Transforming the Law Enforcement Organization to Community Policing

Final Monograph

January 2001

By

Edward Connors
Barbara Webster

Prepared for
National Institute of Justice
Acknowledgements

We are extremely grateful for the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) staff who provided valuable oversight on this project, especially Robert Langworthy, Steven Edwards, Phyllis McDonald, and Jeffrey Ian Ross, who was the project monitor during the early stages of the project.

We also owe a debt of gratitude to the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ) staff members who devoted their time and effort to this study: Dr. Tom McEwen, Director of Research, assisted in developing and analyzing the national survey, as well as helping plan and review major interim products; Deborah Haley and Tom Lundregan assisted in conducting case studies, developing and analyzing the national survey, and contributing to early drafts of this monograph; and Joan Peterschmidt provided invaluable administrative and editorial support. In addition, Annette Sturdevant and the staff at Organizational Development Systems, Inc., assisted in developing the national survey and conducting special data collection and analysis on strategic planning.

This report was prepared by the Institute for Law and Justice under grant number 95-IJ-CX-0091 for the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The points of view or opinions stated in this report are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
In 1957, a Canadian disc jockey asked Buddy Holly in an interview how long he thought this new “rock and roll” music would last. Buddy Holly replied, “I don’t really know; but probably not more than six months at most.”

Chapter 1

Introduction

When organizational transformation succeeds, say the corporate change experts, employees feel they are working for a different company. Transformation is a radical change process, undertaken to respond to a crisis or to take advantage of a great opportunity. It has a much more profound effect than any mere improvement program on both workers and customers. Transformation begins at the top with a vision and results in lasting change in “the way things get done around here,” but only when transformation becomes everybody’s job (Deming, 1982; Pascale, 1997).

In 1997, the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ) received a research grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to study how these principles might apply in policing. This monograph, prepared by ILJ with assistance from Organizational Development Systems, Inc., examines what happens when policing organizations attempt a transformation to community policing.

Community policing as a vision has enough power to set organizational transformation in motion. It represents such a departure from the familiar, bureaucratic policing model that it has been called no less than “a renegotiation of the social contract between the police and society” (Bayley, 1994). If this is true, then the implications for the internal workings of police agencies are profound. For community policing principles like problem solving and community partnerships to materialize as organizational strategies and operational realities, a transformation is needed. The desired change—from a closed organization designed to react to crime, to one that is
open and proactive about preventing crime—may have to be accomplished through “evolution, not revolution” (Brown, 1993), but it is no less than radical.

The study discussed in this monograph began with these basic assumptions:

- Corporate transformation models have relevance for police agencies interested in transforming to community policing organizations;
- Police agencies engaged in organizational transformation to community policing are now able to give guidance to others—if not a roadmap, then at least a coherent discussion of the steps involved and the issues that must still be faced.
- The policing field is mature enough in terms of community policing implementation to learn from others’ transformation successes and mistakes. Many progressive agencies are ready to institutionalize their community policing gains.

The policing literature often discusses problems in defining community policing, frequently pointing to differences in implementation from one jurisdiction to the next. But for all its local variations, community policing today either looks like a special program (or set of programs), or it looks like a process of organizational transformation—an early stage in the process, perhaps, but with a goal to make community policing everyone’s job. More frequently, it looks like a special program, and this comes as no surprise. In the corporate arena as well, specialized improvement programs are common; transformation is rare (Pascale, 1997).

It is hard to determine the status of community policing today (Maguire, 1997; Wycoff, 1994) and even harder to guess how many agencies will stay a course that looks like organizational transformation. Most police executives today would say that their agency is engaged in community policing. It has become politically and financially correct. President Bill Clinton even touted community policing as leading to reduced crime. Since there is no universally accepted definition of community policing, a police agency could put an officer on foot patrol or a bike and say the agency is doing community policing. Few agencies, however, can claim that they have used community policing to transform their entire organization.

On this study's survey of 337 law enforcement agencies involved in community policing implementation, only about 12 percent said they had made extensive revisions to
the critical human resources areas of job descriptions, performance evaluation criteria, or promotional processes because of a shift to community policing, although another 25 percent reported making moderate changes in those areas (ILJ, 1999).

Officers in the “12 percent organizations” may feel they are working for a different organization, since the agency’s community policing vision appears directly linked to their daily work or advancement potential. Most agencies, though, have not yet reached this point. Even agencies considered among the most advanced in community policing have not yet achieved a level of “proficiency” in all dimensions considered important for department-wide change (Fleissner, 1997; Cordner, 1997). Nevertheless, they are far enough along to help advance the field by answering some critical questions:

- What does the organizational change process entail?
- Which steps or elements do police and community leaders consider essential to a transformation from a traditional law enforcement agency to a community policing organization?
- What critical issues do they face as they attempt to consolidate their gains?

To address these questions, this study of organizational transformation to community policing involved three major tasks:

- Conduct case studies in four police departments widely recognized for their progress in organizational transformation to community policing (Portland, Oregon; St. Petersburg, Florida; San Diego, California; and Tempe, Arizona);
- Survey a selected national sample of police and sheriff’s agencies that were beyond the experimental stage of community policing; and
- Search the relevant business and corporate literature for insights on community policing transformation.

**Organization of the Monograph**

Most chapters in this monograph include discussions of relevant literature, survey results, and examples from the case study sites. We have not included detailed examples from all four sites in every chapter; instead, we have selected examples to illustrate unique approaches, unusual progress, or issues of importance to other jurisdictions in the process of organizational transformation. The monograph is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: Background on Organizational Transformation and Community Policing: Models and Frameworks. This chapter reviews some of the literature relevant to organizational transformation and community policing, including corporate change models, community policing frameworks developed by others, and ILJ's framework for thinking about the steps involved in an organizational transformation to community policing.

Chapter 3: Research Approach and Methodology. This chapter reviews the research methodology for conducting four case studies in communities known for their progress in organizational transformation to community policing. It also discusses the sample and methods involved in conducting the national survey of policing agencies on their efforts to change toward community policing.

Chapter 4: Overview of Organizational Transformation at the Study Sites. This chapter provides a brief history of the transition to community policing at the project’s case study sites.

Chapter 5: Step A. Creating a Vision of Community Policing: Creating a Sense of Urgency. This chapter begins the examination of the steps involved in an organizational transformation to community policing. The chapter examines reasons why departments have changed to community policing, discussing both the sense of urgency to change and opportunities for change. It focuses on creating a vision for better policing and also discusses mission statements.

Chapter 6: Step B. Communicating and Building Support for the Vision. Leadership, one of the important opportunities for change, is also an overriding factor in all the transformation steps. In this chapter, leadership is discussed in the context of how it was demonstrated at the case study sites and its importance for communicating and building support for the community policing vision. Specific communication techniques at the case study sites are also reviewed.

Chapter 7: Step C. Developing Strategies to Achieve the Vision. The focus of this chapter is on the importance of strategic planning for a community policing transformation. The approaches to planning at the case study sites are featured, with particular emphasis on the strategic planning process in Portland, Oregon.

Chapter 8: Step D. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition: Building Consensus Toward the Vision. This chapter discusses ways to identify community concerns (surveys, beat forums, and others) as a first step in gaining community support, then emphasizes the importance of organized neighborhoods and interest groups for launching and sustaining a community policing transformation. Results from the national survey and examples from the case study sites are included.

Chapter 9: Step E. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: Overcoming Resistance to Change. This chapter addresses the need to empower employees by such actions as decentralizing decision making and encouraging risk-taking and non-traditional ideas. The discussion features details on how the four case study sites handled this.
• **Chapter 10: Step F: Planning for and Creating Small, Short-term Successes.** This chapter discusses the importance of early “wins”—particularly problem solving successes—for the transformation process, when these successes are tied to the overall community policing vision. Specific examples from the case study sites are provided.

• **Chapter 11: Step G. Implementing and Anchoring the New Approaches: Changing the Culture, Structure, and Practices of the Organization.** This chapter discusses issues of organizational culture; changes needed in all human resources policies and practices; and changes in organizational structure, deployment, and other areas important for transforming into a community policing organization. Examples from the case study sites are included, and the need for new ways of measuring success is discussed.

• **Chapter 12: Trio of Sine Quo Nons: Overriding Factors Indispensable to Transforming the Organization.** This chapter first discusses the importance to the transformation of leadership, with a focus on leadership at the CEO level and the challenges police CEOs face compared to those faced by their counterparts in the corporate world. In addition to leadership, overriding factors are use of technology to support community policing and additional resources, and these factors are also discussed in Chapter 12.
Chapter 2

Background on Organizational Transformation and Community Policing: Models and Frameworks

The literature on corporate organizational transformation has been criticized as too theoretical, too promotional, or too reliant on case examples with which very few organizations can identify (Pascale, 1997). The same can be said about the literature on organizational change in policing. As Greene, Bergman, and McLaughlin (1994) point out, the “organizational medium through which this ‘new wave’ [community] policing is to take shape is essentially under-studied.” Yet this lack of analysis has not stopped the community policing movement from taking hold. Whatever it may look like in practice from place to place, community policing has moved forward over the past 15 years. Viewed with a skeptical eye at first as “just another program,” it is becoming for many police agencies and communities an organizational strategy, but one that is still evolving (Greene, 2000; Community Policing Consortium, 1994; Greene et al., 1994; Weisel and Eck, 1994). As discussed below, researchers are just beginning to explore how such concepts as total quality management might apply to policing, as well as the relevance of corporate transformation to organizational transformation in policing. It may be that there are “essential steps” involved in any successful transformation from a traditional law enforcement agency to a community policing organization (Wycoff and Skogan, 1994; Greene et al., 1994), but exploration of this possibility is still in its infancy.

Community Policing and Total Quality Management

Hoover (1996) is one of the few criminal justice researchers who has written on the difficulties facing police and other service agencies that attempt to follow the same total quality management (TQM) principles advocated for private corporations. But at its most ambitious, community policing has much in common with TQM that has not been fully explored. TQM is a system of organizational development for achieving customer satisfaction by delivering services and products that work. Extensive training, statistical
methods, employee teams, and performance management are among its key precepts; but the term TQM (like community policing) has been so widely used that there are almost as many different TQM programs as there are companies that have started them. It may be that there are no bad forms of TQM (or community policing), but rather incomplete forms that fail to produce substantial improvements (Martensen, 1994).

Successful TQM and community policing efforts require major changes in organizational cultures. Some researchers and practitioners have cautioned that community policing will not take hold in organizations whose bureaucracies and management styles were designed for reactive, call-driven policing models (Brown, 1989; Sparrow, 1988; Moore, 1991). Similarly, too many TQM efforts have been superimposed on traditional organizational structures. A successful TQM transformation must meet four criteria. First, it must be based on a quality mindset and quality orientation in all activities at all times. Second, it must be strongly humanistic to bring quality to the way employees are treated, included, and inspired. Third, it must be based on a decentralized approach that provides empowerment at all levels. Fourth, TQM must be applied holistically so that its principles, policies, and practices reach everyone, every function, and every unit (Creech, 1994). These criteria are also germane to a successful transformation to community policing.

**Process of Organizational Transformation**

The contemporary discipline of organizational change draws on the seminal work of Kurt Lewin (1950), who saw change as an orderly process with three stages: unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. The first stage involves creating motivation for change by examining how the organization currently accomplishes its mission. The second stage stresses learning new information and analyzing alternative models and perspectives. The third stage consists of integrating new behaviors, attitudes, and practices. Because Lewin put people at the core of the change process, he emphasized the importance of managing resistance to change effectively.

In the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift with respect to theories about organizational change in general. Previously, change was seen as an incremental process.
Today, it is more often viewed as a radical process (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Pascale, 1997), a sequential process (Leifer, 1989), or a “tectonic” or mid-range process that is neither too drastic nor too subtle (Leger, et al., 1994). Analysts and researchers who have expanded upon Lewin’s observations have developed many organizational transformation models that differ from earlier transition models.

Although the transformation models view the change process from different perspectives, they share a common theme: change is an orderly process that must be planned and managed. Furthermore, they all agree that the environment has a profound impact on organizations. Leifer argues that change is induced when a new perception of environmental uncertainty and ambiguity forces the organization to adapt. Romanelli and Tushman state that organizational transformation is stimulated by major environmental changes as well as crises in performance or the naming of a new CEO. Similarly, Morton (1991) points to the turbulent business environment as a major factor in organizational transformation. These perspectives emphasize the tremendous influence external culture has on organizations.

Unlike transitional change, in which organizations may merely realign roles and functions, transformational change requires a complete restructuring of philosophy, values, perceptions, underlying assumptions, and operating procedures (Buckley and Perkins, 1984). To transform a police organization to community policing is to change its very culture and institutional practices.

Organizational Transformation Models

Many researchers have identified various elements necessary for successfully implementing organizational change and adapting to a rapidly changing environment. Although transformation models may have common building blocks, they exhibit subtle differences that make them more applicable to some environments than to others. For example, Morton (1991) emphasizes information technology as the impetus for change. He describes the need to manage organizational transformation through five phases, taking into account five organizational forces: people issues (training and education to take on expanded roles); management processes (redistribution of power and control);
structures (organizational restructuring); strategy; and technology. Romanelli and Tushman (1994) use five domains to measure organizational activity: (1) organizational culture; (2) strategy; (3) structure (e.g., centralized v. decentralized); (4) power distribution; and (5) control systems. Leifer (1986) explains organizational transformation in terms of (1) developing a vision of the organization’s future and the desire to reach it; (2) building consensus among participants about the organization's mission and goals; and (3) deciding to apply resources to the problem. Sturdivant’s (1980) Five Factor Organizational Analysis Model delineates as particularly important the following areas: mission; structure; resources; power; and culture (both external and internal).

Kotter (1995, 1996) breaks down the organizational transformation process into considerable detail, making it particularly useful for exploring which of eight distinct steps appear to be common and significant in community policing. These steps involve

1. Motivating people by establishing a great sense of urgency (because of crises or potential crises, or because of timely opportunities);
2. Creating a powerful guiding coalition and team building;
3. Creating a vision and developing strategies for achieving it;
4. Communicating the vision by every possible means;
5. Enabling others to act on the vision by removing barriers (i.e., changing systems and structures that undermine the vision);
6. Planning short-term wins that demonstrate results within a year or two, and rewarding improvements;
7. Consolidating improvements (a process that may take five to ten years); and
8. Institutionalizing the new approaches.

Organizational Transformation to Community Policing

Policing as an institution has gone through several major transformations in the past to reach this new emphasis on community policing (Reiss, 1992; Goldstein, 1990; Sparrow, 1988; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Langworthy and Travis, 1994). In fact, most police agencies are still heavily invested in the “professional model” of policing and can be expected to have difficulty creating a more open organizational environment.
conducive to community policing strategies. (Wilkenson and Rosenbaum, 1994; Bayley, 1994).

The community policing movement in the United States is often said to be based on a realization that crime-related problems cannot be addressed by the criminal justice system alone. By the mid-1970s, research had shown that rapid mobile response was only rarely useful in catching criminals and solving crimes (Kelling, Pate, et al., 1974), yet officers had neither time nor encouragement to consider the underlying problems that contribute to crime and disorder (Goldstein, 1979; Eck and Spelman, 1987). Changes in population demographics, increasing violence, economic decline in the nation’s inner cities, and many other factors are also believed to have perpetuated the community policing model (Community Policing Consortium, 1994).

In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of police agencies participated in experiments that paved the way for current conceptualizations of community policing. Most of those experiments were developed as special programs within traditional departments (Brown, 1989; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Goldstein, 1990; Koller, 1990; Pate, et al., 1986; Farrell, 1988; Hayeslip and Cordner, 1987). Newport News, Virginia, which attempted department-wide problem solving, was a notable exception (Eck and Spelman, 1987).

Yet even with programmatic implementation the norm, care was taken to emphasize community policing as a philosophy rather than a special program: community policing should not be a community relations unit (Trojanowicz, 1990), a public relations campaign (Ross, 1995), or a team policing squad. In fact, many practitioners have urged community policing advocates to “remember team policing,” which is said to have failed in part because it never overcame its special program status (Wilkenson and Rosenbaum, 1994; Sherman, et al., 1973).

Community Policing Frameworks

In the 1990s, several consortia of police research and membership organizations developed conceptual frameworks for community policing and are still attempting to
define its parameters. In 1994, the Community Policing Consortium emphasized community engagement and problem solving as the two central elements (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). Similarly, the Portland, Oregon, Police Bureau (1990) identified “problem solving, partnership, accountability, empowerment, and service orientation” as key components. At the same time, police agencies must retain their emergency response, investigative, and enforcement functions, although the emphasis on these may change over time. Thus community policing represents a broadening of police functions (Cordner, 1997; Kelling and Moore, 1992; Kennedy, 1993) and a rethinking of priorities. The most recent community policing definition by the COPS Office emphasizes a four-tiered approach: arrest offenders, prevent crime, solve ongoing problems, and improve the overall quality of life.¹

Cordner (1996) wrote about principles and elements of community policing under four dimensions: philosophical, strategic, tactical, and organizational. The organizational dimension included

- Organizational culture and values: mission, strategic planning, empowerment, and other factors.
- Organizational restructuring: decentralization, flattening ranks, de-specialization, teams, and civilianization.
- Emphasis on quality in performance appraisal, training, program evaluation, and other factors.

The organizational development of community policing was also described by Fleissner (1997) in his community policing developmental stage model. He identified four stages that organizations go through in implementing community policing:

1. **Awareness**, where initial ideas are generated based on an interest in community policing and information from other police agencies, news articles, conferences, and more;

2. **Experimental**, in which departments identify potential applications of community policing, acquire more specific information on programs, and plan pilot efforts;

---

¹ Director’s Notes, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 1999.
(3) Commitment, which involves reviewing the results of pilot efforts, forming partnerships with other agencies, engaging the community, committing additional resources, and providing comprehensive training for all members of department; and

(4) Institutional, where community policing becomes ingrained in police agency operations, and where all city departments coordinate services.

Fleissner's work did not identify any police departments that had passed stage three.

**ILJ Organizational Transformation Framework**

ILJ reviewed numerous organizational transformation models from the corporate business world and discovered some key factors, or essential steps, that were common to all transformations. Guided by these models, ILJ then examined whether or not (and to what extent) each step was found in the community policing case study communities and was represented in the survey responses.

The model selected as most applicable to the community policing transformation process was Kotter's model, discussed previously (Kotter, 1996). ILJ used Kotter and others to develop the community policing transformation framework that follows (Exhibit 1). This framework was developed in the later, analytical phase of our study. However, it is presented here, as its themes are reflected in the way we have organized this monograph.

As Exhibit 1 suggests, organizational transformation to community policing can be viewed as occurring in two stages. The first stage of planning and development involves four steps that focus on creating, communicating, planning for, and building support for the community policing vision. The second stage involves implementing and then anchoring new community policing approaches. This stage also requires taking deliberate steps to empower others to act on the vision; plan for and reward short-term successes; and institutionalize the new approaches through specific changes in policies, management practices, deployment patterns, and the organizational structure.
Exhibit 1

Framework for an Organizational Transformation to Community Policing

Stage One: Planning and Developing the New Approaches

Step A. Creating a Vision for Community Policing (and Mission Statement)
- Opportunity is often based on a triggering event, e.g., crime incidents, COPS funding, new chief or mayor/city manager, etc.

Step B. Communicating the Vision (internally and externally)
- Requires leadership and communication skills

Step C. Developing Strategies to Achieve the Vision
- Developing a strategic plan

Step D. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition (inside and outside the organization)
- Building consensus with mayor/council; media; community; and employees, especially the union

Stage Two: Implementing and Anchoring the New Approaches

Step E. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision
- Identifying and reducing obstacles
- Encouraging risk-taking and non-traditional ideas and actions
- Team building—developing change agents
- Decentralizing decision making

Step F. Planning for and Creating Small, Short-term Wins
- Generating visible improvements—problem solving successes (articulating the connection between changes and new approaches.
- Rewarding employees for improvements
- Achieving community awareness, participation, and support

Step G. Institutionalizing the New Approaches
- Changing management practices, systems, policies, and procedures (e.g., budget anchored to support the vision of community policing)
- Requiring restructured geographic deployment/permanent beat assignments
- Changing the organization structure—flattening ranks
- Changing human resources practices and procedures—hiring, training, promoting people who can execute new approaches (share the vision of community policing)
Trio of *Sine Qua Nons*

These overarching factors are indispensable to the transformation.

**Factor 1. Importance of Leadership**
- Developing new leaders; ensuring succession of the vision

**Factor 2. Using Information Technology**
- Using information for decision making, feedback on approaches, and planning is critical to all the above steps; sharing information is essential
- Improving communication between officers and citizens—cell phones, pagers, laptops, voice mail, email, etc.

**Factor 3. Adding Resources**
- Freeing up officer time—improving efficiency of service delivery or adding more officers or alternatives (telephone reporting, Internet reporting, community service officers)

Chapters 5 through 12 elaborate on each of the steps, the key considerations associated with them, and the ways in which they were evidenced at the case study and survey sites. Finally, the framework proposes three *sine qua nons*—factors without which an organizational transformation to community policing cannot take place. These three factors—leadership (particularly at the CEO level), technology, and additional resources—are discussed in detail in the final chapter (Chapter 12).
Chapter 3

Research Approach and Methodology

The overall purpose of this study was to better understand the critical elements of a successful organizational transformation to community policing. The study team conducted a literature review, case studies, and a national survey to address key research questions such as:

- To what extent is organizational transformation, within the context of community policing, consistent or inconsistent with organizational development practices in other types of organizations?
- How do police agencies’ unique external environments and internal cultures affect their organizational transformation efforts?
- Which steps in the organizational transformation process contribute most to successful department-wide implementation of community policing (e.g., building coalitions, decentralizing decision making, strategic planning, etc.)?
- What role does leadership play in supporting the transformation to community policing?
- To what extent does information technology play a role in organizational transformation to community policing?

As noted in Chapter 2, ILJ’s review of corporate organizational transformation models, as well as the literature on police and organizational change, laid the groundwork for identifying key factors, or essential steps, that were common to all transformations. ILJ then examined the extent to which each step was found in the community policing case study communities and represented in the survey responses. The next sections discuss the case study and survey methods used in the study.

Case Studies

The purposes of the case studies were to better understand the transformation process to community policing and to test the hypothesis that a set of essential steps are
involved in any successful transformation from a traditional policing agency to a community policing organization.

The qualitative case study approach provided: (1) rich, in-depth data regarding organizational behavior, beliefs, and definitions of key community policing concepts and transformation steps; (2) unique characteristics of each site and transformation processes; (3) the effects of the transformation on the organizational culture at various levels of the organization, on other city agencies, and on the community; (4) information on the key stakeholders and leaders within and outside each police department who provided critical support for the transformation; and (5) common data on “best practices.”

The cities of San Diego, California; Portland, Oregon; St. Petersburg, Florida; and Tempe, Arizona, are considered leaders in community policing. Each offered a unique look at the processes that can transform an organization from a traditional policing agency to one that is community-oriented, with an emphasis on partnerships and problem solving.

The researchers used a “best practices” approach to select the sites by reviewing the literature; consulting with informed experts at NIJ and the research field; and drawing on our experiences with these and many other policing agencies in the past. The sites represent considerable diversity in terms of geographic area, economic and social conditions, union vs. non-union, and other differences. However, they are similar in terms of active involvement in organizational transformation for at least five years, history of cooperation and openness in prior NIJ and other research projects, demonstrated commitment to documenting the community policing process, understanding and acceptance of the study’s components, and public recognition for progress in organizational transformation to community policing.

Case Study Methodology

Each case study site was visited at least seven times by researcher teams (often two to three staff on each visit). The project director, who spent considerable time at each site, had extensive practical police experience, having conducted over 55 comprehensive police organization and management studies. The specific data collection
methods used during the case study visits included: observations of community policing activities (ride-alongs with patrol, community meetings); personal interviews at all levels of the police organization and with key leaders in city government and the community; focus group interviews with selected groups of police personnel (e.g., patrol officers, supervisors, commanders, civilians) and community members; and collection and review of documentation, reports, and data that indicated changes in levels or types of calls for service, reported crime, complaints, operating policies, etc. This helped us determine whether and how the mission was revised for community policing, a strategic plan was developed, policies and procedures were modified, changes in the organizational structure were made, hiring guidelines and interview questions were developed, personnel review and reward systems were modified, training curricula were developed, etc. Archival documents from when the agency practiced traditional policing were compared with documents that evolved during the transition, as well as recent documents reflecting the current state of community policing implementation.

The chief executives in each of the case study agencies were interviewed multiple times during the study. The total interview time averaged about six hours. These interviews focused primarily on identifying the essential steps for organizational transformation to community policing and discussing the relative importance of those steps in their agencies’ change process.

It is worth noting that all four chiefs of the case study departments have moved on to other positions. In St. Petersburg, Chief Darrell Stephens resigned in July 1997 to become assistant to the mayor of St. Petersburg. ILJ interviewed not only Chief Stephens but also his replacement, Goliath Davis, for this study. Chief Jerry Sanders resigned from the San Diego Police Department in April 1999. Chief Charles Moose left the Portland, Oregon Police Bureau in 1999 to become Chief of Police in Montgomery County, Maryland. Chief Ron Burns left the Tempe, Arizona, Police Department in January 2000.
Case Study Protocol

The study team developed a protocol and structured questionnaires for conducting personal interviews and holding focus groups. The instruments were informed by the selected organizational transformation models and involved a set of open-ended questions. These included a core set of questions relevant to all sites (e.g., define community participation), and customized questions relevant to particular sites.

Focus Groups

A variety of focus groups were conducted at each site. Since community policing is a combined effort of law enforcement and the community, these groups were most often multi-disciplinary and included representatives from influential community groups, command staff, supervisors, and police officers. Approximately 75 persons per site participated in an average of seven to ten focus groups per site. The focus groups were particularly useful in collecting information on the changing nature of the police culture. They also enabled us to test the clarity of the community policing vision and agreement on the definition of community policing.

Observation

Researchers conducting the site visits observed community policing first hand through ride-alongs, community meetings, staff meetings, and other forums. The researchers looked for community-oriented and problem-solving practices, community acceptance of and involvement in the community policing structure and processes, and police officer behaviors including decision making, application of analytical and problem solving skills, and reporting procedures.

Analysis of Case Study Data

The recorded answers to the interview questions, researchers’ notes, and focus groups were processed and analyzed by using the QSR NUD*IST program. QSR NUD*IST is a qualitative data analysis software and stands for Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorizing. It allows users to store data, index, search text, and explore ideas about the data.
Categories for indexing information were created based on the variables explored in the interviews and focus groups. For example, there were categories on management/administration, field operations, human resources, and external relations. Data were coded into these categories, resulting in an index system from which data could be retrieved on a variety of topics by asking questions about index references.

Narrative responses were content analyzed to identify common response patterns. The researchers carefully compared the case study results with selected organizational change models that define key transformation elements and steps. The information collected from the case studies helped in constructing the national survey.

**Overview of Case Study Sites**

The project team selected four agencies that were recognized by many experienced practitioners, police professional associations, and researchers to be among the leaders in organizational transformation to community policing. Each site had at least five years experience with community policing transformation, and each had sustained the effort throughout the tenure of several CEOs. Other factors considered were the availability of past and current CEOs to candidly discuss the change, the departments’ commitment to documenting the community policing process, and the availability of other data. We wanted some diversity in terms of geographic area, economic and social conditions, agency size, and other differences. The sites selected were Portland, Oregon; St. Petersburg, Florida; Tempe, Arizona; and San Diego, California. Exhibit 2 below compares the study sites in terms of population, size, and police workforce.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Square Mi.</th>
<th>Sworn</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tempe</td>
<td>142,139</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>235,306</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>445,458</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>1,148,851</td>
<td>324.0</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Agency size ranged from 431 employees in Tempe to 2,500 in San Diego. Sworn officers represented 64 percent of the agency workforce in Tempe, 68 percent in St. Petersburg, and 74 percent in San Diego. In Portland, the only site with a strong police union, sworn officers represented 83.5 percent of the Portland Police Bureau’s workforce. Portland and St. Petersburg currently have a strong mayor form of local government, while Tempe and San Diego have the council/manager form.

National Survey

To provide a better context for interpreting the case studies, we conducted a national survey to learn more about the status of community policing in other agencies; the factors those agencies considered essential to organizational change; barriers to the transformation process and how they were being handled; and the perceived benefits of the change to community policing.

The sampling frame for the organizational transformation survey came from a question on the extent of community policing implementation that appeared in an earlier ILJ survey on community policing training (McEwen and Pandey, 1997). The earlier training survey respondents were 575 law enforcement executives in jurisdictions with more than 50,000 residents. Of the 575 respondents, 449 indicated they had implemented community policing either in selected neighborhoods or throughout the jurisdiction. (Most of the others were in an early planning or orientation phase but had not begun implementation). These 449 constituted the sampling frame for the current study's organizational transformation survey. That is, we selected those agencies that we believed were more likely to have had experience with issues related to organizational transformation. Of the 449 surveys mailed, 337 were returned and available for analysis (215 from chiefs and 103 from sheriffs). 

As indicators that an organizational transformation was in progress, we were looking for affirmative answers to survey questions about changes in several key areas:

---

2 The survey instructions asked that the agency’s chief executive complete the instrument. Signing the survey was optional. Based on ILJ’s experience in following up on prior surveys, the chief executive in medium to small agencies generally completes the survey. In larger agencies, it is common for the survey to be sent to another individual (assistant chief, planning and research, etc.) to be completed.
• Systematic, formal efforts to involve community representatives in joint planning, decision making, and problem solving

• Human resources policies and procedures (employee selection, evaluation, and promotional criteria; revised job descriptions).

• Internal structure and deployment schemes (for example, a flattening of the hierarchy, decentralization, geographic deployment).

• Strategic planning processes and documents.

• Benefits derived from community policing.

The survey results were reported in a separate report to NIJ entitled, *Organizational Transformation to Community Policing: National Survey Results* (September 1999). Selected results from the survey will be used throughout this monograph to aid in explaining case study results.
Overview of Organizational Transformation at the Study Sites

By the end of this study, each of the four sites had at least seven years experience with community policing transformation, and each had sustained their efforts throughout the tenure of two or three CEOs. This chapter provides an overview of how community policing transformation occurred at each of the sites. The first several sections highlight the major steps each jurisdiction took to make the community policing philosophy an organizational strategy and an operational reality. The final section comments on some of the most striking differences and similarities among the sites. Subsequent chapters are devoted to exploring in greater depth the transformation issues that emerged.

Portland, Oregon

Under the leadership of Chief Richard Walker and then Captain Tom Potter, the Portland Police Bureau began its shift to department-wide community policing in 1988. By January 1990, the department had developed a five-year community policing transition plan (the foundation for subsequent strategic plans), which was adopted by the Portland City Council. The city’s Office of Neighborhood Associations (ONA), formed in 1970, helped the Bureau coordinate citizen involvement in community policing throughout the transformation process.

In November 1990, Chief Walker retired and Tom Potter was appointed chief. Also in 1990, the Citizen’s Crime Commission funded a comprehensive outside analysis of the department (conducted by ILJ); and in 1990-91, various programs, pilot projects, and research efforts were introduced, including the Bureau’s first Neighborhood Response Team (NRT) in the North Precinct. Participative management strategies were revived or created (e.g., Chief’s advisory committees, Chief’s Forum), training was emphasized, and community policing change strategies were adopted by each branch of
the department. In 1992, the Bureau began testing the development of written
partnership agreements with community agencies and groups. Also in 1992, an NIJ
evaluation grant was awarded to support development of community policing
performance measures. By February 1993, NRT and Neighborhood Liaison Officer
(NLO) programs were in place in all three precincts. Refinement of the NRT problem
solving model continued over the next few years and is still in place today.

In June 1993, Charles Moose was selected chief of police after Tom Potter retired.
Important events in 1994 included creating two additional precincts (in an attempt to
further decentralize police services); and conducting the first community-wide survey
throughout the five precincts, with more than 1,500 residents responding. The Bureau
continued the strategic planning process under Chief Moose’s leadership and attempted
to develop employee evaluation criteria that was consistent with the department’s
community policing objectives.

St. Petersburg, Florida

In August 1990, Ernest “Curt” Curtsinger was appointed chief of the St.
Petersburg Police Department and began a city-wide community policing effort.
Curtsinger was the department’s first chief to emphasize community policing as an
operational philosophy; however, earlier that year the department’s PRIDE (Police and
Residents Immobilizing a Dangerous Environment) patrol set a precedent for assigning
patrol officer teams to address problems in relatively small geographic areas. PRIDE
assigned four police officers to Jordan Park, a high-crime, inner city public housing
neighborhood. The working partnership these officers developed with housing authority
staff, other service providers, and residents led to the use of additional intensive,
neighborhood-based patrol units in other hot spots.

Over the next nine to ten months, St. Petersburg’s research efforts included a ten-
city fact-finding tour to learn how other police departments were translating community
policing principles into action. In June 1991, Chief Curtsinger formed a “steering
committee on policing excellence.” This committee represented a cross-section of
department personnel and was charged with overseeing the community policing
implementation process. In the fall of 1991, the department conducted its first city-wide citizen survey, receiving 2,000 responses; and in December 1991, Chief Curtsinger created a new community policing division, which included 44 community policing officers (CPOs) assigned to 44 areas. Later, most of this division was merged under the uniform services bureau; but under both organizational arrangements, community policing in patrol continued to use a CPO team approach.

In December 1992, Darrel Stephens was appointed chief and community policing in St. Petersburg became known as “community problem-oriented policing,” reflecting the importance Chief Stephens placed on problem solving. In April 1993, after various planning and training activities and a follow-up citizen survey, Chief Stephens reorganized the department from a two-bureau to three-bureau system and moved the community policing division (except for the youth resources section) into the uniform services bureau. As community policing continued, many of the department’s investigators were assigned geographic responsibility. Monthly problem solving meetings began at the district level in 1995; a new college education requirement for recruits (60 credit hours) was instituted; the department received a large federal grant to purchase laptop computers for patrol officers; and a number of special programs were launched.

Darrell Stephens’ tenure as chief ended in the summer of 1997, and he transferred to become the city administrator under the mayor. Goliath Davis, who as Deputy Chief for patrol had lead the PRIDE effort in 1990, was appointed Chief of Police.

San Diego, California

The San Diego Police Department is well known for its nearly 20 years of leadership in community profiling, crime analysis, and problem solving. More recently, the department gained recognition for implementing a neighborhood policing

---

3 St. Petersburg experienced several days of civil riots (two separate riots) after a white police officer shot and killed a black man in the Fall of 1996. The city needed help from the National Guard to restore order. In the months after the riots, the mayor made this change, appointing Goliath Davis, an African American.
restructuring effort, and for integrating community policing into all (regional) training academy course offerings.

The term community oriented policing was first used in San Diego in connection with a Community Profiling Development Project in 1973, which was designed to get officers out of their cars and into neighborhoods to identify problems and resources. Problem-oriented policing (POP) gained impetus in the late 1980s under Chief Robert Burgreen (who served as chief from mid-1988 until May 1993); and several federal and foundation grants enabled the department to develop problem solving capacities, apply problem solving to gang and drug problems, and form a POP management team. In 1988, the department created a Problem Analysis Advisory Committee (PAAC), which still holds monthly brainstorming meetings to address problems. Also in 1988, a pilot project established a team of problem solving officers in an area substation. In 1990-1991, similar problem solving teams were assigned to each of seven substations, and POP was promoted as a department-wide philosophy. An organizational audit completed in April 1991, under the direction of [then Assistant Chief] Norm Stamper, resulted in 24 recommendations for incorporating problem solving at all levels and functions.

After Chief Burgreen retired, [former Assistant Chief] Jerry Sanders was selected to succeed him. Chief Sanders wanted to see patrol operations more closely aligned with neighborhoods (rather than census tracts) and to reduce the department’s reliance on special units. By 1993, 42 recommendations for neighborhood policing had been developed with input from community and department members, and Chief Sanders used these as the basis for restructuring the entire department. This effort was aided by a community mapping project, which identified 105 neighborhoods and divided them into 21 service areas (the basis for a revised beat structure). Lieutenants were given 24-hour responsibility over their geographic areas. Chief Sanders continued to emphasize problem solving as the key to reducing crime and engaging residents. The department reported having nearly 1200 citizen volunteers who assist in various ways. Although many department members think of the 42 recommendations of 1993 as a type of strategic plan, until recently there was no formal strategic planning process that incorporated problem solving and neighborhood oriented policing objectives.
Tempe, Arizona

The Tempe Police Department began its community policing efforts with the “Beat 16” project in 1989, although certain activities that support community policing (police/citizen volunteer program, City of Tempe Neighborhood Program) began a year or two earlier. Under the leadership of Dave Brown (Chief of Police from 1988 through 1994), an experimental beat (Beat 16) was staffed by a 12-officer team with responsibility for community policing 24 hours a day. In 1990-91 the department revised its recruit selection process; and all department members received introductory training in community policing. The Beat 16 project was enhanced by conducting citizen surveys and assigning crime analyst support. Also, between 1988 and 1993, the department reduced the number of ranks from eight to five, resulting in one of the “leanest” rank structures of any U.S. department of comparable size.

Chief Brown’s interest in self-directed work teams led to a 1993 staff study of how they might work in Tempe, and a new mission statement and community policing definition was adopted in November 1993. But the change for which Tempe has become best known occurred between 1992 and 1995 when, applying lessons learned from the Beat 16 experiment, the department implemented a new geographic deployment and accountability plan throughout patrol. Beat boundaries were re-configured, lieutenants and sergeants were given 24-hour responsibility for officers in their beats, mini-stations were opened in most beats, officers and sergeants set their own work hours, and officer involvement in problem solving increased.

Following Chief Brown's retirement, Ron Burns was appointed Chief of Police in January 1995. Shortly after he took command, a number of patrol supervisors raised objections to the geographic deployment model in place. Chief Burns agreed to modify the model, increasing the number of sergeants and assigning shift, rather than geographic, responsibilities to some of them. The department continued community policing training, has provided officers with laptop computers, and began developing a problem solving management information system. Tempe also has a number of programs that reflect its community policing objectives (e.g., a crime-free multi-housing project, neighborhood
offices, a downtown bicycle program), and works with a core group of more than 150 volunteers.

One of Chief Burns’ priorities upon taking office was to develop a community policing strategic plan. In 1995-96, six key strategic issues were identified and published in a “strategic issues handbook,” and the department developed a five-year strategic plan for community policing.

Comments on Organizational Transformation at the Sites

Among the study sites, Portland stands out in terms of its strategic planning for community policing. That is, Portland exemplifies a “textbook” case where comprehensive strategic planning steps were taken in the order generally recommended by organizational change consultants. Moreover, Portland’s formal strategic planning process featured extensive community and employee involvement (including the union); support from strong, organized neighborhood associations; and the formal backing of city council, including a significant commitment of funds for additional police personnel.

St. Petersburg also developed a strategic plan early on, but proceeded with far less community involvement than Portland in the strategic planning process. Nevertheless, the strong commitment of both city and department leaders enabled community policing to survive despite a volatile political climate.

Tempe is more typical of sites that began its organizational change by pilot testing a community policing approach in a specific geographic area. But Tempe also differs from most sites because the success of its experiment resulted in a quantum leap: a community policing deployment plan that affected every patrol officer and supervisor in the department. In addition, Tempe’s dramatic flattening of the rank structure (from eight ranks to five) made pushed-down decision-making a reality in that department.

San Diego, well known for its early problem solving experiments, built its transition around patrol problem solving teams, with organizational re-structuring
occurring about five years into the transition. Formal strategic planning processes in Tempe and San Diego gained impetus only within the past several years.

The next part of the monograph begins the presentation and discussion of the steps involved in the framework for an organizational transformation to community policing.
Chapter 5

Step A. Creating a Vision of Community Policing: Creating a Sense of Urgency

- Developing a vision for the organization requires a leader with vision who can seize opportunities to promote change.

- New visions should be encapsulated in easy-to-understand mission statements—not the buzzwords du jour.

The ineffectiveness of some traditional policing tactics—random patrol, rapid response to non-emergencies, follow-up investigations without regard to the presence of solvability factors—were brought to light about 25 years ago. Many researchers believe police frustration with poor returns on the investment of personnel in these tactics is a primary reason for the change to community policing. Others place less faith in police autonomy, emphasizing that police are “barometers of the society in which they operate” (Williams and Murphy, 1994): they will not change much unless society pressures them to change.

But whether the impetus for change comes primarily from within or outside of the organization, the starting point for the organizational transformation to community policing is a vision for what the organization could become. In a change process, a good statement of that vision (1) clarifies the direction of the change and (2) inspires people to take action in that direction. Kotter (1996) identifies key characteristics of an effective vision:

- Imaginable: conveys a picture of what the future will look like.

- Desirable: appeals to employees, customers, and others who are stakeholders.

- Feasible: comprises realistic, attainable goals.

- Focused: is clear enough to provide guidance in decision making.
• **Flexible**: is general enough to allow individual initiative and alternative responses in light of changing conditions.

• **Communicable**: is easy to communicate; can be successfully explained in two minutes.

This chapter continues with a discussion of the sense of urgency often used by leaders to create organizational change and the opportunities for change that the chiefs in the case study sites took advantage of. This is followed by a discussion about the community policing visions at the case study sites.

**A Sense of Urgency to Change**

External pressure to change in policing has been applied from several different directions. Citizens in the 1980s demanded that public agencies across the board produce more value for the dollar. Not only have citizens demanded greater accountability for the way tax money is spent, but relief from impersonal, bureaucratic run-arounds and buck-passing (Barzelay, 1992).

There have also been continuing external demands for police accountability in the use of force, fair treatment of minority individuals outside and inside the agency, and equitable provision of services in neighborhoods where residents are poor or members of racial and ethnic minority groups. One frequently cited view of the history of police reform (Kelling and Moore, 1988) has been criticized for minimizing issues of race. In a different interpretation of events, Williams and Murphy (1994) maintain that only after the civil rights movement of the 1960s did any significant reform occur in terms of “more equitable distribution of police services, less deadly force, more respect for individual rights, and equal employment opportunities in police departments.” Others have suggested that at least part of community policing’s appeal is its potential to keep distrust and tension from erupting into violent confrontations with the police (Bayley, 1988), or to build a new foundation after such a confrontation occurs--for example after the MOVE incident in Philadelphia (Pelfrey and Greene, 1997).\(^4\)

\(^4\) Systemic corruption in a police agency might also provide impetus for major organizational change. For example, Greene (1994) maintains that a high-level police corruption scandal in Philadelphia, along with the MOVE incident, provided significant impetus for that city’s shift to community policing. However, corruption scandals were not a factor at any of the case study sites.
Many urban centers in the mid-1980s through mid-1990s saw a dramatic rise in violent crime. Unprecedented numbers of black and Hispanic teenagers fell victim to homicides and assaults; and the violence associated with distribution rights for crack cocaine, as well as its powerful addictive properties, grabbed the public’s attention. Drugs, gangs, and violence were featured on the nightly news in suburban and rural communities as well as in big cities.

Questions about both internal and external influences on the decision to change were included in this study’s national community policing survey and explored during the case studies to find out

• What needed to change or what unusual opportunities arose?
• What was the vision for better policing?

Exploring the Need to Change

Respondents to the organizational transformation survey were asked to what extent the move to community policing was influenced by 14 possibilities frequently mentioned in the literature (respondents could and did choose more than one reason). The top five reasons—that is, those which influenced half of the agencies to a great extent—were as follows:

• Chief wanted to switch to community policing (62.8 percent)
• Wanted to reduce crime and fear of crime (62.8 percent)
• Wanted to become more pro-active as a department (58.7 percent)
• Wanted to establish partnerships with community groups (50.8 percent)
• Wanted to focus on specific neighborhoods with high crime levels (48.9 percent).

Exhibit 3 provides greater detail on responses to the survey question on reasons for moving to community policing.
According to survey respondents, improving relations with minority groups did not appear to be as significant as several other reasons for making an organizational change to community policing. However, it was a major reason for more than a third (34.4 percent) of responding agencies and was explored at the case study sites where, as discussed below, it was one of several factors that contributed to a sense of urgency to change.

Case study focus groups and individuals were also asked to discuss the need for change in their jurisdictions. A significant number of participants at each site recalled at least one issue related to crime, economics, or race relations that pushed the need to
change to the forefront in the minds of residents, local government representatives, and police department leaders. At most sites, a combination of factors (e.g., areas overrun by street-level crime, lack of resources) prompted a sense of urgency to change.

In St. Petersburg, study participants pointed to a rise in cocaine-related crime in the city. There was also particular concern about street-level drug dealing in the neighborhoods surrounding the city’s new Tropicana sports complex (the “Dome”). The Dome was considered a centerpiece of the city’s economic development agenda in the 1980s, with crime near the Dome seen as a serious threat to the area’s economic viability. Public outcries about this situation, according to many focus group members, prompted the city manager to push for a reassessment of police services.

In Portland in the late 1980s, street-level drug dealing was also seen as out of hand in some parts of the city; and study participants described prostitution at that time as “virtually institutionalized,” particularly in the North Precinct. Another frequently mentioned concern was an increasing number of transient and homeless people in the city, with many residents fearing the disorder and crime this might bring. At the same time, Portland in the mid-1980s was experiencing an economic depression. These strains on the city budget and layoffs of police forced the city to analyze delivery of police services.

San Diego in the 1980s was particularly concerned about gang violence and a rise in drug-related crime. In Tempe, crime rates were low compared to the other sites, but study participants there also discussed rising fear of crime as a factor. Of particular concern was the older, downtown area in the northern section of the city, where participants noted an increase in drug, gang, and transient crime in the late 1980s. In fact, the department’s Beat 16 experiment was supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance's drug demand reduction funds, and heroin trafficking in Escalante Park was one problem the experiment addressed.

No specific incident related to race relations, police brutality, or abuse of force was reported as an impetus for changing to community policing at any of the study sites.
However, participants at each site did discuss the need to resolve more general issues of trust and equity between racial and ethnic minorities and the police.

In St. Petersburg, many study participants pointed to a history of poor relations between African American residents and police. Some of these problems influenced internal operations, and some came to a head in the political arena. For example, a number of participants felt the success of the department’s PRIDE project should have been given more credit as a springboard for community policing. Others pointed to race-related controversies surrounding the firing of Chief Curtsinger in 1992 and his (unsuccessful) mayoral campaign. After Chief Stephens was hired, community policing continued to gain momentum. Even so, two riots broke out in the fall of 1996—the first, after a white police officer shot a black man through a car windshield, killing him; and the second a month later after charges against that officer were dismissed. Clearly, Chief Davis (appointed in September 1997) faced challenges in terms of building bridges with diverse community groups.

The Portland Police Bureau also had to overcome what many residents saw as a history of poor relationships with members of racial and other minority groups. In the early 1980s, a Black citizen’s death resulted from a Portland officer’s use of a choke hold. This incident, among other factors, influenced Mayor Bud Clark’s support of community policing (J.E. Bud Clark, 1996). In the late 1980s, the Black United Front urged the mayor to call in the National Guard to assist the Bureau with drug enforcement. This prompted discussions among citizens and police; and over time, relationships improved, particularly after African American leaders became involved in the Chief’s Forum. Other police advisory groups formed in the early 1990s provided forums for other interest groups to contribute to community policing planning.

In San Diego, study participants discussed cultural barriers to understanding and cooperation among police and Latino, Cambodian, and other racial and ethnic minority groups. Many members of these communities, they said, did not trust the police because of their experiences in Mexico and various Asian countries, a problem compounded by language barriers.
Tempe is the most racially heterogeneous of the four study sites. Even so, some focus group members recalled situations where officers were accused of indiscriminately identifying Latino youth as gang members. Interestingly, participants in Tempe and San Diego said national attention to the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles and the riots that followed caused them to consider the potential for similar occurrences in their own communities. A number of Portland focus group participants felt the early inclusion of black leaders in community policing helped prevent outbreaks of violence there after the Rodney King incident.

**Opportunities for Change**

Regardless of which factor was most influential in a given community, key local leaders—inside and outside the policing agency—became acutely aware of a need to change, and to change sooner rather than later. But change into what? What would represent a better vision for better policing?

Nationally, the debate about how to improve policing had taken on several dimensions. Some emphasized the importance of attacking the root causes of crime and delinquency (more or better schools, jobs, family services, housing, social justice, etc.). Others said, fix the “broken windows” and stop the disorderly conduct that invites drug markets and crime in disorganized, physically eroding neighborhoods (Wilson and Kelling, 1989). Still others believed traditional approaches would work if only more resources were poured into them. The common ground, however, was a sharper realization among police of their dependence upon a cooperative public to affect the “bottom line”—less crime. The widely publicized “failure of the war on drugs” may have helped drive this point home (McEwen, 1997).

In the face of public demands for both police accountability and effectiveness, the community policing philosophy has had tremendous bi-partisan political appeal. On a national level, several Presidential administrations have provided funding for community policing experiments. The community policing movement gained momentum when the 1994 Violent Crime Act earmarked several billion dollars for local community policing implementation. This was an unprecedented federal outlay to support a specific type of
policing strategy, with the bulk of the funds earmarked for local police hiring (“100,000 more officers on the streets”), but also for equipment, training, and other support.\(^5\) Today, law enforcement agencies must implement community policing in some form to obtain federal funds from the U. S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) for additional personnel. This is still no guarantee that organizational transformation will occur, but the Crime Act certainly expanded local opportunities for community policing experiments.

At the same time, there were signs—ranging from growing investments in private security, to the popularity of citizens police academies, to Orange Hat brigades—that many citizens were willing to take responsibility for their own safety and to solve problems in cooperation with the police. As discussed later in this monograph, having well organized neighborhoods already in place before launching community policing can provide the type of fertile ground needed for transformation to take hold.

Many of the jurisdictions surveyed for this project, as well as the study sites, seized upon several opportunities associated with community policing. These included opportunities to improve public relations or the department’s public image; funding to experiment with problem solving and other community policing approaches; funding for personnel and other community policing support; and the availability of strong department and city leaders committed to change. For the study sites, perhaps the most important of these was the hiring or promotion of police CEOs whom city leaders believed would create and communicate a strong vision for improved policing.

**Public Appeal**

Even where police community relations are not strained, it is easy to see the public appeal of community policing. Its central themes (partnerships, neighborhood focus, problem solving, etc.) can present an attractive alternative to a bureaucratic, aloof public image. In fact, nearly 79 percent of respondents to the organizational

\(^5\) At the peak of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the mid-1970s, Congress appropriated about $800 million a year for state and local law enforcement efforts.
transformation survey for this project said community policing had resulted (to a moderate or great extent) in more positive media coverage.

Participants at each study site discussed how they obtained favorable media coverage of community policing; but it is safe to say that “PR” was not the driving force behind their efforts, given the extensive organizational change that has occurred. In fact, several police administrators and a number of survey respondents expressed concern about over-promoting community policing: it could be damaging if initial promises cannot be fulfilled due to a lack of organizational commitment or resources (Stephens, 1993; Ross, 1995). A few participants held a different view. Community policing may result in additional resources, they said, if residents who did not receive “neighborhood officers” can be encouraged to organize and present their concerns to city council.

**Funding to Test Community Policing**

Funding opportunities for community policing, particularly those attached to the 1994 Crime Act, were another possible impetus for change. This funding was important to a considerable number of organizational transformation survey respondents. About 32 percent said their department’s move to community policing was influenced to a great extent by “availability of federal funding for officer positions,” and another 28 percent considered this a moderate influence. Open questions include (1) whether the special community policing units and programming launched with Crime Act funds will receive continued local funding in years to come, and (2) whether these federally-funded initiatives will ultimately look like “add ons” or will help ignite the fires of organizational transformation.

At the case study sites, various COPS grants have helped expand community policing activities; but Crime Act funds did not represent an impetus to launch community policing, since at each site, the commitment to community policing transformation preceded the availability of Crime Act funds by several years. However, all four sites, in different ways and at different times in the change process, were involved in experiments to pilot test community policing approaches. For example, in the 1980s, San Diego conducted problem solving projects aimed at gang and drug...
problems. The success of Tempe’s Beat 16 experiment represented a “point of no return” for that department, which went on to adopt the Beat 16 approach throughout patrol. Portland used LEAA funds in the 1970s to help form its Office of Neighborhood Associations (ONA), which remains an important component of community policing in that city today. Federal funding was important to all of those efforts. St. Petersburg’s PRIDE patrol, supported with city funds, was credited with successfully demonstrating how police partnerships could reduce crime and fear in a targeted neighborhood.

Department Leadership: Creating and Communicating the Vision

The availability of progressive police department leaders who are willing to take risks can also be considered an opportunity for change. In discussing how innovation is adopted in police agencies, Weiss (1997) points to the “cosmopolitanism” of many of today’s chiefs—that is, the extent to which they travel in and are influenced by policy and research circles outside of their departments. All of the major membership organizations serving police administrators (PERF, IACP, NOBLE, NSA) have endorsed and supported community policing individually and as part of the Community Policing Consortium (supported by the U.S. Department of Justice).

In the process of conducting the case studies and analyzing the results, it became clear that the availability of strong leaders—those heading the police agencies and others in city government—could, indeed, be considered an opportunity for change. Moreover, as the ILJ framework in Chapter 2 portrays, leadership was an overriding factor that affected all steps in the transformation process. Later in the monograph, two detailed discussions of leadership are provided. The first is in Chapter 5 on communicating a vision for better policing. This discussion focuses on police CEO and city leadership at the four case study sites. The second detailed discussion on leadership is provided in Chapter 12 on the three sine qua nons of organizational transformation to community policing. The leadership discussion in Chapter 12 offers a number of references from the literature on private sector transformation and compares challenges faced by corporate and police CEOs.
Developing the Vision or Mission Statement

As discussed in the next chapter, there are many ways in which department and community leaders can communicate a vision for better policing. Mission statements are one of them.

Mission statements are supposed to encapsulate the vision of the organization, convey a sense of direction for employees, and help create an awareness of that direction in the community. But all too often, mission statements are loaded with jargon, making it nearly impossible for employees to understand or relate to them. The test of a mission statement’s usefulness is to stop any officer on the street and ask him or her to state it and tell you what it means. Most will fail this test.

When Ford Motor Company went through its transformation to work teams in the early 90s, leadership developed a very simple mission statement—Quality is Job 1. This simple phrase packed a big message. Ford was moving its emphasis from meeting production line quotas to keeping its cars on the road longer (reducing mechanical problems after sale), a revolutionary change. Pride in quality workmanship was replacing speed of production. The statement had the advantage of being easy to remember and understand. Anyone on the shop floor could tell you the new vision and what it meant. The same cannot be said today of many of our community policing mission statements.

Among the policing agencies surveyed for this study, nearly four out of five developed a new mission statement as part of their shift to community policing (56 percent to a great extent; 22.3 percent to a moderate extent). All four of the case study sites also developed new mission statements to support the community policing vision early on in the transformation process. An example from Portland is found below.

---

6 Interestingly, nearly 38 percent did little to formulate a value statement as part of the implementation of community policing (20.3 percent to a limited extent; 17.6 percent not at all).
Portland Police Bureau Mission Statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Mission Statement</th>
<th>New Community Policing Mission Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Bureau of Police is responsible for the preservation of the public peace, protection of the rights of persons and property, the prevention of crime, and the enforcement of all Federal laws, Oregon statutes and city ordinances within the boundaries of the City of Portland.</td>
<td>The mission of the Portland Police Bureau is to maintain and improve community livability by working with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human rights, protect property and promote individual responsibility and community commitment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The old mission statement was developed basically by fiat from the chief at the time (as far as anyone in the bureau can remember). The new statement was developed by representative committees in the bureau. This is an important point. Acceptance and commitment to the revised mission statement was said to be greater among people who were involved in its development. The old statement, 45 words long, emphasized prevention and enforcement, historic cornerstones of policing. The new statement, revised in 1990 with 34 words, still retains elements of prevention but dropped the emphasis on enforcing laws. New values were introduced: human rights, community livability, individual responsibility, and community commitment (the "community livability" reference was added in 1994).

While the new mission statement still may not pass the "street officer test," it does distinguish itself from the old statement as being more inclusive (stressing "all" citizens and "community"). However, the new statement introduced a difficult to define term—community "livability." It might have been easier just to retain the old statement's easily understood term, "public peace." However, "livability," although an ambiguous term, does tend to convey a broadening of the police function.
Comments on Urgency, Opportunity, and Vision

The police agencies at the study sites may not have been “broken,” but they were under pressure from the community to solve long standing crime and community relations problems. There was less commonality in terms of city finances, with two cities under considerable strain (Portland and St. Petersburg) and two operating in economic climates that were thriving in comparison (Tempe and San Diego). In a 1993 presentation on community policing in Tempe, Chief Dave Brown offered the following answer to the question, “Why Change?” that appears true for many other sites:

- Crime and fear of crime are the hot issues.
- Police alone will not make an impact.
- Citizens and police are frustrated by lack of change.
- Complex problems need complex solutions.

After the need to change becomes clear, the question, “Change to what?” logically follows. None of the many new mission statements reviewed for this study packed the same punch as Ford’s *Quality is Job 1*; but many did convey such key community policing principles as working with citizens and solving problems.

Finally, the need to change met with important opportunities to change: community policing’s public appeal, funding to experiment with the approach, and the availability of strong leaders. At all four study sites, city government and elected officials selected police chiefs they believed could lead a transformation to community policing. As these chiefs left or retired, city leaders continued to select successors who were committed to the same community policing vision. Each new chief, backed by high-level city government leaders, inherited an important base of external support for the transformation. This progression of leaders, their similarities and differences, and their styles and techniques for communicating the community policing vision are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 6

Step B. Communicating and Building Support for the Vision

- Leaders must be ready with their "stump speech" for any and all occasions.

The real power of a vision is that it inspires others to act. Employees act best on an organizational vision that they understand and share. In order for this to occur, the vision must be effectively communicated throughout the organization and community.

Influential police employees throughout the ranks can have a significant impact on community policing’s acceptance, but the organization’s official leaders are in the best position to communicate the community policing vision. Managers can also help, but they must learn how to communicate. As Kotter (1996) explains it,

For people who have been trained only to be managers, communication of vision can be particularly difficult. Managers tend to think in terms of their immediate subordinates and boss, not the broader constituencies that need to buy into a vision. They tend to be most comfortable with routine factual communication, not future-oriented strategizing and dreaming.

All the chiefs in the case study sites were effective communicators. They were good at giving speeches on the vision of community policing. In fact, they gave hundreds of speeches about the transformation to community policing at city hall, community centers, police precinct stations, chamber of commerce meetings, and more. Some historians have said that leadership is a performing art. These chiefs were ready to give their community policing “stump speech” at any occasion.

Department Leadership in Communicating the Vision

Much of the literature on corporate change emphasizes the need for strong leadership to transform an organization. Again and again, management, which is closely associated with planning and control, is distinguished from leadership, which requires an
ability to create and communicate a vision in terms that inspire people to work toward organizational goals. Change must be planned and managed, but without leadership, the effort will not begin, nor will it be able to successfully weather the next steps (Kotter, 1996). The fact that most police agencies—like other types of organizations—are long on management and short on leadership is a recurring theme in several articles in the past few years on leadership for organizational change in policing (DeParis, 1997; Ortmeier, 1997; Nowicki, 1997). Moreover, leadership at the top of the policing organization must be sustained over time. After the Chicago CAPS initiative had been in place for six years, evaluators noted that for all of its accomplishments, it had reached a point where there was “inertia at the top,” contributing to a slowdown in organizational changes—for example development of new resource reallocation and performance evaluation systems (Skogan and Hartnett, 1999).

The importance of police chief leadership was emphasized consistently during focus group sessions and individual interviews at the case study sites. In fact, the various chiefs were hired or promoted specifically because they were willing to take the career risks associated with leading organizational change.

In both Portland (under Chief Potter) and St. Petersburg (under Chief Curtsinger), there was a great deal of internal conflict at the beginning stages of the transformation, and “anti-chief camps” emerged at both sites. These chiefs made deliberate efforts to dispel resistance, with personal leadership styles that were usually described as directive. In contrast, their successors (Darrell Stephens in St. Petersburg and Charles Moose in Portland) were often described as having more participative leadership styles.

A commonly held view in St. Petersburg was that Curt Curtsinger was hired specifically to take risks. City leaders felt he brought with him an understanding of community policing as a department-wide philosophy; he would forcefully push for change internally; and he would be capable of “selling” the community on the need for change. Many researchers and practitioners hold that community policing will not happen “by decree,” but there is little question that Chief Curtsinger took a firm stand: community policing would happen in St. Petersburg. He involved officers of different
ranks on an excellence in policing committee to oversee the transition; and he personally held numerous meetings with officers to explain the community policing vision. He also sent selected officers to 10 other cities to discuss and observe community policing efforts. Although some of the sites visited by Curtsinger's "road team" advised against community policing as a separate program, Curtsinger formed a separate community policing division, believing this was the most expeditious way to get the effort started. Borrowing ideas from Portland’s strategic plan, he ensured that a strategic plan for community policing was also developed for St. Petersburg.

Portland’s shift to community policing began under Chief Richard Walker. Chief Walker had once served as interim chief, had retired from the department, and was recruited by [then] mayor Bud Clark to bring the department “back to order” and restore stability after a series of short-lived police chief appointments (Clark, 1996). The mayor believed Walker was willing to go forward with community policing; but he also envisioned [then captain] Tom Potter, who headed the community policing division, as the department's next visionary leader (Clark, 1996). Clark selected Potter for a visit to Japan to learn about that country’s community policing approach; and soon thereafter, Potter was appointed chief of police when Walker retired.  

Many in the department today believe Potter’s own plan to retire within a few years was one reason he was willing to take the career risks associated with an aggressive community policing transformation. In a 1993 interview (J. Clark, 1993), Potter confirmed that his intent was to lead the department’s transformation only until Mayor Clark’s term ended in December 1992.

My commitment was that I would lay the foundation for community policing, and then let the others put up the walls, floor and roof. I did not feel I could sustain this level of activity for a prolonged period. It’s an exhausting job if you do it right.

In terms of management styles, Potter, like Curtsinger in St. Petersburg, was described as taking a firm approach internally: police members may or may not like the

---

7 An outside study in 1988 of the police bureau, funded by the Portland Crime Commission, supported a number of reforms, including the move to community policing.
change, but they must act as if they do. “It has become clear to me in the last two and a half years,” Potter said in 1993, “that as you change [all employees’] behavior, and you hold them to it long enough, you’ll change the thinking.” (J. Clark, 1993). During the case study interviews, Potter was also described as “understanding the need to bind the community policing concept to the community first.” He made concerted efforts to educate the mayor and city council about community policing; and earlier, as captain of the North Precinct (the location of the majority of the city's minority population), he was instrumental in developing the department’s first written partnership agreement with other city agencies to address drug trafficking and prostitution.

There was a marked difference in leadership styles between Curtsinger and Darrell Stephens in St. Petersburg; and between Potter and Charles Moose in Portland. Both Stephens and Moose were consistently described as demonstrating more participative management styles than their predecessors. Charles Moose was promoted from within the Portland Police Bureau, where community policing involvement had become one of the main promotional criteria under Chief Potter. Stephens was hired from the outside, in part because of his advocacy for problem solving as executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and his experience with it as former chief of police in Newport News, Virginia.

The hiring of Dave Brown as chief in Tempe represented a dramatic shift from a closed department known for its militaristic leadership style to a more open organization committed to community policing. In contrast to his predecessor, Brown communicated from the beginning the high value he placed on streamlined communication, pushed down decision-making, and teamwork. Brown began his career in Tempe, worked up to the rank of major, served as chief in another Arizona city, then returned to Tempe. According to many study participants, Brown was seen as something of an idealist, but one whose actions matched his words. For example, Brown promised that officers and sergeants, with support from the top, would be making more decisions on their own, and he was often described as having lived up to that promise. In the view of some study participants, the change to Brown was seen as a pendulum swing toward too much...
flexibility, with his replacement (Chief Burns) trying to bring the pendulum more to center.

Under Chief Burgreen in San Diego, the department’s problem solving efforts, computerized crime mapping capabilities, and other innovations were often featured at national policing conferences and training forums. Chief Burgreen also rewarded innovation internally, with effective problem-oriented policing a criteria for high-level promotions. One example noted by study participants was Norm Stamper, whose 1970s innovations in community profiling were considered a forerunner to department-wide POP. Later as assistant chief, Stamper adapted to the SDPD the principles of quality leadership that distinguished community policing in Madison, Wisconsin (Stamper went on to lead community policing transformation efforts as police chief in Seattle until his resignation last year). Following Burgreen as chief, Jerry Sanders continued the emphasis on department-wide problem solving and community involvement. Sanders, as a captain, was in charge of the first division to implement POP in the mid-1980s.

City Government Leadership

At all four study sites, the initial push for change came from leadership outside as well as inside the department; and a shared vision for community policing transcended individual agendas. Study participants at all four sites emphasized that government support was crucial to a police department transformation, both financially and politically (helping to sell it to the general public).

In St. Petersburg, not only the police department but also the form of city government (from manager/council to strong mayor) was in transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The city manager at that time was described as recognizing the political importance of moving toward community policing, whether or not it was clear exactly where this might lead. His concerns about the potential cost of department-wide change were eventually outweighed by community policing’s public appeal and potential for reducing crime and improving relations with the minority community; and he began seeking a new chief with a community policing vision (Curtsinger). A few years later, St. Petersburg’s mayor embraced the concept of community policing and brought in Darrell
Stephens as chief. The mayor soon became a champion of community-oriented government and played a key role in strengthening support services. For example, he increased the number of code enforcement officers and fire inspectors, formed neighborhood resource centers, and later wrote a weekly newspaper column on community policing.

Portland’s form of government is unique. A mayor and four commissioners are elected at large and have both legislative and executive duties. Bud Clark, Mayor from 1985-1992, recalled for this study several factors that influenced him to promote community policing. One was a lack of stable department leadership (Clark himself appointed eight chiefs in five years). Another was the department’s reputation as insular and traditional, which Mayor Clark saw exemplified in the choke hold death noted earlier, and in a video comparing Portland unfavorably with other cities. He also recalled being influenced by a 1988 National Conference of Mayors meeting where community policing was featured. Clark had also taken several trips to Japan and was impressed with the low crime rates attributed to the police officers’ excellent working relationships within the local neighborhoods.

The Portland city council passed a resolution in 1989 that essentially mandated a change to community policing; and one month later it backed up this mandate with “Operation Jumpstart,” which provided funds for over 100 new officers. Council support continued in later years, with community policing resulting in another personnel increase of approximately 200 officers.

In Tempe, the mayor, council, and city manager had been politically and financially supportive of the police department for a long time and stayed on board throughout the change process; and San Diego was similar in this regard. Several Tempe city council members and the city manager attended and were influenced by the national POP conference in San Diego; and Chief Dave Brown began a new era of closer police/city council relationships that served to support organizational change. According to many study participants, the police departments in both Tempe and San Diego have
gained reputations as “agents of change,” serving as a catalyst for other city agencies to try new strategies or decentralize their services.

Techniques for Communicating the Vision

In our interviews with the chiefs we found some common themes about how they effectively communicated the community policing vision. These include the following:

- Tried to keep the message simple. One of them even mentioned the KISS\(^8\) principle.
- Made a point of using examples that people could relate to.
- Used a variety of means to spread the word (discussed more below).
- Repeated the vision themes over and over again in various settings (one chief referred to this as the “Sesame Street” model).
- Continuously reaffirmed that this vision was the top priority of the department. They tended to link all other aspects of police operations back to community policing.

Also, most (but not all) of the chiefs said that they were good listeners—a very important characteristic of a good communicator. This was confirmed in the focus groups of department personnel. Most chiefs in the case study sites developed an atmosphere in the organization of open, give-and-take dialogue.

One of the most appealing features of community policing is the idea of neighborhoods having “their own” officers who know the people, problems, and resources available. But a number of experienced police CEOs cautioned against overselling community policing, particularly in terms of “a cop on every block.” As noted in the ILJ framework in Chapter 2 and discussed in Chapter 12, resources is one of the three overriding factors without which organizational transformation to community policing cannot take place. As Chief Dave Brown noted, community policing generally involves an “evolution, not a revolution.” Given the complex training, staffing, deployment, and other issues that must be addressed, the consensus of many CEOs was not to promise too much too soon. On the other hand, residents who have had rewarding experiences

\(^8\) “Keep It Simple, Stupid.”
through direct involvement in some aspect of community policing may become effective ambassadors (see Chapter 8 on forming a guiding coalition).

**Promoting Community Policing to the Public**

Policing organizations involved in the transition to community policing have an obligation to communicate the vision to residents, many of whom (sometimes millions of them) will never participate in advisory boards, beat meetings, or problem solving groups.

The case study sites successfully garnered media coverage—most of it positive—to communicate their community policing efforts. The following advice for publicizing community policing represents a consensus of opinions offered by study participants at the four sites (specific techniques they used are listed below):

- The most effective way to promote community policing is to involve citizens directly in the planning process.
- Public statements should promote the long-term vision and avoid specific promises unless the resources are there to fulfill them.
- Provide success stories that demonstrate the potential of community policing and problem solving.
- Don’t forget about promoting successes achieved through more traditional enforcement or investigative actions. Connect these with community policing.
- Publicize early efforts, even though they may be limited in scope. The theory is (and it was played out in Portland and St. Petersburg) that if community policing is alive in one area of the city, neighboring areas will insist on it, too. This demand will be directed to the city council and manager or mayor.
- Don’t sit back and rest when improved media relations occur. Continue to cultivate relationships with individual members of the news media.

**Specific Techniques Used by Survey and Study Sites to Inform the Public about Community Policing**

- Police lieutenant’s weekly newspaper column on community policing
- Mayor’s newspaper column on community policing
- Citizens police academy and city council members’ participation in it
- Meetings about community policing with court administration, judges, and city attorneys
• Emphasizing community policing in pamphlets, brochures, web sites, and other
  vehicles used to communicate with the public
• Publishing neighborhood officers’ names, pictures, telephone numbers
• Cable TV shows
• Annual department media day where reporters participate in police-related
  activities
• Incentives for police to purchase homes in high crime areas
• Monthly video magazine featuring problem solving along with other news items
• Attendance of media representatives at problem-solving meetings

Communicating the Vision Inside the Organization

There are many techniques that can be used to get the message out to employees
that change is afoot, and to describe the nature of that change. Signs, posters, slogans,
newsletters, announcements, orientation sessions—collectively, the study sites seemed to
use them all. These have value as symbols of change, but by themselves, they have little
impact on what people do.

Researchers often discuss two approaches to building internal support for an
organizational transformation: (1) changing attitudes to affect behavior, and (2) changing
behavior to affect attitudes. The first approach assumes that once people understand the
new philosophy, priorities, goals, etc., they will adjust their behavior to correspond with
them. The second approach asks people to first take specific actions in line with the new
philosophy. After they experience some measure of success, they (and others) will see
that the approach works and will more readily buy into the new philosophy.

Most of the police transformation leaders at the case study sites recommended the
second approach—that is, more people will “act their way into thinking” (Pascale, 1997)
than the other way around. But they also offered these cautions:

• The new community policing vision and values must also be clearly expressed
  and understood. Officers involved in an experiment must be able to link what
  they are doing to this vision.
• Community policing by special unit or in an experimental beat may be necessary
  at first. But the consistent message must be that this is only one step toward
department-wide implementation.
Later in the monograph (Chapter 11), issues of organizational culture are discussed in terms of internal acceptance of community policing.

**Comments on Building Support for the Vision**

Each police chief at each study site consistently linked the community policing vision to the agency’s plans and accomplishments. Their efforts to do this were deliberate, and they persisted despite internal and external barriers that they and most other departments face. In this chapter, we have focused on describing the leadership styles and approaches of the CEOs at the study sites in communicating the vision. Chapter 12 provides an additional discussion of leadership in other contexts.

Finally, it is important to recognize the significance of leadership from outside the police department. Because city officials and community leaders shared a vision for community policing, organizational change at the study sites was able to transcend individual agendas and continue from one CEO to the next.
Chapter 7

Step C. Developing Strategies to Achieve the Vision

- Developing strategic plans is important for thinking about, controlling, and deciding the future of community policing.
- Strategic planning is a learning process. Reaching the vision requires trying new approaches, many of which may not work. This is the essence of the learning process.

Strategic planning is critical for community policing, just as it is for developing any organizational transformation. City managers and mayors have been trying to get police departments to do strategic planning for decades, long before the growth of community policing. However, few police agencies take the time to engage in a thorough agency examination to (1) work through an inclusive strategic planning process for community policing, and (2) produce planning documents that are useful for distributing resources, guiding implementation, and evaluating progress.

One background question on a previous ILJ community policing training survey attempted to clarify the extent of planning for community policing by asking police and sheriffs whether or not they had a written plan to guide how community policing would be implemented in their agencies. Nearly two-thirds of respondents (63.9 percent) said they had no written plan (McEwen and Pandey, 1997). In their review of the nation’s smallest law enforcement agencies, Maguire, Kuhns, et al. (1997) found that only 12 percent had a strategic plan for community policing. These findings raise questions about how serious law enforcement agencies are about developing thoughtful strategies for department-wide community policing.

The organizational transformation survey for this project attempted to gather more detailed information on planning for community policing from agencies believed to have progressed beyond experimentation. For one question, a list of 16 planning activities were provided, most of which are commonly associated with strategic planning (vision, mission, value statements; goals, objectives, action steps; determination of resource
requirements; assignment of responsibility for action steps, etc.). Nearly three-fourths of respondents reported that, to a great or moderate extent, they had developed vision and mission statements, examined barriers (70 percent); and developed community policing goals and objectives (71 percent). Fewer agencies, however, said that to a great or moderate extent they had

- Developed an implementation plan and schedule (56.4 percent)
- Developed a long range plan for community policing (53 percent)
- Assigned responsibility for each action step (56.6 percent)
- Integrated the community policing plan with the department’s strategic plan (58.4 percent)

The findings in Exhibit 4 below show that as strategic planning activities became more specific, detailed, and time-consuming, fewer departments engaged in them.

### Exhibit 4. Planning Activities for Community Policing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Activities</th>
<th>Not At All</th>
<th>Limited Extent</th>
<th>Moderate Extent</th>
<th>Great Extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Established a vision.</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Developed a mission statement.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Formulated a value statement.</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Examined barriers (policy/procedures, resource, cultural, external environmental) to community policing.</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Developed goals and objectives for community policing.</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Developed action steps to achieve objectives.</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Determined resource requirements to achieve objectives.</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Assigned responsibility for implementing each action step.</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Developed an implementation plan and schedule.</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Developed mechanisms to measure progress in achieving objectives.</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Created citizen satisfaction surveys to measure community policing efforts.</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Consolidated above elements into a long-range plan.</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Communicated the plan to others.</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Evaluated progress in meeting objectives.</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Revised the plan as needed.</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Integrated the community policing plan with the department’s strategic plan.</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A separate question asked respondents their agency’s definition of strategic planning and asked, “Do you have a written strategic plan for your department?” Approximately 47 percent said no. In the comments respondents provided on strategic planning, four themes predominated:

- Agencies implemented community policing too fast and without adequate planning.
- Better planning would have achieved earlier and more extensive buy-in from line officers and mid-level supervisors.
- The cost of community policing was not represented adequately in the budget.
- The department should have communicated its planning activities more effectively.

**Strategic Planning at the Study Sites**

The best example from the study sites of an inclusive, formal strategic planning process was Portland. The Portland process featured an elaborate task force scheme that directly involved 10 to 15 percent of the workforce, with over 100 citizens and other agencies represented on all task forces. The process worked, but it took a great deal of time and resources. St. Petersburg also developed a strategic plan early in the transformation process, but without the same level of community involvement. In contrast, neither Tempe nor San Diego used a formal strategic planning process in the early stages of community policing development, although both developed strategic plans in recent years.

In 1988, the Portland city council endorsed the police bureau's transition to community policing. The process of developing a five-year transition plan began when Chief Potter formed a committee of citizens, bureau personnel, and representatives from the mayor’s office and the Office of Neighborhood Associations (ONA). This committee met weekly for two years and was facilitated by the newly created community policing division (transformed from the research and planning unit). As part of this process, Dave Williams (who later became an assistant chief) wrote a concept paper on the need to implement community policing. The paper included a draft definition, provided examples, and explained the strategic planning process.
In February 1989, the police bureau conducted an internal survey to solicit ideas on steps the community and bureau could take to strengthen community-police partnerships, and to obtain recommendations on ways to evaluate community policing. A local consulting group was hired to assist with this effort and helped develop a planning guide and critical path chart. Another consultant was hired to conduct focus groups and community surveys. In April 1989, the first of five community meetings were held to discuss the transition and encourage community input.

Portland then developed a definition of community policing that was incorporated into Resolution #34587, which was passed by city council in July 1989. The bureau also conducted a national survey in July 1989 to identify community policing strategies that Portland might adapt to meet its own needs. Based on the survey results, committees were created to consider various implementation strategies. These committees included (1) media and education, (2) evaluation, (3) productivity/workload analysis, (4) information and referral, (5) agency partnerships, (6) legal/legislative, (7) training/recruitment, (8) grants/finance, and (9) criminal justice system. The draft strategic plan was reviewed by these committees, other city bureaus, and community organizations. City council formally adopted the plan, complete with goals, objectives, and strategies covering the years 1990 through 1994.

All of these planning and research activities, along with the push from city council, led the police bureau to work toward department-wide community policing, rather than setting up a special community policing program or unit. Case study participants emphasized several reasons for this:

- A high level of city-wide community support based in part on past problem solving successes (through ONA as well as police initiatives);
- The desire to avoid problems other jurisdictions had experienced with special units;
- Reluctance to create a specialized program that could easily be dissolved by withdrawal of funding or political support;
- The need to send a strong message throughout the ranks that this new way of doing business was for all employees.
Several study participants said it was standard practice to involve in the planning process people who had complained about the bureau in the past. In this way, the bureau acknowledged the community’s perceptions of significant problems and demonstrated it valued their views. Focus group members pointed out that many of these people later became the bureau’s biggest supporters.

The first strategic plan was described as too academic, while the second revision was considered more practical. Beginning in August 1994, managers from all divisions were required to develop specific work plans for the strategies in the plan. Three reports, tied to the budget, were generated: a work plan description report (strategies); work plan status report, which listed strategies by objective number; and a work plan outcome report (projected v. actual outcomes). The strategies were reviewed by an assistant chief and discussed with division commanders. The bureau also developed a financial handbook for bureau employees and trained managers on how to prepare budget monitoring reports.

At first, the strategic plan was tied to a five-year budget cycle, but the cycle was later changed to two years. A strategic plan for 1996-1998 was adopted in September 1996. In addition, the city instituted a Comprehensive Organizational Review and Evaluation (CORE) process, which involved outside performance auditing of all city bureaus by the year 2000. The police bureau adjusted its strategic plan to fit the CORE format, which helped the bureau develop financial plans and clarify its strategies.

In addition, in 1998-99, the mayor and police chief hired outside consultants to help the police bureau develop a new strategic plan to "take community policing to the next level." The bureau is currently working to implement this new plan.

Development of St. Petersburg’s initial strategic plan was largely an internal effort, with two outside consultants (one of whom was from the Portland Police Bureau) assisting in the process. In addition, a panel of 10 community representatives reviewed the plan. Subsequent plans were essentially an update of this original document. In November 1994, the department also developed a Plan for Performance Assessment of Community Policing. One planning issue discussed by study participants was the
number and nature of the many grants the department had received. Some of these were seen as not following along with the department’s strategic plan. A number of study participants questioned whether department objectives drove the grant-seeking process, or whether the availability of grant funds directed which activities were undertaken. This is a common issue in policing nationwide.

In August 1991, the Tempe Police Department produced a management manual that discussed the community policing challenges, organizational values, management principles, roles and responsibilities for all personnel, goals and objectives, and performance evaluation. In November 1993, the department revised its mission statement to reflect a greater emphasis on community involvement. Chief Ron Burns has placed a greater emphasis on strategic planning. In November 1995, a “strategic issues group” identified six priority issues and began a process of recommending strategies and objectives to address them. The Tempe Police Department finalized its first comprehensive strategic plan in 1997.

In San Diego, many study participants said they considered the department’s “42 recommendations” developed in 1993 as a type of strategic plan, although it did not include such elements as a specific timeline or performance benchmarks. In February 1997 the department began a more formal strategic planning process.

Comments on Strategic Planning

In the framework for an organizational transformation to community policing, developing strategies to achieve the vision is a key step. All four of the case study sites and many of the police agencies responding to the survey realized the importance of this step.

The vision lacks direction without a map of how to get where you want to go. Strategic planning is future thinking, controlling the future, and deciding the future (Mintzberg, 1995). To be successful, such strategic planning needs commitment at the top and support from those lower down. Thus, strategic planning should be decentralized and democratic in involving the workforce and the community.
As Portland demonstrated, the strategic planning process is just that—a key process in showing that management emulates the principles it is asking others to adopt, namely, department-wide member and community involvement, openness and candor (openly recognizing areas needing improvement), trust, sharing, and more. The process of developing the plan itself was part of the process for implementing community policing—helping to begin shaping attitudes and behavior.

Both the transformation survey and the case studies in Tempe and San Diego suggest that, for many community policing departments, formal strategic planning is often an interim process, or an afterthought, rather than the beginning of a community policing transformation.

Strategic planning for community policing does not have to be painful and complicated, with every conceivable action step spelled out in detail. One recent book on strategic planning notes that often, organizations that are very good at developing written plans may not be very good at implementing those plans (Mintzberg, 1995). On the national survey for this project, respondents who commented on planning seemed divided in their conclusions: some advised moving slowly, while others cautioned against the “analysis into paralysis” syndrome.

Police agencies need to use an analytical approach, in terms of using data, to help shape strategies. Workload analysis (calls for service, detective caseload, etc.) and crime and problem analyses are important to understand and shape the community policing transformation. However, the quantitative data must also be matched with qualitative information gleaned from citizen surveys, focus groups, advisory committees, and public forums, which are also essential to (1) help the department identify the service standards the public expects, and (2) lend vital support for maintaining those standards during the jurisdiction’s budget process.

Several CEOs interviewed for this project expressed a “fear of success.” That is, they were concerned that if community policing was successful (i.e., reduces crime, reduces calls for service), the department would lose resources. Specifying and justifying standards of service places police agencies in a better position to answer questions about
why additional personnel or funding may be needed for community policing. Staffing standards, then, are driven by standards of service, not crime rates.

Most agencies are familiar with service standards for emergency response and other traditional police services. For example, a citizen in a true emergency will expect a police response in less than 4 minutes; every beat will have an officer assigned 24 hours a day; no more than 35 percent of an officer’s time will be spent answering dispatched calls. But far fewer departments (and communities) have come up with similar standards for new services under community policing. The specific services desired will vary from city to city, but in any case, there may be high public expectations for community policing without a full exploration of the staffing implications. Citizens want the police to be more visible in certain neighborhoods, to maintain a presence in some or all public schools, to provide specific follow-up services to victims of violent and other serious crimes, to focus on specific problems (drugs, gangs, vandalism, etc.), to increase its services to special populations (youth, the elderly, homeless residents, recent immigrants, etc.)—the list could go on and on. But whatever the community’s service priorities, standards of service (and staffing standards) must be strategically developed to address them.
Step D. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition: Building Consensus Toward the Vision

- Consensus building takes time and patience but pays off in support and commitment to the vision.

At the core of policing is the principle that in a democratic society, the community has collectively assigned its peacekeeping role to the police. A policing organization must always remember that its very existence stems from the community.

At the heart of reinventing government, or transforming an organization to community policing, is the desire to improve customer service. For community policing, this means no longer assuming that citizen concerns and priorities are the same as those of the police. Instead, many agencies are using citizen surveys, beat meetings, community forums, and other means to identify citizen concerns and understand what services community members really want police to deliver. But the surveys and meetings are just the beginning of citizen involvement in community policing as envisioned by its advocates.

The community policing philosophy also assumes a degree of citizen willingness to solve problems with the police and other agencies. Collaborative problem solving with community members is usually discussed in a relatively limited context (addressing a concern in a particular neighborhood, or dealing with a specific crime or disorder problem). But a few departments have expanded the concept of community participation to provide forums for direct, formal citizen involvement in organization-wide planning and management. The existence of well organized neighborhood associations is a tremendous advantage. This is exemplified in Portland, where the Office of Neighborhood Associations (ONA) and other community groups have helped the Portland Police Bureau institutionalize community participation. This study also identified some important—and largely unresolved—issues associated with citizen
participation, including broadening a department’s base of support, re-energizing citizen
volunteers and clarifying their roles, organizing community groups where none exist, and
determining what limits (if any) should be set on citizen participation.

**Identifying Community Needs**

It is hard to imagine a business successfully launching a new product line or service without analyzing the demand for it (conducting surveys, focus groups, test marketing, etc.). Hollywood movie producers and directors often change movie endings based on reactions from pilot test audiences. Similarly, it seems logical that police agencies would take deliberate steps to refine their understanding of what the public wants of them before committing resources to community policing. The national survey results for this study suggest that while many agencies have conducted some form of market research, a fair number have also “flown by the seat of their pants,” or at least used less formal means to assess customer needs and desires. For example, about 54 percent of respondents reported “conducting a survey of citizens’ needs and problems” as a community policing start-up activity; and 54 percent used citizen satisfaction surveys to measure their community policing efforts.

To obtain citizen input on an ongoing basis, community policing departments appear to rely on beat meetings somewhat more frequently than citizen surveys. About 59 percent of transformation survey respondents reported “conducting beat meetings open to the public.” Other popular means of involving citizens were citizens academies (introduced by about 59 percent of respondents) and volunteer programs (introduced by 52 percent). However, it is likely many of the volunteer programs and citizen academies pre-dated community policing (Gaines, 1997; McEwen and Pandey, 1997).

**Importance of Organized Neighborhoods and Interest Groups**

Activities like surveys and beat meetings represent significant outreach to the community, and to some extent, they may influence policy or service changes. But when survey respondents were asked the extent to which community leaders were involved in
planning the move to community policing, only 22 percent said “to a great extent,” with another 32 percent reporting a moderate level of involvement by community leaders.

Among the study sites, Portland is the most significant example of a community that was already well organized before the shift to community policing began. The Portland ONA and other groups played a prominent role both in launching and sustaining the community policing transformation. As a result, Portland officers expressed less concern than those at the other sites about developing or seeking out interested community groups for problem solving.

The Portland ONA began with LEAA crime prevention funding in 1974. The funding allowed the city to hire full-time staff to service all 94 neighborhood associations. The staff worked out of the regional offices of the neighborhood associations. The city continues this commitment to the neighborhoods today. As crime problems increased, neighborhood associations pressured the police and city to help solve them. ONA staff and neighborhood associations began to document chronic problems and engaged certain precinct commanders who were known for their concern (most of those commanders later became top police bureau administrators). These efforts resulted in several of the bureau’s first partnership agreements with neighborhoods and other agencies. As the community policing transformation progressed, the police bureau found it could rely on the ONA structure to ensure problem solving activities would be supported in all areas of the city.

The police bureau took deliberate steps to give other special interest groups a formal role in the transformation process. In fact, few police agencies of comparable size can match the Portland Police Bureau's efforts to institutionalize community participation in police planning and management processes. The chief’s forum, which began under Chief Potter and was expanded by Chief Moose, is still valued today for helping ensure department accountability. Composed of 25 members, this forum, which meets monthly with the chief, provides a formal means of obtaining citizen input on policies and procedures, breaking down communication barriers, building partnerships, encouraging shared ownership of problems and working through problem-solving processes,
disseminating information, and acting as a type of “rumor control.” In fact, the chief’s forum and other well-established advisory groups are considered part of the bureau’s organizational structure (see chart that follows). Each assistant chief works directly with at least one of the advisory groups. The department also has a citizen review board but this is a complaint review board, not an advisory or planning group.

**Citizen Participation, Portland Police Bureau**

- Chief of Police
  - Advisory Committees
    - Budget advisory council
    - Community advisory council
    - Non-sworn employee advisory group
    - Sexual minority roundtable
    - African American advisory group
    - Hispanic advisory group
    - Asian advisory group
  - Chief’s Forum
  - Assistant Chiefs
  - Public Information

Tempe also has a Neighborhood Association Program (NAP), which was created in 1986 by city council ordinance and is placed administratively in the city manager’s office. The Tempe NAP helps coordinate and form new neighborhood associations, provides grants to help those associations improve public areas, mails association newsletters, and provides other services. The NAP staff welcomed community policing and helped the police link with neighborhood groups. But organizational change in Tempe was more a result of department and city leadership. There was no organized demand for change by the neighborhood associations.

Community involvement in San Diego’s 1993 restructuring effort was achieved primarily through the city’s Neighborhood Watch Advisory Board. Study participants
also credited the department’s neighborhood policing manager (Nancy McPherson) for her energetic efforts in coordinating community meetings and serving as department liaison to various groups. The department also has a city-council appointed Citizens Advisory Board whose members reviewed the department’s restructuring plans. The general assessment from the ILJ focus groups and individual interviews was that while Neighborhood Watch groups worked well with police, many of the participating neighborhoods were low crime areas. Study participants said community groups in other areas of San Diego were not as active; and police representatives said that often when they wanted to work with a neighborhood, they felt they needed to organize it first.

Similarly, St. Petersburg had a well organized crime watch program. It also had many active neighborhood associations; but as noted earlier, it also had a history of tension between the police and African-American residents. Some study participants said the success of the PRIDE patrol in 1989 helped build trust in its targeted neighborhoods, but in general, the police department in the early 1990s had a long way to go to involve residents in community policing. Since that time, the departments community policing team approach has resulted in a significant increase in resident involvement in problem solving.

Comments on Community Participation

One of the main lessons from this study for other communities is that a lack of organized neighborhood and special interest groups can slow down the community policing organizational transformation process. Many study participants said community support was definitely needed when the transition began; it helped broaden a sense of ownership in the transformation, provided continuity when the department’s leadership changed, and helped sustain the transformation when various setbacks and difficulties occurred.

Interestingly, only slightly more than half (52.4 percent) of the respondents to the organizational transformation survey stated that community leaders were involved in planning the move to community policing to a great or moderate extent.
A number of study participants cautioned that community involvement may decline over time as various planning processes are completed. Even cities with strong community support face several important questions as a community policing transformation proceeds:

- How can departments sustain the involvement of citizens who have contributed to the initial planning effort but who no longer have the same sense of urgency, or are no longer clear about their roles in the transformation?
- How can police departments involve neighborhoods that are not well organized? How can they involve representatives of interest groups that have been under-represented or under-served in the past?
- Are police in fact the best organizations to develop neighborhood and special interest groups, or is this better done by other city agencies or types of community-based organizations?
- Should community involvement run deeper as well as broader? Should citizens get more directly involved in the department’s budgeting process? In setting policy? Just how open should the department become?

Concern about sustaining citizen involvement was expressed by a number of study participants, particularly in Portland. Despite the tremendous strides there toward institutionalizing community participation in police planning, both police bureau officials and community representatives noted that some of the department’s advisory groups may need rejuvenation or new direction. The chief’s forum was described by some members as less active today than it was during the early stages of community policing transformation. Some said this was because (1) community excitement about having greater access to the police has died down, and (2) the major modifications of bureau policies and procedures have been accomplished. Some forum members apparently have interpreted the decline in activity as non-inclusion, recommending that their roles be reviewed, more clearly defined, and periodically reiterated. The difference between giving input and actual policy setting should be clarified, they said.

In San Diego, the department took specific steps to clarify the roles community members (especially its contingent of more than 800 volunteers) could play to support community policing. For example, in October 1995, it produced a comprehensive reference guide for individuals, community groups, and businesses, “Community Responsibilities for Making Neighborhood Policing Work in San Diego.”
In San Diego and Tempe, officers sometimes felt they needed to organize residents in certain neighborhoods before they could work with them to solve problems. In some cities, officers have even attempted to organize neighborhood associations where none exist. The Tempe Police Department, for example, invested some of its own resources into organizing a neighborhood association as part of the Beat 16 experiment. But the police had no experience in community organizing, frustrations mounted, and the department later abandoned the effort. Tempe focused most of its attention on ways the beat teams could work more closely with existing neighborhood associations, which were considered a valuable resource but one that had been under-used in the past (McEwen, 1998).

Finally, the community policing philosophy raises questions about what limits should be placed on the extent of citizen participation. Involving the community in planning and decision making is considered essential for maintaining the community’s support and trust. Yet as open as the case study departments may be compared to many other agencies, only one (Portland) involved the community directly in policy development and fiscal matters.

Community engagement and involvement in most police agencies is generally limited to exchange of information, some degree of working together to solve neighborhood problems, and, in a few agencies, advisory boards. But in nearly all police agencies, the community is not involved directly at the table in setting agency goals, policies, and budget priorities. Policing should take a lesson from the education field. In American education K-12, elected or appointed school boards are the norm. These boards, made up of ordinary citizens, have significant power over the school system. They have the authority to approve personnel changes, budgets, and policy changes in the schools.
Step E. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: Overcoming Resistance to Change

- Keys to empowering others include encouraging risk-taking and nontraditional ideas, decentralizing decision-making, building work teams and change agents, and getting rid of obstacles.

This step in the transformation is the beginning of the hard part of the process—implementing and anchoring the new approaches in the vision for community policing. This step includes such actions as getting rid of the obstacles to change, overcoming the resistance of employees, team building and developing change agents, empowering employees by decentralizing decisionmaking and encouraging risk-taking and non-traditional ideas and actions.

Empowering the Workforce

Empowerment is complex and elusive. While each of the four case study sites and many of the survey sites espoused employee empowerment as a goal under the vision of community policing, we cannot find an example where real empowerment has been achieved.

In fact, most CEOs would have a difficult time defining what they mean by empowerment. In recent years, it has become somewhat faddish for CEOs to list this among goals for changing organizations. But if a working definition is “to give power to others,” then the reason for empowerment is simple. CEOs alone cannot implement their own vision. They need the assistance of all employees. However, if employees feel powerless, they won't know how to help or what to do.

If employees have been recruited to participate in the Stage One steps—creating the vision, communicating the vision, developing the strategic plan, and forming a powerful guiding coalition—they should feel a certain degree of empowerment already. However, they still are likely to misunderstand the limitations of their power. Before
employees can help remove obstacles to change, they must believe that they are empowered.

Former Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, chief Dennis Nowicki notes that officers are given mixed messages about empowerment. While officers are often told to take risks and try unproven problem solving techniques, the real department message is, "Yes, you are empowered, go forth and make the world a better place. If you succeed, you may receive faint praise; if you fail or make a mistake, you will most assuredly be hung out to dry." (Nowicki, 1997:8).

Management change expert Chris Argyris makes the same point about empowerment in private industry:

When it comes to empowerment, executives and employees are engaged in shadowboxing. Management says it wants employees who participate more; employees say they want to be more involved. But it is difficult to know who means what. Is it just a charade? Employees push for greater autonomy; management says the right thing but tries to keep control through information systems, processes, and tools. Employees see vestiges of the old command-and-control model as confirming their worst suspicions—that superiors want unchallenged power. Management just wants to see better numbers. Thus the battle between autonomy and control rages on, and meanwhile, as companies make the transition into the next century, the potential for real empowerment is squandered. (Argyris, 1998)

The problem is that before CEOs can transition from a command-and-control model to distributed decisionmaking, they must trust their employees. Trust takes time. As each successive CEO takes over a police organization, their first act is often to slow the action and consolidate and assemble a power base. Taking in the reins of power means taking it from subordinates. They then assess staff, policies and procedures, systems, and programs for strengths and weaknesses. This also takes time. Only when reliability and trust are developed over time do CEOs then ease up on the reins and begin to decentralize decision making on matters of budget, personnel, policy, and more.

Another measure of empowerment is the openness of an organization. Can employees say what they want, the First Amendment notwithstanding, and not feel that retribution in some form is around the corner? In all four of the case study sites, but especially Tempe and Portland, the organizations were highly open. Employees felt free
to openly criticize the chief's ideas, policies, and decisions. Such a democratic atmosphere demonstrates that the chief is "walking the talk" of empowerment as it relates to openess of communications. During the course of holding numerous focus groups at the sites, ILJ staff experienced this feature of the organizations firsthand. In fact, in some focus groups, the communication was so open that if the chief had been in the room, it seemed certain the staff would have made the same critiques.

As several of the CEOs indicated, the best way to deal with empowerment is the honest approach. Employees must understand that empowerment always has limits. The CEOs must attempt to be clear about who has the right to take what risks and change things. They must specify the boundaries of allowable change. In turn, CEOs must understand that there is a quid pro quo to the empowerment process. For the organization to make new demands on employees to meet the vision of community policing, the organization must make sure employees get commensurate returns (Pascale, 1997).

Overcoming Resistance to Change

When the transformation began in Portland, there was a great deal of internal resistance. Administrators and managers spent time explaining community policing theory, but not the nuts and bolts of how employees’ roles would change. Position papers were sent to all employees, but reactions were not formally solicited. The reality was that the information was disseminated; the perception (some six years later) was that not enough was done.

Survey participants also said many departments did not place enough importance on linking community policing to more traditional enforcement functions. As a result, some officers feared community policing approaches would replace certain enforcement tactics; and adages like “work smarter, not harder” were not well understood or appreciated. In addition, at the same time community policing began, many departments also re-instated drug task forces and initiated new gang task forces. This fostered an impression that community policing was “just another program” to run parallel with regular enforcement efforts.
Most people interviewed in Portland recalled Chief Potter’s approach of mandating support for community policing (those who did not personally accept the philosophy would be expected to act as if they did). Chief Potter met one-on-one with all captains and above to assess their level of support. This hard-nosed approach was appreciated by some who considered it essential for overcoming resistance, and it was resented by others as too authoritarian. Chief Moose’s management style, considered more “accommodating” than Potter’s, involved talking with commanders who were resistant and asking them what could be done to make community policing more appealing. But consistently strong support for community policing was demonstrated by both chiefs, regardless of personal style. Many study participants said Chief Moose was able to “take community policing to a higher level.”

Specific actions considered among the most important for building internal support and overcoming resistance to change in Portland included the following:

- Hiring many new officers and encouraging the retirement of a significant number of managers and officers who had been among the most resistant.
- Requiring that all police functions (detectives, traffic, patrol, support services, etc.) prepare written community policing plans.
- Involving the union in the planning stages. Since community policing was credited for increasing the total number of personnel by about 200, the union supported it.
- Requiring detectives to become involved in community policing activities (e.g., problem solving).
- Reactivating internal management advisory committees that included non-sworn, officers, supervisors, investigative, and command personnel.
- Making sure there were “wins” in the beginning and that employees were informed of them (e.g., bureau newsletter; local media to publicize intentions and successes).
- Maintaining visible symbols of permanence (e.g., after posters displaying mission, values, and goals were defaced, they were replaced with framed (glass encased) versions and hung throughout the bureau and in the training area).

St. Petersburg study participants agreed that despite differences in their CEOs’ leadership styles, the message from the top was consistent: community policing was there to stay. Chief Curtsinger involved officers in planning by forming an internal
Committee on Policing Excellence, with various ranks and functions represented; sending officers to visit other sites where community policing was in progress; and later, hosting visits from other agencies.

In retrospect, one of the most significant barriers to internal support in St. Petersburg, according to study participants, was the decision to begin community policing by establishing a separate community policing division. This was seen as a hindrance to internal communication and to the formation of teams across functions. Chief Stephens attempted to turn this around by disbanding the separate division. He also transferred experienced, “pro-community policing” officers into specialty units (e.g., drug enforcement, vice), to help deliver a pro-community policing message to those units. Chief Stephens also made consistent efforts to provide information about department members’ achievements (e.g., in the agency’s *Behind the Badge* newsletter), and he used signs and symbols of change (posters highlighting principles, values, customer services, quality leadership, etc.).

Many study participants in San Diego considered the department’s concerted efforts to link traditional and problem solving approaches as having boosted internal support. Chief Sanders’ overall message early on was that "law enforcement tactics were not surrendered in a problem oriented police agency." Rather, neighborhood policing was consistently described as “expanding the selection of tools that can be used to deal with problems.” At the same time, the department emphasized that decisions should be based on the information collected when analyzing problems, not because “that’s the way we always respond to that particular problem.” Training materials emphasize that the department measures success either by reductions in calls for service or solving community problems. Chief Sanders also personally attended the monthly department-wide problem solving forums to show management his support for community policing and answer officers' questions about problem solving.
Comments on Empowering Others

To change behavior and build support, department administrators need to face the issue of internal resistance head on and then take a much more analytical approach than is usually seen. In other words, problem-solving is not just for patrol officers.

Further, any new chief heading a community policing transformation must squarely face the likelihood of resistance among some of his or her administrators. Twenty years in the future, perhaps all top commanders a new chief inherits will have “arrived” in terms of their community policing abilities and advocacy. Today, many of those high level commanders are still thoroughly vested in a traditional, command and control approach to conducting police business. And deputy or assistant chiefs who offer only “moderate” support for community policing may be damning it with faint praise. Police chiefs must have the power to appoint the top administrators of their choice if they hope to see a community policing transformation take hold during their tenure.

In attempting to transform the entire organization, empowerment of employees is a key step that is given more lip service than implementation. The CEO must identify barriers or resistance to change and deal with them. The CEO needs advocates or change agents, as Chris Argyris calls them, to push the vision throughout the organization and to build new teams, loyal to the vision of community policing. Risk-taking in decision making must be encouraged and mistakes must be tolerated in order to decentralize decision making throughout the organization. The steps are difficult. In this study, we did not find any departments that we would hold up as models for empowering employees. Most CEOs, especially being public employees, think the risks are just too great to relinquish too much control. Police officers already have a great deal of discretion working alone in the field. Most supervisors want close control over their officers to limit and monitor this discretion. The military model of close supervision is strongly institutionalized in police organizations.

In Tempe's attempt to advance the empowerment of officers through a new method of geographic deployment, the most resistance came from patrol sergeants. The department implemented a structure where a sergeant and eight to ten officers managed a
beat 24 hours a day. The sergeants were given maximum flexibility to set their own work schedules. Sergeants had to rotate days and shifts to meet with their officers, who were working different days and shifts. Most of the time, however, officers were on duty with very minimal supervision. The sergeants could not adapt to this level of officer empowerment. The experiment was halted after about six months.\(^9\) This matter is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.

At the beginning of any organizational transformation effort, the CEO should carefully take the pulse of the organization through internal employee surveys and focus groups. These methods are useful to assess employee morale, job satisfaction, communication issues, issues that are barriers to change, and other factors critical to empowerment.

It is also important to generate feelings of empowerment by involving employees in all stages of the change process—that is, in planning for as well as implementing change.

Chapter 10

Step F. Planning for and Creating Small, Short-Term Successes

- *It is critical to articulate the connection between the new approaches and the results. Results must be linked back to the vision and employees must be rewarded for the improvements.*

All the tomes on changing organizations point to this step as critical as an organizational transformation evolves. In order to maintain the momentum created in the Stage One steps, management must demonstrate that the vision has currency. The vision cannot win converts without results. In Chapter 5, we provided the example of the Ford Motor Company launching its new approach and vision: *Quality is Job 1.* This vision portrayed a radical change in car manufacturing—a change from productivity as the sole measure of success to including quality (reduction in mechanical problems after sale). The vision had the advantage of being easy to remember and understand. Anyone on the shop floor could tell you the new vision and what it meant. However, the vision would have gone nowhere if Ford had not quickly moved up in sales compared to its competition.

This step in the change process requires the creation of visible improvements—a sign that the vision works. Such successes often have to be directed. To ensure success, the improvements should involve small, short-term efforts or activities. The efforts must also be carefully measured to document the degree of success. The most obvious place to start with a small, short-term success in an organizational transformation to community policing is with problem solving.

Problem solving is one of the defining components of community policing. It is not possible to move a police agency to a community policing organization without it. In the twenty years since Goldstein (1979) first argued persuasively for the need to take a problem-oriented (rather than incident-driven) approach to police work, the majority of
agencies that profess to do community policing have embraced problem solving concepts in some way (Cordner, 1997; Community Policing Consortium, 1994; and numerous publications from the COPS Office).

Many early experiments involved training special units or teams to handle problem solving projects. The COPE squad in Baltimore County, Maryland (Hayeslip and Cordner, 1987), organized to address fear of crime issues, and New York City’s precinct-based CPOP units (Farrell, 1988) are early examples of this approach. Newport News, Virginia, was one of the few departments in the early- to mid-1980s that attempted department-wide problem solving (Eck and Spelman, 1987). Practitioners, researchers, and advocates involved in these early experiments articulated the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) problem solving process, which still represents the heart of police problem solving training today.

But the logistics involved in freeing up time for problem solving, and the change it represents in the focus and daily work of policing, make it difficult to infuse throughout an agency. Some variation of the special team approach still predominates today. This is true even in the progressive agencies studied for this project, although they were aggressively pursuing goals for department-wide involvement in problem solving.

**Problem Solving in Practice**

Initially, problem solving in St. Petersburg was emphasized only in the community policing division, and a problem solving guide was developed for community police officers. As noted earlier, Chief Stephens disbanded the separate division and consistently emphasized problem solving in all functions. For example, in 1995, communications center employees joined with police teams to participate in their problem solving projects. Department crime analysts analyzed repeat calls for service to determine locations where multiple calls originated and helped officers develop plans to identify and address the underlying problems.

Chief Stephens also initiated district-level POP meetings. These were held monthly, and Chief Stephens participated in most of them. The purpose was to
emphasize the value of problem solving, hold all levels and functions accountable for engaging in it, and generate ideas for solutions. POP training and the district POP meetings were credited for helping to build detective support for problem solving. In focus groups, a number of detectives said they were impressed with the extent of officers’ knowledge of their areas. Others noted the value of these meetings in getting sergeants on board with problem solving.

However, during focus groups and interviews, officers did air a number of complaints about the POP meetings. Some said too much time was spent developing impressive presentations for small or inconsequential problems, and that “POP meetings were driving the problem solving efforts instead of the other way around.” Others said POP meeting presentations should be made only on new problems or when different solutions are proposed. Others objected to the paperwork involved in writing up POP projects on activities that seemed routine; and still others wanted the officer role limited to starting the problem solving process, with supervisors or analysts following up on it.

All patrol officers in St. Petersburg were expected to participate in problem solving. However, the bulk of the problem solving activities were still performed by the specialized community police officers.

Early in Tempe’s community policing transformation, the problem solving effort during the Beat 16 experiment was not as extensive as the planners hoped it would be. The team worked on approximately 40 problem solving projects during the period from March 1991 to October 1992 (McEwen, 1994). Time was an issue (Beat 16 team members also answered calls for service), especially at first. Later, changes in officer work schedules and dispatching improvements freed up more time for problem solving there and in other beats. One of the main purposes of the beat team meetings was to plan how to proceed against specific problems.

The Tempe Police Department also focused on multi-agency problem-solving in the city. For example, inter-departmental service teams began meeting monthly. Composed of city agency representatives with decision-making authority (including police commanders), this team gained a reputation for “making things happen.” In the
view of chief Ron Burns, the police department’s collaborative approach “spread in terms of community government,” with other agencies coming to appreciate the problem solving process as they worked to become “seamless organizations.” The active involvement of all officers and sergeants in problem solving remained a continuing goal under his command.

For at least the past decade, the San Diego Police Department has emphasized problem solving as the foundation of all of its transformation efforts. Moreover, former chief Jerry Sanders stressed the value of problem solving in all functions, not just patrol. “It is my feeling,” noted Sanders (1996), “that everybody—whether you are a detective, patrol officer, or administrator—should be using problem solving.”

In order to demonstrate that problem solving is a short-term win for the community policing vision, departments must face the issue of how to measure the results of problem solving. A 1995 San Diego Police Department training guide states that effectiveness in police work means “solving community problems or reducing the number of calls for service. Not every police problem can be eliminated, but when calls for service start decreasing, the community and the police department take notice.” The department established a direct link between its objectives for problem solving and measurement of success with computer-assisted dispatch data on calls for service. San Diego also participated in a research effort to enhance its ability to do this.

Finally, through the Problem Analysis Advisory Committee, San Diego provided officers with a forum for building problem solving partnerships with outside agencies (see below).

**Problem Analysis Advisory Committee**

**San Diego, California**

The Problem Analysis Advisory Committee (PAAC) was formed in December 1988 to provide a forum where officers and community members could brainstorm using the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) problem solving model. Ever since that time, PAAC has held monthly meetings. Each month, people who have expressed an interest in PAAC are mailed an agenda before the meeting. Regular participants have become comfortable
with the SARA process. PAAC meetings use an informal format and are chaired by the Chief of Police.

As explained in the department’s *Problem Oriented Policing Training Guide* (1995), “[t]he role of outside agencies in the PAAC is very important as officers make new contacts, learn about available resources, and develop partnerships for solving community problems. The participation of other agencies reinforces the growing awareness in officers that the police cannot solve problems by themselves.”

In Portland, the Neighborhood Response Team (NRT) concept was developed in July 1990 in the North Precinct in response to the lack of time officers had to follow-up on neighborhood problems. NRT officers acted as the next stage in the problem solving process after the beat officer had identified a problem. The NRT officers would be called in as resources with enough time (they did not have to respond to calls) to comprehensively address the problem and carry out the plan with assistance from the beat officer. On the one hand, it makes sense to have a team of problem solving specialists to acts as a resource for the beat officers. On the other hand, it indicates that the bureau may not have integrated problem solving into all aspects of police work.

The Portland Police Bureau was also assisted in problem solving by the Neighborhood District Attorney program. This effort assigned a deputy district attorney to a specific police precinct to help identify the major public safety problems related to the area; key individuals, groups, and organizations wanting to improve the situation; and the existing resources within the community that could be used to resolve the problems.

On the organizational transformation national survey, 45 percent of respondents said that to a moderate or great extent they set up a problem solving system during the start-up phase of community policing (29 percent reported limited involvement in problem solving). Despite the long-standing emphasis on problem solving in the literature and by national organizations, another 27 percent did not include problem solving at all when they began community policing.

Also, only 43 percent of agencies (13 percent to a great extent, 30 percent to a moderate extent) reported developing information systems to support problem solving
(although another 35 percent reported making limited information system changes to support community policing).

**Comments on Problem Solving as a Short-Term Success**

In the research for this monograph, we found that numerous police agencies had made changes in the direction of implementing problem solving, but the changes were not universal. The agencies that did engage in extensive problem solving tended to collaborate with other city or county agencies (e.g., code enforcement) to share resources.

We also found a several factors that limited the success of problem solving:

- **Time.** Officers need time for problem solving. It is difficult to create uninterrupted blocks of time in a patrol day for problem solving. Calls for service are assigned too intermittently to allow for an officer spending 30-60 minutes on problem solving activities without being interrupted. The most successful problem solving examples involved agencies that assigned problem solving to officers or others (civilian analyst, civilian community service officer) who were relieved of call for service duty.

- **Lack of Technology.** Problem solving involves analyses of data and information that identifies repeat calls and patterns of problems. Most police agencies need to use more technology, such as mapping software, to help identify and analyze problems. The technology has to be a tool that is easy for officers to use or they won't use it. Information technology is also useful for tracking and evaluating problem solving efforts.
Step G. Implementing and Anchoring the New Approaches: Changing the Organization’s Culture, Structure, and Practices

- The organization’s structure, management systems, and policies must be in line with the vision.
- Changing the human resources policies—recruiting, hiring, training, performance evaluation, and promotions—serves as the foundation for community policing to become the culture of the organization.

The final step of institutionalizing the new community policing approaches is clearly the most difficult. The step involves changing the heart of the organization, not just tinkering at the edges. For community policing to endure in the organization, for it to last beyond the CEO who initiated it, it must be ingrained into the culture of the organization. This does not mean that all aspects of the preexisting culture must be replaced. But it does mean that the predominate culture must be community policing.

The core of transforming the organization to community policing department-wide involves changing the behavior of those who work there. The key is to commit to hiring and promoting people dedicated to community policing as a way of life in the organization. Thus, all critical human resources policies and practices should be changed to advance community policing.

The bible of any organization is its policies and procedures. A CEO cannot introduce a new way of doing business without revising the policies and procedures to encompass community policing’s vision, values, and practices.

Other changes in the organization have also been recommended by researchers and experts to help institutionalize community policing practices. Those changes include flattening the rank structure to enhance up and down communication and push decision making down in the ranks; decentralizing specialists; realigning beat boundaries; and assigning officers to permanent beats.
Changing the Culture

Culture refers to norms of behavior and shared values among a group of people. Norms of behavior are common or pervasive ways of acting that are found in a group and that persist because group members tend to behave in ways that teach these practices to new members, rewarding those who fit in and sanctioning those who do not. Shared values are important concerns and goals shared by most of the people in the group that tend to shape group behavior and that often persist over time even when group membership changes. (Kotter, 1996: 148)

According to Pascale (1997), at Sears, Shell Oil, and the U. S. Army, “the 800-pound gorilla that impaired performance and stifled change was culture;” and many other analysts warn against underestimating the difficulty involved in “driving people out of their comfort zones” (Kotter, 1996). Similarly, police culture is considered one of the most significant obstacles to implementing community policing (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990; Pelfrey and Greene, 1997; DeParis, 1997; Goldstein, 1993, 1997). But there are many perceptions of what is really meant by organizational culture, and in particular, by police culture.

In a well known article called, “The Asshole,” Van Maanen described police culture in terms of officers’ views of the public. Police divide people into three categories, he maintained: suspicious persons (those believed to have committed a crime), assholes (people who challenge police authority or legitimacy), and know nothings (ordinary citizens). (Van Maanen, 1978). More recently, Walsh illustrated cynicism about community policing by offering a quote from one commander: “ ‘I understand all the assholes are now called customers.’ ” (Walsh, 1995). In a similar vein, Hoover says, “When they [police officers] receive a lecture consisting of nothing but naïve platitudes about how they should be partners with community residents, they are likely to roll their eyes.” (Hoover, 1996).

Police culture is not always described in terms of cynicism. For example, analysts looking for common ground point to a commitment to protecting one another; a “blue collar” preoccupation with job security, salaries, and benefits (Bayley, 1994); or a desire to help others—probably the most common reason officers give for going into police work. Police employees also have been described as belonging to two cultures,
one of managers and one of workers (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983; Bailey, 1994; Nowicki, 1997). Others argue there are different cultures within and across police agencies (Mastrofski, 1987). For example, Dantzker (1997) notes the “widely varying police attitudes across types of police departments” as one reason for inconclusive research results on job satisfaction; and each police function (detectives, juvenile, patrol, etc.) may have its own sub-culture.

But one culture or many, resistance to change is widely considered to be a common denominator; and the larger, older, and more bureaucratic the organization—any organization, not just police agencies—the more resistant people are likely to be. Faced with the prospect of transformation, employees tend to protect their turf; resist identifying with the organization as a whole; retreat into the safety of their particular profession, function, or location; and either reject new ideas or “study ideas to death” (Pascale, 1997).

Successfully transforming an organization to community policing requires a complete change in the organizational culture. As Carter (1999) has stated,

Beyond organizational issues is the need to change the occupational attitudes, values, and beliefs of officers. We are asking officers to challenge conventional wisdom and perform tasks they have historically not been asked to do—in some cases, tasks they have been explicitly told to avoid. Because of the natural dogmatism humans experience, this intellectual shift is extraordinarily difficult. Officers experience dissonance in daily tasks while trying to assimilate cultural changes in the organization.

One question in the national survey for this project asked respondents to rate employee groups’ “acceptance thus far of your community policing efforts” (see Exhibit 5). Reported acceptance by the chief or sheriff at the responding agencies was nearly unanimous, with 88 percent reporting CEO acceptance to a great extent and 8.7 percent, to a moderate extent. Interestingly, CEO respondents reported moderate to great support for community policing among nearly three-fourths of sergeants (often considered among the most resistant of employee groups). The lack of acceptance of community policing by the unions, as interpreted by the CEO, is evident from the survey results.
Exhibit 5. Extent of Internal Acceptance of Community Policing Reported by CEO (or designated survey respondent) (N= 337)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee Group</th>
<th>Not At All</th>
<th>Limited Extent</th>
<th>Moderate Extent</th>
<th>Great Extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Staff</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Officers</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detectives</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-sworn Personnel</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a study of community policing at six departments, Weisel and Eck (1994) were encouraged by the finding that a solid core of personnel (ranging from 68 to 80 percent) believed “community policing is here to stay” (regardless of length of service, race, sex, or level of involvement in implementing community policing activities). They suggested that the stereotype of cynical, resistant police was over-rated. (Of course, believing community policing is here to stay does not necessarily mean believing it will affect one’s own daily work.)

Although the organizational transformation survey did not include a further breakdown of the “command staff” employee group, the earlier community policing training survey did. Training survey findings showed considerable support for community policing among all employees, with administrative personnel demonstrating the highest levels of support. Most respondents (nearly 78 percent) reported that officers above the level of captain strongly supported community policing, 54 percent believed lieutenants and captains demonstrated a high level of support, and 45 percent reported strong support among civilians. Nearly 90 percent believed support among both sergeants and officers was at least moderate, but strong support was reported for only 28 percent of sergeants and 26 percent of officers (McEwen and Pandey, 1997).
The fact that 40 percent of the transformation survey respondents report less than “great” acceptance among their command staff should raise a red flag. If commanders (and others) cannot be convinced to support the transformation, neutralizing them is often recommended—for example, by forcing early retirements, making lateral transfers, or eliminating positions (Kotter, 1996). This is often easier said than done in the public sector (Hoover, 1996), either because of the political nature of high-level appointments, because of civil service regulations, or sometimes because of tradition. For example, assistant chiefs in San Diego serve at the pleasure of the chief, but none were replaced by Chief Sanders when he took command. As Sanders explained, “It has always been that you step in and work with the [existing] teams. That is just our culture.” But whatever the situation, something more than a "moderate" commitment among commanders is needed.

Some of the community policing literature has recommended changing the organizational culture first—working to introduce new norms and values. After the culture is changed, some researchers argue, then the other changes in community policing will follow.

However, CEOs cannot change culture that easily. The culture change will not occur early in the transformation process; it will occur very slowly over a period of many years. In some cases, it will take a generation of officers to change the culture. Culture changes when workers in the organization see a connection between the vision, new approaches, and new results that benefit the workers.

**Human Resources Policies**

In Scott Adams' Dilbert cartoon series, Catbert, the "evil H.R. Director," wields great power over Dilbert's organization. As Catbert cavalierly fires staff without the slightest compunction, his motto is, "You can't spell 'who cares?' without H.R." The message is clear—HR is power.

Transformation is said to involve “an honest-to-God change in human behavior on the job.” (Pascale, 1997). For community policing, this means officer (and other employee) involvement in problem solving and in various other tasks that might roughly fall into the categories of community outreach or partnership building. At the same time,
no department in the U.S. is giving up its basic law enforcement functions in the name of community policing. Rather, community policing represents a broadening of police functions (Buerger, et al., 1999; Cordner, 1997; Kelling and Moore, 1988). It acknowledges that peace keeping, order maintenance, and service have always been part of police work (Van Maanen, 1978; Walker, 1995). But as Walker points out, “there is no ‘watchman’ model worth returning to.” (Walker, 1995). Community policing is not walking a beat and rattling doorknobs. Problem solving and partnership building require new skills and abilities and commensurate rewards for using them.

Responses to the survey for this project (see Exhibit 6) suggest that organizational transformation efforts are still quite limited when measured by changes in human resources policies. Most responding agencies had made a considerable investment in community policing training, but only about one-third reported revising job descriptions, the promotional process, and other personnel policies (to a moderate or great extent) as a result of community policing. Collectively, the case study sites provide examples of a wide range of personnel policy changes; but no single site made significant changes in all areas of human resources policy.
Exhibit 6. Extent to Which Police Agencies Made Personnel Changes Related to Community Policing (N=337)

Personnel Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Changes</th>
<th>Not At All</th>
<th>Limited Extent</th>
<th>Moderate Extent</th>
<th>Great Extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Revised department’s recruitment process to attract personnel with community policing capabilities.</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Revised recruit selection process.</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Introduced post-academy training for recruits.</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Revised the job descriptions of officers to emphasize community policing.</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Revised performance evaluation process to emphasize community policing accomplishments.</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Revised the promotional process to emphasize community policing accomplishments.</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recruitment Process, Selection Criteria, and Job Descriptions

One frequently discussed way to boost organizational support for community policing over time is to recruit and train a “new breed” of officer. In addition to the skills and abilities traditionally associated with success in police work, community policing demands above average skills in verbal and written communication, the ability to work closely with people from all walks of life, and a strong desire to develop skills in conflict resolution and creative problem solving through collaboration. The challenge for police departments is to reach out and attract individuals who might otherwise not think of police work, such as persons in education and social work fields. However, according to a previous ILJ community policing training survey, only about 26 percent of law enforcement agencies had changed their recruit selection process or criteria as part of their commitment to community policing (McEwen and Pandey, 1997). Similarly, only about 30 percent of transformation survey respondents (Exhibit 6 above) report having
revised their recruit selection process (to a great or moderate extent) because of community policing.

None of the case study sites changed recruitment processes as a result of community policing. Portland stands out for its aggressive efforts (with varying results) to recruit members of racial and ethnic minority groups; but these efforts pre-dated or ran concurrently with the shift to community policing, rather than resulting from it directly. However, all four sites eventually made changes in their recruit selection criteria that they attributed to community policing.

Tempe administrators strongly believed it was not enough to hire recruits with the same characteristics and backgrounds as in the past, and then hope they could be trained to fit the “community policing mold.” The “Selection ‘90” task force in Tempe conducted a comprehensive job task analysis of the officer position and identified several “performance dimensions” it believed were directly related to community policing. The task force then revised the recruit selection criteria to reflect a greater emphasis on interpersonal skills. The task force also adopted new selection interview questions and role-play exercises related to problem solving and decision making.

Among the study sites, only Portland and Tempe made significant changes in written job descriptions as a result of community policing. As former Assistant Chief Williams in Portland pointed out, departments generally hire and train people “to be fact finders and report takers, to testify in court—tasks that are very focused, very concrete.” If community policing means additional and very different tasks, job descriptions must include these. In addition to revising its job descriptions, the Portland Police Bureau, aided by outside consultants, also revised the psychological profile for recruits (the most recent prior revision was in 1970). Portland also revised the criteria for background checks to be more consistent with the department’s community policing principles. Starting in the early 1990s, the police bureau's materials (including those on its World Wide Web site) began using the term “community police officers.”

A number of study participants in Portland discussed the effect of these changes. Fifteen years ago, they said, most recruits would have had experience in sports or the
military, with self-discipline and assertiveness among their most valued personality traits. Eight years ago, recruits were younger and were generally characterized as less aggressive with more limited life experiences. Currently, Portland is a young department; the majority of officers and a number of supervisors have fewer than five years on the force. Like Portland, Tempe significantly increased its personnel to support community policing and is also a young department. This situation can ultimately benefit community policing in an agency where the philosophy is emphasized in training and practiced on the street. Years from now, officers who “remember the traditional policing days” will be in the minority. Of course there are tradeoffs. Officers with limited policing and life experience and fewer community contacts may need more training, coaching, specific direction, and supervision.

Portland is also among the minority of U. S. police agencies that require recruits to have a four-year college degree. Sometimes, this policy meets with union resistance; and without aggressive recruitment efforts, it may decrease the pool of eligible minority candidates. However, the union in Portland supported the college requirement because, according to some study participants, it offered a good argument for increased pay. Tempe also attempted to institute a four-year college degree requirement for recruits, but was not successful. City management did not support the change because they feared it would lead to increased police salaries.

Although no changes in recruit selection or job descriptions were noted in St. Petersburg, the department involved community members in selecting community policing specialist officers (CPOs) for its area teams. One lesson learned, according to many study participants, was that it is a mistake to assume older officers will be resistant to change and inappropriate as CPOs. Sometimes less experienced officers, they said, are eager to succeed but do not yet have the core experience and community contacts that veteran officers can bring to the job.

Training

A shift to department-wide community policing implies “[c]hanged and augmented responsibilities” for sworn and civilian line personnel and “redefined job
functions at all levels of management” (BJA Community Policing Consortium, 1994). These changes must be accompanied by training in the skills, knowledge, and abilities needed to perform the new functions. The transformation survey for this project did not explore training issues because the earlier ILJ training survey examined training content, hours, delivery methods, and needs for recruits, officers, FTOs, managers, community members and others. Some of the national trends from the training survey are listed below.¹⁰

- Academy training for recruits on community policing was most often provided through separate courses (e.g., philosophy of community policing, community policing concepts, problem solving concepts, etc.) Only about 18 percent of academies reported incorporating the community policing philosophy into all recruit courses.

- About 39 percent of law enforcement agencies said they had provided community policing orientation or training sessions to all patrol officers (another 53 percent had provided it to some patrol officers).

- Most agencies (89.8 percent) reported using FTOs, but only about one-fourth of academies or agencies offered community policing training to FTOs beyond that available to all veteran officers.

- Only 24.5 percent of academies provided training for community members in community policing, although 82 percent said they believed citizens needed such training and that citizens and police officers should attend certain types of training courses together.

- Only about 20 percent of academy directors reported offering training for management on changing the police organizational culture, leadership for community policing, total quality management (TQM) in policing, or strategic planning for community policing.

- Similarly, fewer than 20 percent of department administrators and training directors reported having provided training in managing department resources for community policing (18 percent) or in leadership for community policing (15 percent).

- Telephone interviews were conducted with a subset of 95 administrators in agencies that had reported department-wide community policing. In those departments, 63 percent had provided all managers with some type of community policing training (through workshops, conferences, in-service courses, etc.) and 33 percent had provided it to some managers. In only 11 of the 95 agencies (11.6 percent) was management-level training in community policing considered part of the promotional process.

¹⁰ For a complete discussion of the community policing training survey findings, see Tom McEwen and Rachana Pandey, National Assessment of Community Policing National Institute of Justice, 1997.
In both the written questionnaire and telephone interviews for the training study, we asked academy directors and police executives for advice about community policing training. A significant number emphasized the importance of training executives, managers, and/or supervisors before training patrol officers, sometimes noting problems that had occurred by taking the opposite approach. As one academy director expressed it, “[W]e have learned that field supervisors should be trained first, so that supervisors can better set expectations, answer questions, and help further the process of change within the organization.”

Portland provides an example of a department that did train administrators in community policing before requiring all officers to be trained. In 1990, this included three days of training in problem solving delivered to 45 employees and five neighborhood representatives; two days of police instructor training; a two-day community policing seminar for command staff (delivered by Chris Braiden, former Superintendent in Edmonton, Canada; Robert Trojanowitz, former Director of Michigan State University's Community Policing Center; and Cornelius Behan, former Chief of Police in Baltimore County, Maryland). Another one-day community policing seminar for command staff was held several months later. From January through May, 1991, the police bureau provided eight hours of in-service training to other personnel that included an overview of the community policing philosophy, problem solving, the bureau's community policing values, and other topics. The police bureau also partnered with the Oregon State Police Academy to develop ways to incorporate community policing into all recruit training topics (including defensive tactics, investigations, firearms, and others). Several study participants noted a current need to develop and provide training in leadership specifically in the context of community policing.

In terms of revising recruit training for community policing, in 1996, the Regional Public Safety Training Institute in San Diego received an NIJ grant to help make extensive revisions to the recruit curriculum and to measure the results, with a goal of incorporating community policing into all recruit training classes. To launch this effort, 85 subject matter experts sat in on all classes of the academy’s 35th session, then recommended revisions to a chief’s advisory board. As a result, 64 classes were expected
to add community policing and problem solving material. Pre-and post-tests were used to compare the problem solving and community policing knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the 35th and 36th academy sessions with those of subsequent groups. San Diego was also among the minority of U. S. departments that offered specialized in-service training for detectives in community policing.

When community policing was launched in St. Petersburg, intensive training efforts were geared primarily to the needs of the officers selected to serve as CPOs. Training for supervisors and managers focused on how to facilitate problem solving. Eventually over the next three years, all employees received community policing training; and study participants noted that the quality of training (instructors and materials) improved with experience. St. Petersburg also re-evaluated the academy curriculum and the FTO program to incorporate more training in community policing. During one phase of field training, probationary officers were placed with CPOs, and performance ratings included assessments of community policing skills (e.g., problem solving).

Tempe’s approach in the early stages of community policing was similar to St. Petersburg’s, in that a specialized group of officers received the most intensive training. From January 1991 to October 1992, Beat 16 team members received 14 separate training classes on topics related to community policing. They also attended conferences on problem solving (e.g., San Diego’s POP conference). Training on community policing principles was delivered to all officers during 1991-1992. Outside trainers included Jerry Sanders and Nancy McPherson (the neighborhood policing manager) from San Diego.

Although the case study sites have incorporated community policing into many aspects of training, the consensus across the sites was that more training was needed. Police training nationally is limited by a lack of resources for and commitment to continuous learning. Many managers and supervisors think of their job as overseeing or monitoring the work but not training, which is viewed as a specialized activity. In the military, combat troops spend the majority of their time in training exercises. Every conceivable activity is viewed as a training opportunity. For example, if a unit was going
to an offsite area for a training exercise, even the transportation to the area would be viewed as part of the exercise.

Many study participants specifically stressed the need for better training of and by field training officers (FTOs). It is still fairly common for an officer to learn about community policing in the academy, they said, only to have FTOs tell them to forget it.

Case study participants (like the training survey respondents) also emphasized that, after laying a philosophical foundation, training must move quickly into practical applications for each specific function within the organization. For these reasons, “canned” training packages were not well received; the material must be customized to reflect a knowledge of local conditions (internal and external). These points were emphasized by many administrators, including Assistant Chief Dave Williams in Portland, who said:

Training sets the tone, the foundation, and the expectations. I think we hit that area [training] the hardest, yet in some ways really missed the mark. . . . [It was] very theoretical and conceptual. We really didn't do the job we thought we had in breaking it down into its nuts and bolts. If I am an officer on the street, a clerk in the office, how does community policing make my job different from what I normally do? How is it different under community policing?

The lesson we learned was to . . . get right into the nuts and bolts: Okay, here is community policing. This is what it means. Now here are the job elements. Here is what your job description is now under this framework. We did that for everybody in the organization, even the chief of police.

Performance Evaluations and Promotions

All of the CEOs and top administrators from the case study sites agreed that promotions must reward efforts to change the organizational culture, or there will be no change. As one respondent to the earlier training survey emphasized when asked to provide “hindsight” on this issue,

Evaluations, promotional materials, and other aspects of police officer duties did not ‘officially’ include community policing. As a result, this is where the logjam of acceptance was seen most.
In Portland, Chief Potter invoked the “rule of five” for promotions; that is, rather than automatically selecting the highest-ranked promotional candidate, he chose from among the top five, making sure those selected were pro-community policing. Although this was not entirely accepted by the department and was resisted by the union, it drove the point home to many officers that unless they “got on board,” they would never work their way up. Later, Chief Moose published a memorandum delineating the organization’s expectations for promotion.

When the study period ended, Portland was still attempting to revamp its officer performance evaluation criteria to reflect the department’s commitment to community policing and to finalize the performance appraisal system for command ranks. These had been goals for department administrators for several years and were priorities for Assistant Chief Dave Williams during the study period. The police bureau retained a private consulting firm to assist in this process.

Community members in both Portland and St. Petersburg reported a great deal of frustration when neighborhood community policing officers were promoted or transferred. Residents often resented the department, they said, for removing an officer they had learned to trust, especially in communities with a history of poor police-community relations. But for many police managers, promoting neighborhood officers, or transferring them after a year or two, was seen as essential to the community policing transition for two reasons:

- When placed in new positions, they could positively influence the behavior of other officers.
- When their replacements were also willing to strengthen community relationships and address problems, the department demonstrated an organizational commitment to community policing. In other words, it could show that community policing was more than just a function of one officer’s personality or style. Also, it increased the number of officers the community had close contact with.

Of course, no department has enough supervisory or management positions to reward all successful neighborhood officers with promotions. Study participants in St. Petersburg noted that, before community policing, officers who were promoted were
usually the ones who had demonstrated success in specialty units, a situation typical of many departments. Chief Curtsinger, they said, shifted the focus to patrol: promoting officers based on community policing successes in patrol would be one way to encourage “buy in.” Under Chief Stephens, problem solving became more important in the promotional process. He also felt strongly that pro-community policing officers, once promoted or transferred to specialty units, would help integrate problem solving into non-patrol functions. “I recognize that not all officers have an equal opportunity to be involved in community policing,” he said, “but I did not want to promote those who were anti-community policing.”

During Chief Stephens’ tenure, the department also established a formal career development process that provided new police employees with information to help them reach personal career goals. Officers received counseling from immediate supervisors; training recommendations; and advice on developing the competencies needed for the jobs to which they wanted to advance. When CPOs were transferred or promoted, St. Petersburg first looked to the area’s team to find a replacement, since other team members already knew the area. In several parts of the city, this made for a smooth transition.

Other Incentives

Except for pay increases, promotions, and significant improvements in working conditions, most incentives are not very valuable in motivating resistant officers to adopt community policing strategies. The consensus from the study sites was that rewards for problem solving and other community policing activities were important to the overall transformation effort; but several participants stressed these should supplement, not replace, recognition for bravery or well-executed enforcement actions. Some examples of incentives used at the study sites are provided below.
Exhibit 7.  Incentives and Rewards for Community Policing Efforts

- Ceremonies to honor both community and department members for problem solving, citizen involvement, and partnership building (Portland).
- Letters of commendation for community policing excellence (Portland).
- Precinct-level employee recognition program (Portland).
- Chief’s Forum problem solving award (Portland).
- Allowing community policing officers to host visiting agencies (all study sites).
- National attention and recognition for community policing efforts (all study sites).
- Volunteer recognition events (all study sites).
- Recognition in department newsletters, newspaper articles, etc. (all study sites).
- Low interest mortgages for officers who purchased homes in troubled neighborhoods (St. Petersburg, April 1995).

Changing the Organization Structure

Decentralization

In Cordner's (1996) "organizational dimension" of community policing, he isolates one element of this dimension that he refers to as "restructuring." As Cordner notes, the types of restructuring associated with community policing include: decentralization (delegating to lower ranks), flattening (reducing layers of hierarchy), de-specialization (reducing specialized units to devote more resources to community policing), teams (teamwork), and civilianization (allowing non-sworn to handle non-emergency calls in the field).

In order to institutionalize the community policing vision in a police organization, some degree of decentralization is necessary. The term decentralization in community policing has been applied to several different, though related, concepts. First, decentralization involves “pushing down decisionmaking,” that is, permitting decisions to
be made at the lowest reasonable organizational levels. This was discussed under *Step E. Empowerment*. Second, decentralization involves reducing the number of levels or ranks within the organization. The desired results are to make supervisors more accessible by reducing the layers of bureaucracy, and to ensure communication reaches the lowest levels (Maguire, 1997\(^{11}\); Silverman, 1995). Third, decentralization often refers to making patrol and other police services (e.g., investigations) more accessible physically by locating them in area precinct stations, mini-stations, satellite offices, storefronts, neighborhood service centers, etc. Theoretically, precinct or area station commanders (and in turn, their field supervisors and community policing officers) know their areas’ needs and resources better than central administrators. Thus, they should have greater autonomy under community policing than under a “central control and command” model—but with safeguards in place to prevent potential political manipulation and corruption. In practice, many departments are struggling with how to place greater control of resources in the hands of precinct commanders (see, for example, Pelfrey and Greene’s report (1997) on organizational transformation in Philadelphia).

Another change considered important to the community policing transformation, and also noted by Cordner (1996), is *de-specialization*. This may involve reducing the number of special units; reducing the number of investigative specialties; assigning more investigative responsibility to patrol officers; or making greater use of non-sworn community service officers, volunteers, telephone report units, and other alternatives for handling minor incidents, routine paperwork, and other tasks. Some importance is also placed on “de-formalization” (Maguire, 1997) in community policing, based on the reasoning that if community policing means less micro-management, notebooks of department directives need not be so thick.

Several questions on the organizational transformation national survey for this project asked about organizational restructuring resulting from community policing. Results are listed below:

---

\(^{11}\) Maguire’s study found that "police departments showed a significant decrease in organizational height." (p. 586). However, in his conclusion, Maguire found no significant differences in structural change between police organizations that have not implemented community policing and those that have.
• 11 percent of respondents, to a great or moderate extent, had eliminated one or more ranks (another 8 percent to a limited extent).

• 25 percent, to a great or moderate extent, had decentralized detectives (another 18 percent to a limited extent).

• 56 percent, to a great or moderate extent, pushed decision making to lower ranks (another 33 percent to a limited extent).

We can see some evidence in these findings that institutionalizing the community policing vision is hard to do. Few agencies have taken the transformation steps to flatten the ranks or decentralize detectives. However, most responding agencies had made efforts to push decision making to lower ranks.

Among the case study sites, Tempe made the most far-reaching effort to streamline the reporting lines and reduce the number of ranks. Between 1988 and 1993 the department eliminated five ranks: assistant chief, major, captain, corporal, and senior detective. For the past four years, the ranks in Tempe have been chief of police, commander, lieutenant, sergeant, and officer. Just last year, due to growth in the size of the force, the chief added a single assistant chief position.

Shortly before Chief Burgreen retired in San Diego, the department eliminated the ranks of deputy chief and commander. Reporting directly to the chief are six assistant chiefs (unclassified positions) and the personnel director. The next highest rank is captain (there are 15 captain positions). In St. Petersburg in 1993, the deputy chief position was eliminated and the department was reorganized from a five-bureau to a three-bureau structure (Uniform Services, Investigative Services, and Administrative Services).

The chiefs interviewed noted that these changes, flattening the ranks, helped to improve communications up and down the organization. As Chief Burns stated, "In a city with a population of 150,000 people, I can still hold a meeting of all our mid-level management (lieutenants and above) on a few days notice and get all of them in the room to discuss policy changes."

San Diego, St. Petersburg, and Tempe all made considerable progress in terms of de-specialization. In San Diego, there were approximately 50 civilian community service
officers (CSOs) in patrol divided among the service areas and another 19 who were fluent in various Asian languages and dialects. These 19 worked in storefronts in communities with predominately Asian populations. Telephone report units (TRUs) are also decentralized at the station level and are usually staffed by injured or disabled officers, although CSOs are also used. San Diego also uses civilian investigative aides. In addition, San Diego counts its department volunteers at about 1200. Some of these are trained to take minor accident and other reports. Others have been trained in problem solving. Many examples of volunteer work are contained in the publication, *Community Law Enforcement: The Success of San Diego’s Volunteer Policing Program* (Kessler and Wartell, 1996). Tempe also makes excellent use of volunteers. A recent publication noted that volunteers give the police department over 100,000 hours of service per year. In addition, civilian CSOs in Tempe handle about 15 percent of the call load for sworn patrol officers.

**Geographic Deployment**

Assigning patrol officers permanently to one beat (beat integrity) opens the door for community engagement and problem solving to come together. Further, if officers are to have any chance of knowing, and then “owning” specific areas, beats must often be scaled down to a manageable size and redrawn to conform more closely to residents’ perceptions of neighborhoods (rather than census tract lines, for example). The word *permanent* in the context of beat assignments typically means one or two years. Permanence also implies an end to such practices as rotating shifts and a reduction in cross-beat dispatches.

In numerous focus groups with Portland citizens, participants said the overwhelming hurdle to long-lasting relationship building (building trust) was that officers changed positions too often. Those changes hinder relationship building not just with neighborhoods but also with other agencies in the city and with the private sector.

Geographic deployment for community policing also means geographic accountability, and this means changes in the type and level of supervision needed. Field supervisors must not only monitor but also facilitate the work of neighborhood oriented,
problem-solving officers. In theory, these supervisors should also be accountable for a specific geographic area, rather than a particular shift. In practice, resistance to this change can be anticipated. Supervisors’ responsibilities may increase under this scheme. New skills may be needed (coaching, group facilitating, data analysis, etc.). And it may seem unreasonable to be held responsible 24 hours a day for an area while providing only eight hours of daily, direct supervision.

Two key questions on the national survey asked about these important factors in organizational transformation. Results for responding agencies are listed below:

- 71 percent, to a great or moderate extent, gave geographic responsibility to patrol (another 18 percent to a limited extent).
- 46 percent, to a great or moderate extent, said that community policing start-up included "changing beat boundaries to align with neighborhoods" (another 18 percent to a limited extent).

All four case study sites were committed to getting patrol officers closer to citizens for a continuous period so they could become more familiar with an area, experience some sense of ownership in it, and engage in problem solving. Three sites (Tempe, San Diego, and St. Petersburg) made significant revisions to beat boundaries to create new community policing areas. Portland did not, although it did re-draw its precincts to correspond more closely with Office of Neighborhood Assistance service areas, and it created two new precincts later in the transformation process.

In Tempe, the changes in geographic deployment and accountability occurred in three phases over a two-year period (1992-1993). These are outlined below along with the key changes that characterized each phase.

- Phase I (pre-alignment phase) (July-December, 1992)
  - Four quadrants were established in field operations.
  - One lieutenant was assigned to each quadrant. Lieutenants were relieved of shift responsibilities and given geographic assignments to monitor neighborhood problems.
  - Patrol sergeants were asked to list their top choices for beat assignments. Sergeants were given training on community policing.
With crime analysis assistance and based on call for service data, new beat configurations were developed within each quadrant (the emphasis was on matching neighborhood boundaries).

- Phase II (alignment phase) (January-June, 1993)
  - Sergeants were assigned to new beats and developed work schedules for the officers to be assigned to them in phase III. In each beat, a team of 12-16 officers had to provide coverage 24 hours a day.
  - Staffing levels were developed based on call for service analysis for each of 15 beats.
  - “Internal recruitment” began. Officers bid for beats; assignments were made based on officer preferences and seniority.

- Phase III (assignment phase) (began July 1, 1993)
  - Sergeants became responsible for their geographic areas (beats) rather than shifts. Sergeants worked flexible hours and days (e.g., Monday and Tuesday/Thursday/Saturday) to make contact with all of their officers each week. Some "sergeants-at-large" were assigned to ensure full supervision coverage for the city.
  - Sergeants were responsible for seeing that officer work schedules ensured 24-hour beat coverage.
  - Daily roll calls were eliminated. Instead, weekly or bi-weekly team meetings were held.

These changes in geographic deployment, along with supporting changes to flatten the organization and to empower sergeants and officers, were considered among the most extensive in the nation. However the process was not without difficulties. In 1994, the department formed a patrol workload team composed of patrol commanders, lieutenants, and sergeants to review the geographic deployment in patrol. Although the group identified a long list of benefits derived from the new deployment scheme, most sergeants voiced concerns: lack of 24-hour beat supervision (officers working when sergeants were not), increased sergeant workloads, too much beat integrity, too many different officer work schedules to organize, lack of daily communication with officers, little time for mentoring new officers. In 1995, the chief of police agreed to modify the deployment plan by allowing sergeants to go back to working shifts but still maintaining responsibility for the geographic beat area.
In San Diego in 1993, Chief Sanders appointed a restructuring committee headed by [then executive assistant chief] Norm Stamper. A major objective was to develop a plan for aligning police service areas with neighborhoods rather than with census tracts as in the past. Over a six-month period, the restructuring committee held a series of “community mapping” meetings throughout the city. Coordinated by the department’s neighborhood policing manager and hosted by area captains, these meetings served as forums for discussing the restructuring project, raising concerns, and offering ideas. Chief Sanders describes the meetings this way:

We actually went out to every community in San Diego and said, ‘Draw what your neighborhood looks like on this map.’ It came up to 105 neighborhoods. Then we said, ‘Draw what your community looks like, the areas you feel are part of your community.’ What we finally came up with through this process was 21 areas, and those became our beats.

The department’s Neighborhood Watch Board and the city council-appointed Citizen Advisory Board reviewed the plan; open employee meetings were held; a state-wide survey of other departments was conducted; and technical assistance and cost projections were provided by various internal units (crime analysis, communications, fiscal management, long range planning and others). The 1994 report, *Neighborhood Policing: The Next Generation*, contains 42 recommendations that served as the department’s plan for community policing implementation for at least the next four years.

On September 10, 1994, the new plan’s primary components were implemented in two field operations divisions (also called area commands) that served as demonstration sites: the Northeastern Division, which was divided into the North and South service areas; and the Southern Division, divided into the Border and South Bay service areas. The executive lieutenant position at both divisions was eliminated. Each of the four service areas had the following characteristics (now in all service areas):

- Covered 3 to 5 beats
- Was supervised by a lieutenant with 24-hour responsibility
- Had patrol and investigative teams headed by sergeants (investigators were generalists except juvenile and auto theft).
• Had 5 non-sworn, uniformed, community service officers (CSOs). These CSOs took non-emergency crime reports in the field and were assigned to all 3 shifts.

The department also administered a “neighborhood policing restructuring project survey” in September 1994 and 1995 to all employees in the demonstration divisions and a control group of employees in other divisions. This was a comprehensive survey covering job characteristics, supervisor leadership and support, and other areas as well as knowledge of and use of problem oriented policing and neighborhood policing concepts, time spent on calls, time spent on activities associated with problem solving, perceptions of neighborhood problems, and level of success in solving problems. These survey results were used to make fine-tuning adjustments in the restructuring plan.

Throughout 1991, the St. Petersburg Police Department used a split-force concept to implement community policing in the city’s three patrol districts. Calls for service workloads, as well as neighborhood and natural boundaries, were used to divide the city into 44 community policing areas within three patrol districts. Each area was assigned a community policing officer (CPO) who did not usually handle calls for service. These CPOs were supervised by a separate community policing division rather than by district- or area-level field supervisors.

St. Petersburg originally chose this structure to emphasize the importance of community policing to the public and the local government. Some study participants felt community policing actually succeeded because its status as a separate division helped keep it alive during the transition from Curtsinger to (interim chief) Vines to Stephens. However, most agreed it contributed to tension between CPOs and “regular” patrol officers, a problem compounded by location of the community policing division in a building separate from uniform services.

At a February 1993 retreat shortly after he took charge, Chief Stephens announced his intention to change this organizational arrangement (SPPD, 1993):

[I]n my opinion, we cannot argue this is a major philosophical change in policing if we have only 5 to 10 percent of our human resources engaged. If this approach is truly going to be a part of our philosophy...
of policing, each and every individual in the organization must understand their role and what they are supposed to contribute.

One of the first steps toward this goal was to merge the community policing division under the uniform services division, and to bring it back from the separate building as well. The next step was to bring CPOs and patrol officers in each area together as a team under the same sergeant. Many CPOs were concerned that their supervising sergeants had not “bought into” community policing and would assign them back to handling radio calls. At this stage in the transformation, patrol officers were already assigned geographically, but sergeants were still deployed temporally. One objective, then, was to get sergeants in line with patrol.

Today, community policing area (CPA) teams in St. Petersburg generally consist of one community policing officer, three to five patrol officers, one or more investigators, supervisory personnel, community members, and representatives from other city departments. The teams are supervised by patrol sergeants whose geographic responsibilities may include several CPAs. Sergeants have both geographic and temporal responsibilities. Sergeants on each shift serve as team leaders and are responsible for coordinating work across shifts. CPOs help facilitate communication between officers on different shifts serving the same areas. Lieutenants manage several sergeants and their teams and are expected to have an understanding of larger and possibly inter-related problems. This team approach began in District II, and after a six-month pilot test and three months additional planning, was implemented in the other two districts.

New Ways of Measuring Success

In a recent article, Greene (2000) discusses four “levels of change for community policing”—areas where change issues can be expected to arise and where new outcome measures are likely to be needed. The “environmental” level refers to changes outside the organization, including greater public support for police and changes in neighborhood dynamics and capacity, as well as reductions in crime, fear, and problems. The other three levels of change in Greene’s construct are internal: “individual” (e.g., greater job satisfaction), “group” (e.g., more teamwork), and “organizational.” As Greene explains it, at the organizational level, anticipated changes include changes in culture, structure,
and human resources, such as those discussed earlier in this chapter, and also changes in the ways in which organizations measure effectiveness.  

**External Outcomes of Community Policing**

Regardless of the organization’s overriding philosophy (crime fighting, community policing, zero tolerance), there is a belief that police can have an impact on crime. Data on reported crime clearly should not be the sole measure of that impact, yet the release of UCR statistics comparing this year with last is still an “annual ritual” involving the police, politicians, and the media (Stephens, 1996).

So far, community policing organizations have not been much more successful than traditional agencies at measuring their crime fighting success. Few rigorous studies of community policing’s impact on crime have been conducted, although there are many case studies and stories. However, researchers have filled volumes with ideas (some more practical than others) for showing effectiveness in reducing and preventing crime. For example, with community policing in mind some have recommended:

- Improving the capacity to analyze, and placing greater emphasis on, call for service data as a measure of police impact on crime (and related problems)
- Measuring reductions in repeat victimizations for certain types of crimes (e.g., domestic assault) (Sherman, 1998)
- Selectively evaluating effectiveness in preventing specific types of crime in specific locations (Bayley, 1996)
- Conducting local victimization surveys (e.g., recent OJP efforts to adapt National Victimization Survey questionnaires and software for local use).

In short, community policing leaders inherit from their predecessors a continuing need to demonstrate impact on crime more accurately and completely. As Bayley (1996) points

---

12 Greene also includes “technology” as an organizational area in which change issues can be anticipated. This is discussed in Chapter 12.
13 A notable exception is the long-term evaluation of Chicago CAPS by Skogan, Hartnett et al. (various publications since the evaluation began in 1994).
14 An ongoing study by Dr. Tom McEwen, et al. for NIJ is focusing on the use of CAD data to support community policing.
out, in part because they lack measures of effectiveness, policing agencies are missing opportunities to take credit for much of what they do.

Along those lines, then, it is important to measure the broader functions emphasized under community policing. Kelling (1996) makes the point that even in private sector organizations, profit is an important goal, but it is not the only goal. Similarly, he says, reducing crime is “one element of the bottom line in policing [but] it is not the bottom line.” Kelling notes that while it is fairly obvious that organizations have multiple goals (and will thus need multiple measures of success), the point tends to get lost in police departments.

New mission statements for community policing certainly portray multiple goals—not only to reduce crime but also to solve problems, improve the quality of life, build partnerships, or even mobilize neighborhoods. This raises public expectations. Problem solving is crime related (e.g., identifying and reducing repeat crimes in hot spots), but it includes addressing behaviors and conditions that are not necessarily violations of criminal law. Moreover, success in problem solving is closely linked to partnership building goals, in the sense that the community is involved in identifying which problems are most important and is also enlisted to help resolve them.

In measuring success in these endeavors, policing agencies will again have to do more than count beans (e.g., numbers of beat meetings held). More is needed to determine whether problem solving, partnership building, and outreach efforts have produced the intended results. Measures suggested by various researchers include:

- Using CAD data (as noted earlier) to assess changes in crimes and problems not normally captured in crime and arrest reports.

- Analyzing new information about “community stabilization and capacity building” and “community health” (Greene, 2000). Suggested measures have included new business starts, repeat business, changes in home ownership, and observable changes in the physical appearance of neighborhoods.

- Assessing citizen perceptions of their safety, as measured by community surveys conducted before and at various stages of community policing implementation.
• Analyzing residents’ perceptions of the police and the extent to which they work proactively with police. Surveys can indicate changes in these areas. Departments can also assess the level and nature of volunteerism and the results of that work.

• Assessing changes in the number and nature of citizen complaints against police.

• Analyzing traffic stops by race. Analyzing data on arrests by race and type of offense, and involving community members in these analyses.

Implicit in the search for new measures is the need to break down findings to determine specifically who has been affected by problem solving efforts, and with whom the department has been building alliances. For example, Skogan and Hartnett (1999) report impressive results from the Chicago CAPS effort in neighborhoods that are primarily African American and white, but less impact in predominately Hispanic neighborhoods.

Departments might also examine their efforts for building partnerships with juveniles. Bazemore and Senjo (1997), although not specifically discussing how to measure organizational change, raise an interesting question: Will juveniles be viewed as part of the community under community policing—that is treated as citizens with a stake in crime prevention and a role to play in making neighborhoods safe—or will they be viewed primarily as yet another problem?

Organizational Outcomes of Community Policing

Policing agencies also have organizational goals and values (e.g., foster open communication, demonstrate respect for one another, achieve a diverse workforce) that have either resulted from, or are receiving special emphasis under, community policing. If departments are serious about trying to accomplish these things, then measures are needed to assess their level of success in doing so.

For example, at this stage in many organizations’ progress, problem solving has been a particular sticking point, especially in terms of organizational support for it (time, resources, training, accountability). In our view, the problem is not so much with finding indicators of problem solving success (see, for example, Eck and Spelman, 1987).
Rather, it is a matter of building the organizational capacity to do problem solving and do it right. It has become almost trite to say it, but it is nonetheless true that officers cannot be told to simply “go forth and solve problems,” or for that matter, “go forth and build trust and develop partnerships.” The organization’s leaders and managers must not only insist on it, but back them up, reward their efforts, and moreover, do problem solving themselves. This is what makes the organizational changes discussed in this chapter so vital.

The introduction to this monograph suggested two simple but important questions to ask in determining whether an organization has indeed transformed:

- Do employees feel they are working for a different organization? And
- What is different about what employees do every day on the job (including managers and administrators, not just line workers)?

Many techniques can be used to find answers to these questions, including employee surveys, analysis of call for service and workload data, document reviews (e.g., job descriptions, performance evaluation criteria), analysis of changes in training curricula, job task analysis, network analysis, and other techniques that place management in a good position to listen to line workers (e.g., involving union representatives in community policing planning; focus groups; management observations and “stop and talks” within the halls and on the street). Listed below are just a few of the questions that might lead to evidence of organizational change to community policing.

- Are new hires now bringing with them some of the key skills and characteristics needed to become part of a community policing culture?
- Do officers fresh from the academy have a community policing coach during field training?
- Does the workforce represent the racial and ethnic diversity found in the community it serves?
- Have written policies and procedures been revised to encompass the community policing vision, values, and practices that have been talked about so much?
• How is the information flow now compared to in the past? Has flattening the rank structure improved this? Has technology been directed toward improving this?

• Are community policing efforts truly being rewarded in meaningful ways (e.g., pay, promotions, recognition, better working conditions, career development opportunities)?

• Do officers really have blocks of time available to devote to analyzing and solving problems? Are they relieved of duties that could be handled just as well by CSOs, investigative aides, or volunteers? Are they being held accountable for how they use uncommitted time?

• Do employees have the knowledge and support they need to go through all of the problem solving steps, or is problem solving pretty much a matter of “identify and fix” (Skogan, 2000)?

• What’s happening with all the data on repeat calls to the same address? Does it contribute to decisions made about which problems to address? Is it used to help assess the effectiveness of interventions?

• What has the department done to meet the training needs of managers, and with what result? Are they now well equipped with the skills needed to manage resources for community policing? To guide, support, and assess the problem solving work of others? To emerge as leaders?

• Are citizens involved, not just in neighborhood watch groups but also at the higher levels of department decisionmaking? Do interest and advisory groups have a formal place within the structure of the department?

• Do citizens file fewer complaints about disrespectful behavior and abuse of force? Are there fewer internal grievances related to sexual harassment and discrimination? Do employees feel the complaint handling process is fair?

• What partnership agreements have been developed with other agencies, and with what effects? Do crime victims feel they are being better served as a result of these alliances?

• Is there political support—internal as well as external—for community policing?

15 Failure to secure political support for community policing, including the support of “change agents” within the department, was described by Jack Greene at NIJ’s 2000 Research and Evaluation conference as the third of “seven deadly sins of change management” (conference transcript).
• Do the news media demonstrate an understanding of community policing as organizational change? Do they present a more balanced view of policing in the community now than in the past?

Comments on Organizational Restructuring

Separate discussions of external and organizational outcomes are more of a convenience than a reality. It will not be possible to tell whether community policing has had an impact on crime and problems if the organization (culture, structure, deployment, human resources) is essentially the same as it was before.

Departments undertaking an organizational transformation to community policing must come to grips with what has been called “the largest obstacle identified in opposition to community and problem-oriented policing—namely the police bureaucracy.” (Greene, 2000). To do this, the department and community leaders who expect officers on the street to analyze problems and build trust will have to do the same themselves at the organizational level.

Moreover, department leaders will need to avoid the same pitfalls in the problem solving process that their officers face. Rather than simply “identify and fix,” they will have to become much more analytical and inclusive, taking a hard look at both the driving forces for change and the barriers to change, within and outside the department.
Trio of Sine Qua Nons: Overriding Factors Indispensable to Transforming the Organization

- Three factors are indispensable to the transformation effort: leadership, information technology, and additional resources.

Importance of Leadership for Change

Leadership is the pivotal force behind transforming an organization through community policing. The national survey in this study found that the chief of police or sheriff overwhelmingly was the primary influence in the move to community policing. Like love, everyone knows that leadership exists, but it is difficult to define. There have been thousands of empirical studies on leadership throughout the past decades, but researchers and theorists have still given no clear and universally accepted understanding as to what distinguishes leaders from non-leaders or effective leaders from ineffective leaders (Bennis and Nanus, 1985).

Leadership used to be thought of as the actions of gifted people who could influence others to act. Throughout history, we think of names like George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill, Martin Luther King, Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, and others. Organizational researchers today think of leadership as an ongoing process, not just the ability to implement a program or idea. Leadership is an ongoing process of change driven by a vision of the leader. The leadership process is intentional (this is where some key traits or characteristics are important) but is also based on opportunity and outside influences.

Leadership must be analyzed within the context of the situation. As Edgar Schein (1992) notes, one of the most consistent findings by researchers and historians is that what leadership should be depends on the "particular situation, the task to be performed, and the characteristics of the leader's subordinates.” Leadership cannot be assessed in a
vacuum. Researchers need to understand and be clear about the leader’s context and relationship to the organization.

Change happens continuously in police organizations. Police organizations typify what Stephen Covey (1995) calls “white-water world.” That is, they are policing in a very dynamic, accelerated world. Consumers are demanding that police organizations reform themselves and meet higher standards. City officials also put pressure on police organizations to “do more with less.” They want community policing implemented today with yesterday’s funding.

In the community policing case studies, we spent some time asking questions and thinking about the leadership process. Unfortunately, this was a minor part of this study. It is clear to us, however, that much more needs to be done in studying the relationship between leadership and the community policing organizational transformation process. Leadership in the police field has not been extensively studied (see Geller, ed., *Police Leadership in America*).

One of the main issues with leadership in the police field, and probably a reason it has not been studied extensively, is the tremendous turnover that occurs. Most studies have found that the average tenure of a chief of police is two to three years. This creates a need for city managers and mayors to groom replacements, something that is done much more often in corporate organizations than in public agencies. Note the smooth transition at General Electric, one of the largest corporations in America, in changing CEOs from Jack Welch to Jeffrey Immelt, handpicked by Welch and the Board of Directors. In announcing the transition, the retiring Welch highlighted his replacement’s key leadership characteristics in a press release:

Jeff Immelt is a natural leader, and ideally suited to lead GE for many years. He brings a keen strategic intellect, a cutting-edge technological background, strong leadership characteristics and a unique set of team-building skills.

In all four of our case study sites, city management was committed to replacing the community policing leaders with new chiefs who would continue to champion this
new change in culture and practice. This is not always the case in police organizations. Often, a new chief comes in with a new philosophy, new ideas, and new programs; and chiefs promoted through the ranks often stick to the traditional ideas and programs, even if change is needed.

Changing the culture is one of the key challenges affecting all parts of transforming an organization to a new way of doing business. Some experts think that this is the CEO’s main job. No lasting change will occur in the work performed by employees unless the culture of the organization changes to promote the work. Edgar Schein notes this in describing the leader as the “creator of culture.” Schein describes the CEO’s process of building the culture in three stages: (1) attract, hire, and promote only people who agree with the change (easier to do in the corporate world than in public service); (2) indoctrinate and socialize subordinates to your new way of thinking and acting (this, of course, takes time); and (3) be sure your own behavior is a role model that encourages subordinates to identify with you and adopt the same values, beliefs, and work ethic. (Schein, 1992)

**Leadership Versus Management**

Many people confuse leadership with management. Most CEOs are managers, not leaders. This may not be such a drawback when the job calls for a control status. Creating rules to guide and monitor the status of ongoing operations is something most CEOs learn from their predecessors. But when an organization is going through major change, leadership as well as management is needed, and leadership is harder to provide.

Leaders focus on doing the right thing; management focuses on doing things right (Covey, 1990). Leaders get the organization going in the right direction; management makes sure it is done efficiently. Leaders enable organizations to adapt to changing circumstances by providing vision and inspiration. In contrast, the most important aspects of management include planning, budgeting, staffing, controlling, and problem solving. Unfortunately, in hiring police chiefs, city officials tend to emphasize management, not leadership.
Leadership and Personality

Many people think that a CEO’s approach to leadership is based on his or her personality—either they have it, or they don't. Farkas and Wetlaufer (1996), in a study of 160 corporate CEOs, found that personality, while significant, was only one of several key traits that determined good leaders. As they note on personality,

In the most successful companies, the COE has scrutinized the business situation, determined what the organization requires from its leader, and chosen the leadership approach that best meets those requirements. Sometimes the approach fits the COE's personality; sometimes it does not. Indeed, our research suggests that some very good leaders repress certain personality traits, or develop new ones they weren't born with, in order to run their organizations effectively. (Farkas and Wetlaufer, 1996: 114)

As also noted by Daniel Goldman, who conducted a survey of over 3,800 corporate CEOs, the more styles a leader exhibits, the better. Leaders who have the flexibility to switch among leadership styles as needed (e.g., authoritarian, democratic, coaching) have the very best business performance (Goldman, 2000).

Are Leaders Born or Made?

Can leadership be learned, or is it like genes? Are you either born with it or not? We may talk about “born leaders,” but most research has found that leadership is in fact a set of practices that can be taught and learned. Kouzes and Posner address this issue as follows:

Contrary to the myth that only a lucky few can ever decipher the mystery of leadership, our research has shown us that leadership is an observable, learnable, set of practices. In over ten years of research, we’ve been fortunate to hear and read stories of over 2,500 ordinary people who have led others to get extraordinary things done. And there are millions more. The belief that leadership can’t be learned is a far more powerful deterrent to development than is the nature of the leadership process itself. (Kouzes and Posner, 1995:16)
Leadership Characteristics

What we found in the case study sites is that the traits of leadership mirrored the key components in the organizational transformation framework described in Chapter 2. Again, this is not based on extensive scientific research and it was not a major aspect of the study. Nonetheless, we feel that based on our research, we can offer these characteristics of effective leaders that help in transforming a policing organization. These characteristics of leadership were present to varying degrees in most of the chiefs who led the case study organizations’ attempts to transform the organizations to community policing.

- **Visionary** (creating the vision). The leader needs to create a vision of where the organization will go and end up. Managers don’t set forth a vision, leaders do. A good leader must have some ability to think into the future about the changing world that police organizations will face.

- **Communicator** (communicating the vision). Good leaders inspire others to share the vision. This requires good communication skills. Some historians have described leadership as a performing art. As we noted under Step B, an effective communicator must always be ready with his or her “stump speech.” However, the case study focus groups also revealed another aspect of a good communicator—being able to listen! We also found that most chiefs in the case study sites created an atmosphere for open dialogue. They were committed to creating democratic workplaces.\(^{16}\)

- **Guide** (developing strategies to achieve the vision). A good leader must be able to provide direction to the organization on how to get there—how to take steps to achieve the vision. A leader is like a compass—always pointing the way. And a leader must be analytical, asking a lot of questions. As Ross Perot used to say,

---

\(^{16}\) As we have noted earlier in the monograph, in the early stages of the change process, leadership styles tended to be more authoritative. The focus was on mobilizing people toward a new vision—making an early impact, taking advantage of an opportunity, and getting things done in a hurry. Later in the process, leadership styles tended to be more democratic—forging consensus; developing relationships; developing future talent. After some initial “righting of the ship,” there was more time for consensus building, planning meetings, etc.
“Anything is possible if you don't know what you are talking about.” The leader needs to create a process for change, not just a philosophy. People don’t follow a philosophy, they follow a leader engaged in a process of change.

- **Consensus builder** (forming a powerful guiding coalition). A good leader must be able to reach out into diverse workplaces and communities to enlist support for the vision of community policing. He or she must be able to form guiding coalitions among diverse and changing populations.

- **Delegator/enabler** (empower others to act on the vision). An effective leader must be able to empower and thereby strengthen employees to act on the vision. Occupational studies have found that workers can cope with repetitive tasks if they feel they have some degree of control over the work. A good leader must create an atmosphere in the organization where workers feel they have control over their jobs. A good leader also absorbs the barbs related to making organizational changes and passes on the credit for accomplishments.

- **Credible** (by far the most important characteristic). The First Law of Leadership: If we don’t believe in the messenger, we won’t believe the message (Kouzer and Posner, 1995). First, a good leader has a basic competency in what he or she is encouraging others to do, so that we can trust their judgment. A variation of the Golden Rule is, don’t ask others to do something you wouldn’t do. Second, a good leader shows the way: honesty, integrity, and fairness in dealing with people (Covey, 1990). Effective leaders show people that they care. They need to remember that it's hard to fire someone who is cutting your lawn.

A good test of effective leadership is to think: If you did not hold a position of authority, would anyone follow you for what you believe in, who you are as a person, and where you want the organization to go? (Thom, 1996).

Police CEOs often complain that they don’t have the perks that the private sector provides to motivate performance. However, these same CEOs may not appreciate the monopoly they have over employees. They have a workforce committed to public policing that has almost nowhere else to go except another police force. But taking this for granted has nothing to do with leadership. To experience the true essence of
leadership, assume that all the people who work for you are volunteers who could leave 
any time they want (Kouzes and Posner, 1995). They are there because they want to be, 
not because they have to be. Under “volunteer” conditions, what would you need to do if 
you wanted these people to perform at high levels? What would you need to do if you 
wanted them to remain loyal to the organization? There are great differences between 
enlisting support and giving orders.

**Information Technology**

Several authors (Davenport, 1992; Bamberger, 1991; Gash, 1991) have discussed 
the need to understand an organization’s information *ecology*, defined as the total 
information environment within an organization. Similarly, in reference to police, 
Sparrow (1991) states, “It is no longer possible to separate organizational strategy from 
information technology strategy.” Unfortunately, that separation is occurring when 
police departments move into community policing without examining their information 
technologies. Nearly a decade after Sparrow’s observation, Dunworth (2000) concludes 
that “although the IT revolution promises an enormous increase in information-
processing capability, the present reality is that too few police departments are utilizing 
that capability effectively.”

Departments must internalize some lessons from 911 and anticipate the impact 
new technologies might have (1) on public expectations, and (2) on the organization’s 
structure and strategies. As a classic policing example of “build it and they will come,” 
911 technology is often indicted on both counts. That is, it has raised unrealistic public 
expectations and has driven organizational strategies and structures. Walker (1995) cites 
not only 911 but earlier technological advances (patrol cars, telephones, two-way radios) 
as evidence that “the availability of [virtually any police] service or remedy stimulates 
demand for that service, thereby altering basic expectations.” Manning (1992) makes the 
point that technologies (communications and CAD systems, for example) are not only 
shaped by organizations but also shape them. And in terms of organizational structure, 
911 technology is seen as a driving force behind centralization of police services in the 
so-called professional era (Maguire, 1997).
Police in the information age cannot afford to ignore the potential for better community policing through judicious use of communications and computer technologies. Some analysts are beginning to place greater emphasis on this. For example, Fleissner (1997) includes “use of technology” as one of 16 areas police should examine in assessing the status of their organization’s transformation to community policing. Cordner recognizes “information” as one element of community policing’s “organizational dimension” (Cordner, 1997), as does Greene (2000). Several others note the importance of information technology to problem solving, a key element in community policing (Lavigne, 1999; Wartell and Greenhalgh, 2000; Rich 1999).

There are many examples of how departments are attempting to use enhanced information technology: mobile data terminals (MDTs) and laptops in police cars, 311 non-emergency call numbers, cell phones, email, the Internet, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and others. Laptops to take reports in the field have not only allowed the officers to remain in the field with the community, but have also expedited the internal information sharing process. Internet and Intranet technology have opened vast avenues for providing data, communication, and ease of use for officers and the community. Information technology is also being used to gather more information on crimes and community problems, analyze information for planning and decision making, and share more information with the public.

The Chicago Police Department was a forerunner in the use of information technology throughout the organization. The Information Collection for Automated Mapping (ICAM) program allows officers to query crime and arrest data and produce individualized crime maps and reports. Officers not only use this information for their own problem solving and investigations, but often share the products at community meetings. Recently, a version of ICAM has been put on the Internet for the public to make their own crime maps. Increasing numbers of law enforcement agencies are providing access to mapping and analytical capabilities to everyone in the organization.
The one question on information technology in this study’s national survey did not render very promising results. Of the 337 agencies responding about the extent to which they had developed information systems to support problem solving, 13.1 percent said they had to a great extent, 30.3 percent to a moderate extent, 34.8 percent to a limited extent, and 21.8 percent not at all. However, there are certainly examples of police involvement in ambitious initiatives to support problem solving by integrating data from a range of agencies and sources (e.g., the NIJ-sponsored SACSI and COMPASS efforts; inter-agency agreements to support GIS).

Use of Technology at the Study Sites

In this project, we were interested in how the case study sites used various information technologies to support an organizational transformation to community policing. All of the chiefs in the case study sites were interested in how new information technologies could be used to their advantage to reach the community, improve internal information flow and efficiency, and free up time for officers to interact with community members. They were also enthusiastic about the use of geo-based systems to support enforcement, prevention, and problem solving; and to help the department illustrate crime and other problems during community presentations. One of the best examples of the use of information technology was in Tempe.

Information Technology Support in Tempe

One of the earliest uses of information technology in the Tempe Police Department was the use of email for internal organization-wide communication. The chief began using email to send messages about community policing. Supervisors used email to communicate with subordinates. A year or two after its introduction, email became the major vehicle for communicating in the organization.

Part of Tempe’s efforts to increase communication with the public centered on developing the capability to capture and share (e.g., on the TPD web site, at community forums) up-to-date information on crime at the neighborhood level. The demand on officers to identify, analyze, and address problems required access to more data, and different types of data, than they traditionally had. Moreover, the move to community
policing was an impetus for the growth of crime analysis and increasing use of geographic information systems (GIS). In Tempe, call for service and crime information was used regularly to identify hot spots and trends and portray them graphically. Combined with rich information gathered through citizen surveys, focus groups, and officer observations, these data informed the development of valuable beat profiles.

Over the years of implementing community policing, the TPD made significant strides in developing its technology for support of community policing. In 1989, the TPD had one crime analyst whose primary responsibilities were preparing summary reports about crime and providing crime-related information to police personnel. The analyst used a computer database called ALERT that contained crime records. No analysis of calls for service was performed at that time.

Later, crime analysts in Tempe were able to capture and portray calls for service and reported crime data at the level of “reporting districts,” with a current total of 407 of these districts for the city. These data became easily accessible through the TPD website in the form of maps, tables, and reports, including specialized reports on crime in multi-family housing areas and mobile home parks, and on specific crime types (e.g., auto thefts). TPD crime analysts were also placed at both the North and South division stations to handle requests for reports from officers, detectives, and managers. At the end of our study period, Tempe crime analysts were using MapInfo software for GIS analysis of call and crime information, but had not yet included data from other sources (e.g., city planning, utilities, business sources, schools, etc.).

The most significant information technology change in the department was the continual shift of analysis from crime to other databases, such as data from the TPD’s CAD system. In fact, officers would frequently request analysis based on CAD data, rather than just crimes. The CAD data offer a richer information source for support of community policing. The TPD remained up-to-date technologically by periodically upgrading its CAD system.

17 This figure includes five new reporting districts in the Northwest corner of Beat 16, which were added in December 1999, after that area was annexed by the city.
Another use of information technology in Tempe was to support resource allocation planning. Crime analysts and patrol management in Tempe factored in calls for service, average response time, miles patrolled, and other data to develop draft schedules for officers. In Tempe as in other departments, there was always the potential that limited time between calls for service and other demands on officers’ time (court appearances, paperwork) might reduce the time available for proactive work in the community. Technology was invaluable in keeping Tempe on track, and the department was able to make about 33 percent of patrol officer time available for community activities and problem solving.

Another major information technology change in the TPD was officers’ use of laptops for completing reports in the field. All officers had laptops, which were issued when officers were recruited; and training was provided on the department’s specially developed input program. The program prompted officers for information needed on each field report, and the responses were automatically stored in the laptops. The reports were then transferred to a central database for crime reporting and analysis.

Information Technology at the Other Sites

Highlighted below are some of the most significant ways in which information technology contributed to community policing in St. Petersburg, San Diego, and Portland.

St. Petersburg

- The Police Information System tracked long-term problem solving efforts and also handled daily incident and activity reports. In 1995, the department began training officers on how to load reports directly from their assigned laptops into the system.
- A 1995 COPS MORE grant for over $1 million enabled the department to install and provide extensive training on portable laptop computers, equipped with MDTs, in all police fleet vehicles. Objectives were to allow officers to “develop a deeper understanding of emerging problems, research existing problems faster, and have access to a database capable of giving them whatever information they needed in the field quickly and accurately” (St. Petersburg Police Department, 1995).
• The department’s Community Problem-Solving Policing Database Management System tracked citizen/juvenile contacts; crime watch, neighborhood association, and church meetings; crime prevention activities; special events; residential/business surveys; service/city referrals; telephone Audix calls; and data on POP projects.

• A voice mail box was provided for every officer

• Several off-site computer systems were installed within community policing “mini-station” areas, including three located at community resource centers.

San Diego

• Cutting-edge crime analysis and GIS software supported both officer problem solving and presentations at community meetings with detailed crime report and map information.

• An informative web page provided monthly statistics on selected reported crimes by neighborhood; and maps and listings showed crime information for the previous month.

• The Automated Regional Justice Information System and the CAD system were used across the organization to identify and analyze problems.

• A Problem Oriented Policing (POP) project application was developed to aid officers in tracking problem solving efforts and resources.

Portland

• Officers used pagers and cell phones to stay in close contact with community members and other city bureaus.

• MapInfo was installed in all precincts, with maps produced on request.

• An Access database was used to organize problem-solving efforts. It was also used for redistricting in 1995.

• Police Bureau and Office of Neighborhood Associations web sites were established.

• The bureau had an open door policy for neighborhood associations to obtain data for problem solving.

Additional Resources

It is our opinion after studying community policing over the past ten years that a police department must supplement its staffing resources in order to undergo a complete organizational transformation to community policing. Community policing places additional demands (e.g., problem solving, attending community meetings, filling out
new forms, etc.) on police agencies without relieving any traditional or previous demands. In fact, the message of the U.S. Department of Justice COPS Office’s Universal Hiring Program is that it takes additional resources to do community policing. We have no knowledge of any U.S. police agencies that have reduced workload (e.g., calls for service) due to community policing, although at some point problem solving should relieve the demands of repeat calls and problems.

In the national survey, we asked a question about the extent to which community policing agencies had written strategic plans for community policing (47 percent did not have one). In the comments section of this question, one theme was repeated many times—the cost of community policing was not adequately represented in the department’s budget.

Two key activities of community policing include engaging the community and solving problems. These activities take time. Early in the community policing transformation process, most police agencies perform these activities with specialized units—special community policing officers. However, as the organizational transformation matures, agencies want to have all officers delivering community policing. To do this, officers need time freed up from the daily routine of their beat assignments. The only ways to do this are to add resources or shift workload to other alternatives.

The initial problem is that many police agencies have trouble making accurate workload projections and keeping existing staffing up to authorized levels. Many police agencies and city officials misunderstand the differences between “authorized” and “actual” police strength.
Exhibit 8 shows the distinction between "authorized" and "actual" staffing for police officers in Tempe (including officers assigned to patrol, investigations, traffic, and other assignments). The TPD, like departments in many other cities, received its authorized staffing annually from the city. However, the authorized staffing was never the actual staffing. Due to turnover (retirements, people quitting, etc.) and sick leave (officers injured on duty/off duty), the actual number of people working every day was often far below what had been authorized. As Exhibit 8 shows, in July 1997, the TPD was authorized 220 officers but had only 194 in a working status. This was a 12 percent difference. In 1998, the city council, for the first time, granted the TPD authority to overhire—to hire 10-15 officers more than they needed to compensate for such attrition. This action brought the department up to actual strength for the first time in years.

Even when actual strength is achieved, most patrol officers still do not have enough time for community policing activities. In a 1990 management study, ILJ found that Tempe patrol officers were spending about 44 percent of their shift time on citizen calls for service. Recommendations were made to increase the number of patrol officers
so that the percent of time spent on calls would be reduced to about 33 percent, allowing more time for community policing activities. Over the ensuing years, the TPD did obtain increases in authorized strength, with the result that the percent of time on calls was reduced.

The patrol planning strategy by the TPD was to divide officers' time among calls for service (33 percent), community policing (33 percent), and administrative duties (33 percent). As seen in the bottom portion of Exhibit 9, in 1990, officers in Tempe spent a great deal of time on citizen calls for service (40 percent). By 1998, officers had successfully decreased their time on calls for service and increased their time on community policing activities.

Exhibit 9. Calls for Service and Percent of Officer's Time Spent on Calls
Thus, to make time for community policing, departments need to be up to full
strength, increase staffing (if possible), and they need to free up officer time for
community policing by reducing the time spent responding to (non-emergency) calls for
service. However, departments also need to take additional steps to provide staffing
alternatives for patrol. The most efficient alternatives are community service officer
positions (CSOs) and volunteers.

**Community Service Officers**

Community Service Officers (CSOs) in each of the case study sites were
uniformed civilians trained to handle non-emergency calls for service (e.g., cold
burglaries, traffic accidents, thefts, auto thefts, etc.). Using CSOs added cost-effective
resources to give more time for officers to do community policing and problem solving.
At first, the utility of CSOs was not readily apparent to sworn personnel in most of the
departments; however, that changed with time. Eventually, CSOs, especially in Tempe,
took on a number of responsibilities including:
• Responding to walk-in reports from citizens concerning non-violent crimes;
• Responding to non-emergency radio calls for service;
• Conducting telephone call-backs to citizens reporting non-violent crimes and completing the appropriate incident report;
• Providing follow-up field assistance to victims reporting minor crimes;
• Assisting in traffic and crowd control;
• Responding to non-injury vehicle accident calls;
• Issuing traffic citations and tickets; and
• Testifying in court.

As of 1997, the authorized strength of CSOs in the TPD was 15. At that time, CSOs were handling between 15-19 percent of citizen calls (the total number of calls was approximately 116,000). This was a significant increase over the 6.6 percent of calls handled by CSOs in 1992.

**Volunteers**

The Tempe and San Diego Police Departments developed excellent volunteer programs. Tempe’s was headed by a full-time coordinator in the department, who was with the program since its inception in 1988 and was the driving force behind its growth to an average of about 105 volunteers at any one time. Since 1988, the volunteer program performed a wide variety of services for the police department. These included administrative assistance for gang/warrant details, assistance in the preparation of cases for prosecution, librarian for the department, neighborhood watch assistant, newsletter editor, records assistant, tour guides, and others. As an example of its effectiveness, the volunteer coordinator documented over 100,000 hours of volunteer assistance to the department in one year.

**Comments on Leadership, Information Technology, and Additional Resources**

Much of the discussion on leadership in this is chapter has focused on leadership at the CEO level. It became clear during the course of the project that (1) leadership at
the top was critical for launching and then sustaining community policing as organization-wide change, and (2) leadership specifically in policing organizations has not been researched extensively. In fact, we believe that as a topic of study the subject is wide open. Moreover, while we have noted the importance of bringing on board managers and other “change agents,” there is much more to be learned and communicated about nurturing and training future leaders at all levels of the department.

Information Technology is an ever-expanding field, and law enforcement can capitalize on various types of IT to be more effective and efficient in community policing. Laptops and mobile field reporting increase data quality and speed to the users while allowing officers to remain in the field. GIS and other analysis technologies increase the identification and understanding of problems and assist in resource allocation. The World Wide Web has opened communication across agencies and jurisdictions and with the public. Moreover, departments are just beginning to tap into the potential it holds for conducting business (e.g., allowing residents to fill out and send reports on minor crimes, download forms and job applications, etc.). As part of the change process, departments will continue to experiment with and adopt ideas for using IT for their officers, analysts, and managers, and to serve customers. Information technology is one more tool necessary in an organization’s transformation to community policing.

Finally, policing agencies intending to transform the organization to community policing will need to carefully plan and project the need for additional staffing. They will also need to evaluate how to use a full range of call handling alternatives and partnerships. CSOs, volunteers, and interns are all worthwhile additions to a department’s staffing plan, providing workable alternatives to sending a patrol officer to every minor, non-emergency call; aiding in community mobilization and partnership building efforts; and engaging in problem solving. Using existing resources efficiently, obtaining grants and other non-traditional funds, and “cutting out the fat” are all means to supplement higher staffing needs.
References


# Table of Contents

**Chapter 1. Introduction**

Organization of the Monograph ................................................................. 1

**Chapter 2. Background on Organizational Transformation and Community Policing: Models and Frameworks**

Community Policing and Total Quality Management .................................... 7
Process of Organizational Transformation .................................................... 8
Organizational Transformation Models ......................................................... 9
Organizational Transformation to Community Policing .................................. 10
Community Policing Frameworks ............................................................... 11
ILJ Organizational Transformation Framework .......................................... 13

**Chapter 3. Research Approach and Methodology**

Case Studies .................................................................................................. 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Methodology</th>
<th>18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case Study Protocol</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Groups</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Case Study Data</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of Case Study Sites</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Survey ........................................................................................... 22

**Chapter 4. Overview of Organizational Transformation at the Study Sites**

Portland, Oregon .......................................................................................... 25
St. Petersburg, Florida ................................................................................. 26
San Diego, California ..................................................................................... 27
Tempe, Arizona .............................................................................................. 29
Comments on Organizational Transformation at the Sites ....................... 30

**Chapter 5. Step A. Creating a Vision of Community Policing: Creating a Sense of Urgency**

A Sense of Urgency to Change .................................................................... 33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exploring the Need to Change</th>
<th>35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for Change</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Appeal</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to Test Community Policing</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Department Leadership: Creating and Communicating the Vision ............ 42
Developing the Vision or Mission Statement ........................................... 43
Comments on Urgency, Opportunity, and Vision .................................... 45

**Chapter 6. Step B. Communicating and Building Support for the Vision**

Department Leadership in Communicating the Vision ................................ 47
City Government Leadership ...................................................................... 51
Techniques for Communicating the Vision ................................................. 53
Promoting Community Policing to the Public ......................................... 54

Table of Contents
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 7. Step C. Developing Strategies to Achieve the Vision</th>
<th>57</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning at the Study Sites</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments on Strategic Planning</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 8. Step D. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition: Building Consensus Toward the Vision</th>
<th>65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifying Community Needs</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Organized Neighborhoods and Interest Groups</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments on Community Participation</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 9. Step E. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: Overcoming Resistance to Change</th>
<th>73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empowering the Workforce</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcoming Resistance to Change</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments on Empowering Others</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 10. Step F. Planning for and Creating Small, Short-Term Successes</th>
<th>81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem Solving in Practice</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments on Problem Solving as a Short-Term Success</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 11. Step G. Institutionalizing New Approaches; Changing the Organization's Culture, Structure, and Practices</th>
<th>87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changing the Culture</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources Policies</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Process, Selection Criteria, and Job Descriptions</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Evaluations and Promotions</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Incentives</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the Organization Structure</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Deployment</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ways of Measuring Success</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Outcomes of Community Policing</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Outcomes of Community Policing</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments on Organizational Restructuring</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 12. Trio of Sine Qua Nons: Overriding Factors Indispensable to Transforming the Organization</th>
<th>117</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Leadership for Change</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Versus Management</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and Personality</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are Leaders Born or Made?</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Technology at the Study Sites</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology Support in Tempe</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology at the Other Sites</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Resources</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Service Officers</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments on Leadership, Information Technology, and Additional Resources</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>