman, stalking) unless court finds “no danger.”

[108]   See, e.g., La. C.C.R.P. § 327.1 (bail condition).

[109]   Laws providing penalties for violation of a criminal court protective order includeColo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-2023 (contempt of court); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-40e, 54-1K (stalking protection order); Idaho Code § 18-920 (1); Iowa Code Ann. § 236.14 (2) (mandates 7 day minimum jail sentence served); La. Rev. Stat. § 14:79 (A)(1), (B)(1); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 321 (3), (6); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 Subd. 22; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.484 (6), (7); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4955; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-4 (a)(3); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code art. 17.292; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.99.045.  See also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 276 § 42A (authorizing imposition of such conditions as will result in no-contact, including travel restrictions), ch. 296 § 6 (authorizing issuance of no-contact order upon release from custody).  Note also that some state laws authorize issuance of a criminal order of protection at sentencing, typically as an accompaniment to probation, see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1203.097 (a)(2).

[110]   See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1203.3 (condition of probation);Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.155 (stalking protection order after conviction for stalking); La. C.C.R.P. § 871.1); W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a (j) (upon conviction for stalking).

[111]   These are Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.005 (4); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 178.484 (8), 178.4851 (6); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-13 (5); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-150 (i) (violation of release conditions); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.99.055.  See also Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 17.46 (no-contact order in criminal stalking cases).  Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (22) authorizing issuance of a no-contact order also provides for discretionary arrest for violation of this type of protective order.

[112]   Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.005 (4); Nev. Rev. Stat, § 178.4851 (6); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-7-103 (b), 40-11-150 (i).

[113]   Fla. Stat. Ann. § 901.15 (14).

[114]   State Victim Rights Act laws or their equivalent have been adopted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  See Ala. Code §§ 15-23-62, 63; ALASKA Stat. §12.61.010; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4405-4419; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-21-106 (d); Cal. Penal Code § 679.02; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-4.1-302.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 54-203 (requiring Office of Victim Services to notify victims of their rights), 54-222a (requiring police officers to notify victims of their rights); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 §§ 9405, 9410; D.C. Code § 23-1901 to 1906; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 960.001; Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-2 et seq.; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 801D-1 et seq.; Idaho Stat. § 19-5306; 725 ILCS 120/4; Ind. Code Ann. § 33-14-10-1 et seq.; Iowa Code Ann. §§ 915.10 et seq.; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-7333; Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 421.500 to .540; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:1844; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A §§ 1172, 3; Md. Const. Declaration of Rights, art. 47; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 258B; Mich Stat. Ann. § 28.1287(753) et seq.; Minn. Stat. Ann. §611A.02 et seq., 629.341; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-36-5; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 595.209.1; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-24-101 to 213; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1848; Nev. Const. Art. 1, § 8(2); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-M:8-k; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4B-44; N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-26-4; N.Y. Exec. Law § 640; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-825; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-34-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2930.01 et seq.; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 19 § 215.33; Or. Const. art. 1 § 42, Or. Rev. Stat. § 147.405 et seq.; 18 Pa. Stat. § 11.212, .213.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-3; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1530; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-28C-1 et seq.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-103; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 56.02 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 et seq.; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 5301 et seq.; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-11.01; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.69.030; W. Va. Code §§ 61-11A-1 to 6; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 950.04; Wyo. Stat. § 1-40-203.

Typical provisions include those found in Alaska Stat. § 12.61.010, which grants victims the right to be present at hearings, right to be notified of court proceeding dates and changes in schedule, right of protection against harm from cooperating with law enforcement, right to be told of compensation availability, right to medical treatment without delay, right to make a statement to court, right to information about parole or other release hearings, and right to notice of escape.

[115]   One difficulty with victim rights laws is that these laws assume that the victim desires that the offender will be prosecuted.  This is a problematic assumption in domestic violence cases.  See Cheryl Hanna, No Right To Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 Harvard L. Rev. 1850 (1996); George E. Wattendorf, Prosecution Issues in Domestic Assault Cases: Trying A Case Without Victim Cooperation, 35 N. Hamp. B.J. (June 1994 at 42).  Many states that require prosecutor-victim meetings explicitly reject any victim veto in prosecution decisions, see. eg., Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.7 (1)(e).

[116]   Alaska Stat. § 12.61.015 (a).

[117]   Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-801 (3).

[118]   Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 4012 (8).

[119]   Police entry-level training on domestic violence is required by Alaska Stat. §§ 18.65.240, 18.65.510; Cal. Penal code § 13519 ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-294g (a), 46b-38b (f); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1034; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.171; Ga. Code Ann. § 35-1-10; Idaho Code § 39-6316; 50 ILCS 705/7 (a); Iowa Code Ann. § 80B.11 (2); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.784; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6 § 116A; Mich. Stat. ann. § 4.450(9 (c), 28.1274(3); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.341 (subd. 5); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 590.105.1 (7)(8)(9); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-927; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 481.054 (1)(m), (2)(e), (stalking training), 5(b); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-20; N.Y. Exec. Law  §§ 642 (5), 214b; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 109.744, .77 (B)(3); Okla. Stat. tit. 70 § 3311 (D)(2) (family intervention training); Or. Rev. Stat. § 181.642 (2); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (a); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-6 (a); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 23-3-39.5, 42.1; Tex Occ. Code Ann. § 1701.253 (b)(1)(B)(iv); Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.3; Va. Code Ann. § 9-170(38); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.99.030 (2)-(4); W. Va. Code §§ 48-2A-9 (i), 48-2C-17; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.85  (4)(b)(1); Wyo. Stat. § 7-20-105.

[120]   Cal. Penal Code § 13516 (a), (b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-11-5 (D); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 109.71, 109.77 (B)(3), 109.73 (A)(4), (5), 109.79 (A); Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1701.253 (b)(1)(C); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.101.270. 

[121]   Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 943.171, 17 (5).

[122]   Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.8451 (1a), Nev. Rev. Stat. § 289.600.  See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.17 (5).

[123]   Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 481.054(5)(b), 481.056 (5)(b).

[124]   N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4B-47.  See also Fla. stat. ann. § 943.172 (victim assistance and rights).

[125]   Okla. Stat. tit. 70 § 3311 (D)(2). 

[126]   The amount and content of the required training varies.  Missouri, for examples, requires a ,minimum of 30 hours training on domestic violence topics, while Connecticut, only 2 hours.  Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. § 590.105(7) with Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-294g.

[127]   Alaska Stat. § 18.65.250.

[128]   See also, Cal. Penal Code § 13519(a), (b), which requires training on enforcement of criminal laws, availability of civil remedies, availability of community help, protection of victim, and techniques for minimum violence.  It also includes citizen arrest, report writing, diversion, tenancy issues, law enforcement impact on children, verification and enforcement of court orders, and citation and release policies.

[129]   In-service training of police is required by Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-294g  (a); Ga. Code Ann. § 35-1-10 (state funded training only); Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-8-2; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.784 (every 2 years); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-6 (b); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-3-39.4, 42.1 (every 4 years); Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1701.253 (b)(1)(B)(iv). Mass. Gen Laws Ann. ch. 6 § 116A (f); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 481.054 ( ) (stalking training); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 109.73 (A)(6); S. C. Code Ann. § 23-6-435; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.99.030 (3) provide for the availability of in-service training for police, but it is not statutorily required.  Cal. Penal Code § 13519 (c) encourages local agencies to provide in-service domestic violence training and makes state assistance available for such training.  Maine requires local law enforcement agencies to develop training on domestic violence for their officers, but leaves the content of such training to local discretion, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 4012 (3).  Texas Occ. Code § 1701.253 requires training on dual arrests “wherever possible.”

Related in-service training laws include Md. Ann. Code  art. 41 § 4-201 (d)(3) (sex crimes); N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:4B-47 (b), which provides for training on “crime victim need.”  N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-11-5; Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 415.034(b)(3)(B)(iv); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.101.270 offer police in-service training for handling sexual assault cases.  Alaska Stat. § 18.68.030 provides for the establishment of sex crime training without mandating attendance.

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.784 requires training on domestic violence for police dispatch personnel.

[130]   D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1034 (d); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-9 (I); Wyo. Stat  § 7-20-105 (a)(i) require in-service training for officers who did not receive entry training in domestic violence.

[131]   Laws requiring local police agencies to develop written policies and procedures include those of Cal. Penal Code §§ 13519 (c)(1), 13700 et seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38b (e); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2307; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.783; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 4012 (2), (7); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(3); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.342 Subd. 2; N. Y. Exec. Law §§ 575 (7), 840 (3)(f); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-14; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.032 (A); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (a); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3 (g); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-3-39.8; Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-12-106; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 1107 (a);Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.4; W. Va. Code § 48-2A-9 (g); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075 (3).  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.080 authorizes, but does not require, local agencies to establish procedures for dispatchers and officers to learn about prior calls.  Cal. Penal Code § 13702 requires local agencies to establish policies and standards for dispatchers in responding to calls about domestic violence and violations of orders of protection.

[132]   State model standards are provided for by Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.1701; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.783; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.342; N.Y. Exec. Law § 575 (7); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3 (g); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 56.05 (c); Va. Code Ann. § 9-170(38); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-9 (g).

[133]   Idaho Code § 39-6311 (3); N.H. Rev. stat. ann. § 173-B:8(II) (order verification procedures); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 5.05 (c), Tex. Fam. Code Ann. art. 86.001 (a) (protective order procedures).

[134]   N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4B-44.

[135]   Alaska Stat. § 18.66.310 (c); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.2901 (1) (special unit staff); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.718; N.D. Cent. Code § 12-62-05; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-3-39.6.

[136]   Ark. Code Ann. § 16-21-206 (2), (8); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38b (f); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.99.030 (3).

[137]   Fla. Stat. Ann. § 960.001 (1)(m); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4B-47 (b); N.Y. Exec. Law § 642 (5).  Cal. Penal Code § 13516 requires development of prosecutor training in sex assault crimes to include handing of victim emotional trauma.  Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.101.270 authorizes interdisciplinary training for prosecutors and police in sexual assault case handling.

[138]   Cal. Penal Code  § 273.81 et seq.

[139]   Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.0311.  See also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 4012 (8) (state and local prosecutor plans required).

[140]   Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.2901 (1).

[141]   Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.2901 (2); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075 (7).

[142]   Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1287(756) (3).  See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4419 (conference with victim at start of trial).

[143]   Iowa Code Ann. § 236.13.  In contrast, Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-113 authorizes prosecutorial diversion once after domestic violence charges have been filed.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3981 (B) requires prosecutor approval for any civil compromise to settle a misdemeanor criminal case involving domestic violence.  Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.7 (1)(f), (2) authorizes diversion after a plea only on condition of treatment attendance.

[144]   See Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 5.06.

[145]   Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.485 (5) (unless domestic violence charge not sustainable).

[146]   See 2000 VAWA Reauthorization § 1103, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg (b)(8) (“supporting formal and informal statewide, multidisciplinary efforts … to coordinate the response … to violent crime against women.”) (STOP grant program).

[147]   Cal. Penal Code sec 13732.

[148]   Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-515.1.

[149]   In the absence of any empirical data showing the relative effectiveness of differing statutory enactments or approaches, we must rely upon a informed judgment for these guidelines.  While they reflect much anecdotal reporting from police and prosecutors, they do not necessarily comport with the views of some victim advocates.  As such, others may well disagree with our assessment.

[150]   See discussion supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.

[151]   An equivalent practice in some jurisdictions in New York state is to have the suspect’s name put on the police department’s warrant information system with the information that the suspect is to be arrested based upon probable cause.  No formal warrant for arrest is sought because of state court rulings relating to right to an attorney attaching when the suspect is arrested.

[152]   Advisory Committee Family Violence Project, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence (1994).  See also National Criminal Justice Association, Project To Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for the States (1993).

[153]   Model Code § 203 (one degree above normal penalty).

[154]   This analysis does not consider differences in state civil law provisions for authorizing protective orders or for funding domestic violence victim assistance programs.

[155]   Supra note 30.

[156]   Supra note 25.

[157]   Supra note 53.

[158]   Supra notes 40, 41.

[159]   Supra note 42.

[160]   Supra notes 59, 61.

[161]   Supra note 45.

[162]   Supra note 47.

[163]   Supra note 73.

[164]   Supra notes 75, 79.

[165]   Supra notes 76, 90.

[166]   Supra note 95.

[167]   Supra note 99.

[168]   Supra note 131.

[169]   Supra note 132.

[170]   Supra note 138.

[171]   Supra note 139.

[172]   Supra note 141.

[173]   Supra note 119.

[174]   Supra note 36.

[175]   Former 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3103, repealed P.L. 985 Special Session No. 1, § 2 ((1995)

[176]   See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6114 (b).  See also, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 4954, 5 (order of protection against witness intimidation; violation is criminal contempt)

[177]   See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709.1 (misdemeanor of first degree; 2nd offense is felony of third degree)..

[178]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2706 (misdemeanor).

[179]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709 (misdemeanor of third degree).

[180]   See 18 Pa Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 4952, 4953.

[181]   See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (a), (b).

[182]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711 authorizes only probable cause-based arrests.  This is defined in the statute to require either physical injury to the victim or other corroborative evidence.

[183]   See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6113 (a).

[184]   See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711.

[185]   See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711 (c)(1).

[186]   See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (c).

[187]   23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (g).

[188]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711 (d).

[189]   71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 180-9.6 (Victim Rights Act).

[190]   23 Pa. Cons. Stat .Ann. § 6105 (b).

[191]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711 (b).

[192]   23 Pa. Cons. Start. Ann. § 6113 (b).

[193]   23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (a).

[194]   53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2164(1), 2170 (e).

[195]   23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105 (a).

[196]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711 (c)(1).

[197]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711 (c)(2)

[198]   23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6105(e), 6113 (a), 6118.

[199]   Id.

[200]   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6104 (d)(3).  See 2000 VAWA Reauthorization § 1101, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d)(2).

[201]   See Search Inc., Implementing the National Incident-Based Reporting System: A Project Status Report (1997) (only 6 percent of US population covered by NIBRS); NIBRS Staff Report 1: Report on State Incident-Based Reporting Profiles and Certified Software Applications 85-86 (1997) (Pennsylvania halted NIBRS testing before implementation).

[202]   This failure was, of course, the rationale for enactment of VAWA.  See infra, discussion at note 3.

[203]   Neal Miller, Stalking As a Focus of the STOP Program, in The Urban Institute, 2000 Report: Evaluation of the STOP Formula Grants to Combat Violence Against Women (2000).